Kennesaw State University

DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University
Doctor of International Conflict Management
Dissertations

School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding
and Development

Fall 12-8-2020

Am I My Brother’s Keeper? : Local and Global Responsibility in the
Digital Age
David Gethings
Kennesaw State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/incmdoc_etd
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Gethings, David, "Am I My Brother’s Keeper? : Local and Global Responsibility in the Digital Age" (2020).
Doctor of International Conflict Management Dissertations. 38.
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/incmdoc_etd/38

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding
and Development at DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctor of
International Conflict Management Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw
State University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.

Running head: AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?

Am I My Brother’s Keeper?
Local and Global Responsibility in the Digital Age

A Doctoral Dissertation
Presented to
The College of Humanities & Social Science
School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, & Development
Kennesaw State University
Kennesaw, GA

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in International Conflict Management

By
David William Gethings
December 2020
© David W. Gethings 2020
Keywords:
Digital Age, Civic Engagement, Responsibility, Human Rights, Populist Nationalism,
Cosmopolitanism

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
Signature Page

ii

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
ABSTRACT
What is our responsibility towards others, both locally and globally, particularly as it
relates to human rights? In a world connected by ever-advancing communications technology
and social media, the question of responsibility takes on a greater significance when individuals
have the capacity to be better informed than at any previous time in history. The digital age
connects people from around the globe, fostering greater awareness about global issues and
creating personal connections, which builds understanding and empathy. Traditionally, domestic
responsibility has centered on civic engagement, such as being active politically and in the
community. International responsibility has largely remained the purview of states through
international law and policies such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine. However, the
digital age has added new dimensions to the concept of individual responsibility, both by
connecting people globally and creating a greater capacity for engagement. New technology
allows for a greater dissemination of information and provides new avenues for engagement both
nationally and internationally. Digital natives, those born into a world in which access to the
internet is a normal part of life, present an ideal population to better understand how digital
connections contribute to feelings of responsibility and how that responsibility is manifested.
Through a survey of 826 digital natives in the United States, this dissertation seeks to understand
how they use social media, consume news and relevant information, and conceptualize and act
upon their responsibilities. The digital age provides a new capacity for the advancement of
human rights through a cosmopolitan responsibility in which we all become the keepers of one
another.
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Chapter I:
Introduction
“Where is your brother?” Who is responsible for this blood? In Spanish literature we have a
comedy of Lope de Vega which tells how the people of the town of Fuente Ovejuna kill their
governor because he is a tyrant. They do it in such a way that no one knows who the actual killer
is. So when the royal judge asks: “Who killed the governor?”, they all reply: “Fuente Ovejuna,
sir.” Everybody and nobody! Today too, the question has to be asked: Who is responsible for the
blood of these brothers and sisters of ours? Nobody! That is our answer: It isn’t me; I don’t have
anything to do with it; it must be someone else, but certainly not me. Yet God is asking each of
us: “Where is the blood of your brother which cries out to me?” Today no one in our world feels
responsible; we have lost a sense of responsibility for our brothers and sisters. We have fallen
into the hypocrisy of the priest and the levite whom Jesus described in the parable of the Good
Samaritan: we see our brother half dead on the side of the road, and perhaps we say to
ourselves: “poor soul…!”, and then go on our way. It’s not our responsibility, and with that we
feel reassured, assuaged. The culture of comfort, which makes is think only of ourselves, make us
insensitive to the cries of other people, makes us live in soap bubbles which, however lovely, are
insubstantial; they offer a fleeting and empty illusion which results in indifference to others;
indeed, it even leads to the globalization of indifference. In this globalized world, we have fallen
into globalized indifference. We have become used to the suffering of others: it doesn’t affect me;
it doesn’t concern me; it’s none of my business!1
In this globalized world, what are the responsibilities of individuals towards their
neighbors both at home and abroad? From political engagement in a democratic society to
human rights atrocities, each person has a responsibility for acting within their capacity to ensure
others can live a life with dignity. Digital natives, those born into a world in which the internet
has been the norm rather than the exception, are on the forefront of this debate as they are
connected to the world unlike any previous generation. The digital world creates a capacity to be
both informed and engaged on issues that impact their communities and others around the world.
Social media connects users, forming digital communities that can spread information, create
friendships, foster discussion, and so much more. This unique confluence of information and

1

Homily of Holy Father Francis: July 8, 2013, Lampedusa, Italy.
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interaction with others creates the perfect universe in which individuals can embrace a
responsibility to act in a way that benefits others. This dissertation examines digital natives in the
United States in an effort to understand how they conceive of and act upon their responsibilities
both within their local communities and the world at large.
This chapter began with words spoken by Pope Francis during a mass on the Italian
island of Lampedusa in 2013, which reflects one of the crises of the modern world. As one of the
first places reached by refugees and migrants coming from Northern Africa and the Middle East,
Lampedusa lies at the center of the debate on who bears responsibility for those whose human
rights are not being protected. Less than three months after this homily was delivered, a ship
carrying migrants and refugees from Eritrea caught fire just off the coast of Lampedusa, killing
366 people (Nelson, 2014). Sadly, this is not a unique tragedy. Since 2014, over 18,000 people
have lost their lives while crossing the Mediterranean in search of a better life (Siegfried, 2019).
After the failure of the international community to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 that
claimed the lives of nearly one million people, the United Nations tasked the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with formulating a policy to address
what happens when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens. Their report, the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), created a doctrine that would provide the international
community the justification to intervene is such cases. However, R2P remains only at the state
level and gives no agency to individuals. Globalization and digital technology may have brought
people closer together than at any previous point of history, yet there remains a fundamental
question: What is an individual’s responsibility toward their community and at the local and
global level? This question addresses both civic responsibility and human rights protections. It
asks, how do individuals perceive and act on their responsibilities for the welfare of others, and
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how do they conceive of these others? With a world made smaller by globalization, what does it
mean to be a neighbor? Has the reference point for compassion and caring changed as a result of
the global digital age? All of these questions center around one fundamental query: am I my
brother’s keeper?
Communication has always played a pivotal role in the protection of human rights. In 1943,
Salek Kuenstler, a Polish Jew, wrote a letter to Sophia Zendler, a Catholic, begging her to look
after his daughter Anita. She agreed, and Anita survived the Holocaust (Kuenstler, 1943). In
1994, during the Rwandan genocide, Tutsis took refuge at the Hotel des Mille Collines in Kigali.
When the hotel came under siege, those in hiding sent faxes and made phone calls pleading for
help. Not a single life was lost at the hotel (Vasagar, 2005). As the conflict in Syria continues to
rage on, Bana al-Abed, a 7-year-old girl living in Aleppo, has taken to Twitter to document her
experiences and plead for help. Many of her tweets have gone viral and reached millions around
the world. Thanks, in part, to her notoriety she and her family were able to escape to Turkey
(Specia, 2017).
As communication technology has advanced, so too have the ways in which it can be used
for the protection and promotion of human rights. The response to the May 25, 2020 murder of
George Floyd, an unarmed black man, by Minneapolis police shows the power of civic
responsibility, civic engagement, social media, and global solidarity. Two surveillance videos
captured parts of the encounter, but the most damning was taken by a bystander, 17-year-old
Darnella Frazier, who captured the eight minutes and 46 seconds which would be the last of
Floyd’s life (McLaughlin, 2020; Nevett, 2020). While completely restrained and on the ground,
three officers held him down, one with his knee on Mr. Floyd’s neck, for the duration of the
video clip. The video went viral and people around the world heard Floyd’s pleas for help as he
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called out for his mother and watched, for eight minutes and 46 seconds, as the people who are
meant to protect him would be the cause of his death. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement,
which began in 2012 to call attention to unequal protection before the law suffered by Black
people, quickly mobilized protests. This event caused a wave of protest demonstrations across
the United States and even in other countries. Protests were held on every continent save
Antarctica, and even drew condemnations from the European Union and African Union (Haddad,
2020). Murals sprang up in places like Kenya and Syria, and on the Bundesliga pitch, Marcus
Thuram took a knee and Jadon Sancho wore a “Justice for George Floyd” shirt (Harris, 2020;
Jeffrey & Miller, 2020). As the protests continue, changes are starting to happen at the state and
local level.
In each of these events, individuals embraced their responsibility to take action during a
situation in which the government failed to do so. The available means of communication were
used to alert others to the situation and call upon them to intercede. As communication
technology has evolved and society has entered the digital age, the ability to spread awareness
about human rights atrocities has become instantaneous. The global community is now aware of
atrocities being committed as they happen. In many cases, individuals now have as much access
to firsthand accounts of human rights abuses as governments or any other entities. This has
created an opportunity for individuals to take a larger role in the international human rights
regime, which was once solely the prevue of states.
As the world becomes more and more connected, where information is transmitted in real
time and communication technology renders distance virtually meaningless, how is it possible
that the response to human rights atrocities is often so lacking? Digital natives, those born into a
time in which access to the internet has been the norm rather than the exception, are in a position
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to reshape global politics. Social media connects people, both locally and globally, in ways that
could never before have been imagined. Traditional notions of national sovereignty are
challenged by the increasingly frequent movements of people, goods, services, money,
information, and, perhaps most importantly, ideas across borders. Yet with all these evolutions,
the world is also witnessing a growing trend of populist nationalism, an ideology that is largely
antithetical to the values of human rights. This confluence of seemingly disparate philosophies
calls for an examination of what it means to be a citizen in the digital age. These circumstances
bring up questions of how individuals are interacting with their local communities and the global
community. Increased access through social media allows for individuals to have contact with
people from around the world, but how will that impact their feelings of responsibility? There are
now more news sources and ways for individuals to both consume, produce, and react to media,
which leads to questions about what types of media digital natives consume, how they consume
it, and the levels of trust they place in various media outlets. There are also more ways for
individuals to be engaged in their community and politics, but how do digital natives act upon
those opportunities? In examining the views of digital natives in the United States, what
responsibilities do individuals bear both within their local communities and the world at large?
As digital natives come of age, their attitudes towards democratic institutions, community,
information, and human rights become increasingly important to consider. To that end, this
dissertation seeks to examine two specific areas of individual responsibility: first, within the
local and national communities that have driven civic life for centuries; and second, the
burgeoning cosmopolitan responsibility for global human rights.

5
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Domestic Responsibility
When Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba released The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes
and Democracy in Five Nations in 1963, it informed a new discussion of what it means to be an
engaged citizen in a democracy. Their classification of different types of citizens (participant,
parochial, and subject) remains a crucial way of understanding individuals in their relationship
with the political community. With more than fifty years passing since the original publication of
The Civic Culture, and massive societal developments brought on by the digital age, a
reexamination of what it means to be a citizen is warranted. Additionally, digital natives deserve
special attention because the trends they set will influence the behavior of future generations.
This dissertation will examine the concept of the civic culture of the digital native
Digital technology has fundamentally changed the way people relate to each other.
Access to information, the ability to communicate in real time, and forums for discussion and
dissemination of ideas are just some of the key tools offered by digital technology. The capacity
for civic engagement in domestic political affairs has been expanded through the use of digital
technology. Campaigning, mobilizing, communication between elected officials and those they
represent, and other forms of political engagement have all expanded online. The internet has
also been used in a variety of ways by populist nationalists the world over. In the United States,
Donald Trump used the internet, and particularly social media outlets such as Twitter, to propel
his candidacy for president in 2016. Opting for a social media campaign rather than traditional
media, his campaign utilized online platforms to set him apart from his competitors. In the
United Kingdom, the successful campaign to leave the European Union (Brexit) was largely
driven by media manipulation by Cambridge Analytica, a company that illegally acquired
Facebook data and used targeted ads and online posts to manipulate public debate (Wylie, 2019).

6
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Both the U.S. and UK examples also faced outside interference from Russia. The power of the
internet has also been seen as a threat to political regimes seeking to suppress social movements.
In 2019, there were complete internet shutdowns or social media blocking in 21 countries
(Woodhams & Simon, 2020). The use, and/or abuse, of the internet by those in power shows the
tremendous impact of technology on governance and society.
Global Responsibility
Along with domestic civic responsibility, digital natives are caught between the
competing ideologies of populist nationalism and cosmopolitan responsibility. Populist
nationalism has been on the rise, embraced by political movements such as Brexit, political
parties like Alternative for Germany, and leaders such as Marie Le Pen (France), Jair Bolsonaro
(Brazil), Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines), Boris Johnson (England), and Donald Trump (United
States). They claim a mandate from a silent majority ignored by a political elite. They are
dismissive of traditional neoliberal political institutions and promise security from an “outside
threat.” Populist nationalists lambast globalization and an increasingly pluralist society, instead
offering a return to an imagined wholesome past. Human rights are seen as unimportant or at
least less important than domestic sovereignty and security.
Much of this comes as a response to the growing connectivity brought about the digital
age and globalization. Countries can no longer isolate themselves from the world around them.
Evans and Newnham (1998) explain the power of change: “Nationalism is often encouraged and
enhanced by contact with foreigners. This contact may take place at the personal level or it may
be mediated via media and other channels. It is clearly possible to manipulate these sentiments to
create a climate of public opinion favourable [sic] to a political leadership faction or party. Once
mobalized [sic] these attitudes are often difficult to control, and a particular leader or leadership
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may become permanently invested with a kind of aura as a result. The term ‘charismatic’ is often
used to identify this fusion of a people’s aspirations in one individual” (pp. 347–348). This fear
of change from without also can be accompanied by a fear of change from within driven by a
belief that powerful elites control a system that the people no longer have control over. This
populist nationalism creates an appeal to the masses through a fear of change.
This increased connectivity can also drive an increased concern for human rights
regardless of where the abuses are occurring (Gregory, 2019; Hankey & Clunaigh, 2013; Peralta,
2018). World leaders and average citizens alike can no longer claim ignorance of atrocities when
videos are streamed live into their homes. Traditionally ethical obligations extend to problems a
person is aware of, which would have been things that happen in a local community. Not only
does modern technology expand awareness, it also expands ethical obligations. Civic obligations,
as discussed by Almond and Verba (1963) along with many others, are usually contingent upon
capacity and there is no logical reason why the scope of those responsibilities should not expand
with an increased capacity.
Thus, the question becomes how digital natives internalize and act upon the forces
driving populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism. If obligation is contingent upon capacity, will
digital natives act upon their increased capacity? Both populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism
make claims upon an individuals’ responsibility, but the onus of responsibility remains on the
individual. By examining the impact of media consumption, personal connections, political
activity, and other such attitudes, this dissertation will explore how digital natives are having an
impact on their world and some of the factors influencing them.
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Human Rights
At the international level, the past half-century has witnessed an increasing expansion of
human rights law. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declared, “All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UDHR, Article 1). This profound
statement is not the first time that human rights had been inscribed, nor would it be the last. The
UDHR did, however, embody the hopes of a post-World War II global community that sought to
create a comprehensive international statement of the rights of all people, regardless of where
they were born. Along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), these three
documents would become known as the International Bill of Human Rights. The UDHR was the
first human rights document to come before the newly founded United Nations. The drafting
committee was comprised of members from nine different countries, with influence coming from
around the world. It was meant as a universal statement of hope, in a world increasingly divided
by the looming Cold War. The UDHR implored countries to recognize these laws and to enforce
them in their own domestic legislation. It also began a movement in the codification of
international human rights law that continues to this day. Yet the struggle for human rights
continues, particularly in the area of enforcement. As Hobbes wrote over 350 years ago,
“Covenants not supported by the sword, are but words and have no strength to secure a man at
all” (1651/2008, p. 113). The originally proposed plan for a United Nations military force never
came to fruition. Regional political alliances such as the European Union, African Union,
NATO, and others have developed military capacities, but much of international law still relies
on agreement rather than enforcement.
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International law follows the liberal tradition of placing responsibility with the state. The
development of the state and society has gone hand in hand with a search for systematic
protection of human rights. In the state of nature, each person acts as his or her own sovereign
and is thus responsible for his or her own protection. Seeking a life less “solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short,” individuals surrender a limited amount of power and personal freedom in
exchange for the benefits of a community. Responsibility for the most basic and fundamental
freedoms passes from the individual to the state, in partial fulfillment of the social contract.
However, when states fail to uphold their end of the social contract, either through inability or
complicity, the burden of responsibility once again must shift. In the wake of genocides in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, massive and systematic abuses of human rights in Burma, Sri Lanka,
and other countries, the United Nations sought to develop a policy that would address these
critical failures. When the R2P Doctrine was released by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, it attempted to address the failures of the
international community to respond to widespread and systematic abuses of human rights. It
declared that when a country is unwilling or unable to protect its own citizens, the burden of
responsibility falls to the international community of states. Despite all good intentions that lead
to the general acceptance of R2P as a guiding principle for the international community, the
world has continued to witness atrocities in places like Darfur, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Burma, Syria and others. Now the digital age, fueled by globalization, presents new
opportunities for a more comprehensive approach to human rights protections through a greater
diffusion of responsibility between the state, the international community, and the individual as
actor, victim, or bystander.

10

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
This dissertation is an endeavor to examine the perceptions and actions of digital natives
in the United States towards civic and global responsibility. The central research question is:
how do the advancements of the digital age impact individuals’ sense of responsibility at the
local and global level and what actions do they take to act on that responsibility? Digital natives
are more empowered and informed than any previous generation to affect change, yet the
question remains whether or not they will embrace that responsibility. The competing ideologies
of cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism are both rising as an impact of globalization and
both lay claim to individual responsibility. Cosmopolitanism focuses on a universal
responsibility to others regardless of where they may live, and views all people as citizens of the
world rather than of any particular nation. Populist nationalism takes an opposing view that
focuses responsibility on one’s nation, the same nation that contributes to individuals’ identities
and to which they owe allegiance. The hypotheses put forth in this dissertation (explained in
detail in Chapter IV), look to address issues of personal relationships with people from other
countries, media consumption, traditional and online political action, and other issues related to
this central idea of responsibility.
Significance
This dissertation seeks to explore these interrelated concepts of civic engagement and
global responsibility as understood by digital natives in the United States. Allison (2013) notes
that “a worldwide embrace of new technology has produced a generation of young people—the
‘digital natives’ aged 13 to 30 —who share a common culture of communication with their
generational peers across borders and across continents” (p. 69). These connections ought to
foster a greater concern for others that extends beyond borders. The digital age has created
capacities to share and receive information, organize, and advocate for any issue, including
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human rights. In an article reassessing The Civic Culture, Sidney Verba (2015) wrote, “The
changes in the world since 1959 include such obvious things as globalisation [sic], the role of
technology, the seeming intensification of ethnic and religious conflict (certainly much more
central than one assumed it would be 50 years ago), as well as the end of the cold war and the
decline of communism. More recently there is the digital revolution and the role of the internet”
(p. 242). In the area of human rights protection, even the relatively new concept of R2P has new
areas of inquiry. There has been a philosophical and normative call for an Individual
Responsibility to Protect (IR2P) put forth by Cronin-Furman and Renee, (2010), Luck and Luck,
(2015), and Pison Hindawi, (2016). Luck and Luck (2015) focus on the individual responsibility
to protect as a key development in R2P policy, but it gives too much focus to influential actors
rather than individuals as a whole. The Individual Responsibility to Protect needs to be
understood as part of what makes someone a good citizen. When civic engagement and
participation are examined, this IR2P must also be included. Citizens have a responsibility to
work within their means to prevent, protect, and rebuild. This may be as simple as voting for
policies that reflect these views or contacting their representatives to urge action. Luck and Luck
(2015) address the problem that an IR2P could contribute to when they note, “the challenge of
sustaining the attention of legislators on atrocity prevention remains daunting, given the link
between distant atrocities and immediate national interests is not always apparent to those
focused on day-to-day legislative and fiscal matters” (p. 247). The IR2P could create this much
needed domestic constituency to keep politicians attentive to these issues.
The impact of the digital age and the opportunities and obstacles it creates need to be
understood. The new opportunities for the role of the individual in protecting human rights are
made possible by the digital age. Individuals have more access to knowledge than at any other
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time in history. Individuals, through avenues such as social media, often have access to much of
the same information that typically would have required professional news services. Live
streaming video is no longer only possible through professional journalism, but now every
person with a camera phone and internet access can stream live images in real-time around the
world. Regardless of whether the individual is on the broadcasting or viewing end, he or she
already has the capacity to take action. Individuals also now have the power to communicate in
real-time with nearly every area of the world. The internet provides access to governments and
societies beyond one’s own physical location. The individual now has the ability to be informed
and engaged, not only on domestic issues, but on global issues as well. “[Democracy], if it is to
live, must go forward to meet the changes that are here and that are coming. If it does not go
forward, if it tries to stand still, it is already starting on the backward road that leads to
extinction” (Dewey, 1946, p. 47). What is yet to be determined is to what level individuals will
embrace these roles.
As alluded to above, this dissertation will also add to the understanding of the modern
conception of the civic culture. Traditional aspects of civic culture, such as political engagement,
in-person clubs and organizations, religious activity, and such, remain, yet the digital age has
greatly expanded how the individual can be engaged in their community. The very definition of
community is even being changed by the digital age. Community is no longer just a geographical
area, but a digital area that is able to exist through online mediums. Individuals can establish
online communities centered around any shared interest or passion. Political engagement is
expanding beyond traditional in-person actions to include online mobilization. Nearly every
single aspect of traditional civic culture is being expanded by the digital age.
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Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. The introduction has outlined a
synopsis of the focus of this dissertation. It has addressed the need for further research into the
topics of responsibility among digital natives, especially as it relates to civic engagement and a
global responsibility for human rights. It has also briefly examined the current global divide
between populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism that will have an impact on how digital
natives internalize responsibility.
Chapter II presents an overview of existing literature in order to create a foundation for
this present research. It is further divided into sections: The Civic Culture; Populist Nationalism;
Cosmopolitanism; and Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect. This establishes the
previous scholarship that informs the development of ideas within this present work. It also
identifies the gaps in the literature from which the research questions for this dissertation were
developed.
Chapter III provides coverage of the digital age and how it has shaped the modern world.
It defines digital natives, and the opportunities and obstacles it presents to them. It also examines
how digital technology impacts civic engagement, populist nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and
human rights.
Chapter IV describes the development of the research methods used in this dissertation. It
goes into detail on the development of the research questions, hypotheses, and plan to examine
those questions. It explains the target sample and survey used to collect information. It also
examines the demographic composition of the sample to better understand where the information
was gathered.
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In Chapter V, Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) is explored in depth and
used to establish how a civic culture is understood. It questions whether or not the typology of
participant, subject, and parochial remain relevant in the digital age. It seeks to develop a model
of the civic culture of the digital native. It also explores how digital natives understand their civic
responsibility. It shows that the civic culture of the digital native is quite robust and goes beyond
the elements found by Almond and Verba, and that with these new avenues of participation come
new obstacles to that participation.
Chapter VI expands the views of digital natives on their responsibility to the global arena,
particularly for human rights. It presents an argument for cosmopolitan responsibility, which,
like the Individual Responsibility to Protect, calls upon those with the capacity to take action to
do so in defense of global human rights. Through the development of a Cosmopolitan/Populist
Nationalism (CPN) scale, this dissertation finds that social media connections and awareness of
global issues are significant predictors in showing a preference for human rights advocacy. The
analysis of survey responses also shows that these concerns are acted upon through a number of
both traditional political actions and new forms of digital action.
Finally, Chapter VII offers concluding thoughts on the overall examination of
responsibility in the digital age. Findings suggest that digital natives have embraced both civic
and global responsibility. Digital natives are taking advantage of the online avenues by which to
be engaged politically, as well as continuing with traditional political action. Digital natives who
show cosmopolitan traits are more likely to be politically engaged, which shows evidence that a
cosmopolitan responsibility for human rights does exist and is being acted upon. The chapter
offers suggestions for further research and provides concluding thoughts on the project.
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Chapter II:
Literature Review
The reinvention of the wheel, being one of the utmost superfluous tasks, needn’t be
heretofore attempted, thus such a Sisyphean quest shall be omitted in exchange for a recitation of
those giants upon whose shoulders this dissertation endeavors to stand. This project seeks to
examine several interrelated concepts. First, is that of the civic culture. At the most basic level,
this asks what the role of a person is within their community, including both rights and
responsibilities. Second, is the current global trend of populist nationalism, both internationally
and within the United States. Third, this dissertation examines the philosophical concept of
cosmopolitanism. Just as the role of the individual needs to be examined in relation to one’s
community, so too must the relationship between the individual and the world. Finally, the
evolution of human rights, humanitarian intervention, and particularly the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) Doctrine will be examined with a particular focus on the duty bearer.
The digital age has changed the way the individual relates to their community, both
locally and globally. The central question of this dissertation is based upon understanding how
individuals, particularly digital natives, understand their responsibility to their community and to
the world. By examining their connections with those from other countries, media use, traditional
and online political action, beliefs about cosmopolitan and populist nationalism ideals, and other
such questions, this dissertation will address what responsibility individuals have to those around
them. Traditionally, the state has been the locus of protection of rights for its people. In
democratic societies, citizens are expected to contribute their voice and preferences to the
political system. Cosmopolitanism extends this responsibility beyond the borders of the state. It
provides a basis for human rights, which are predicated on both legal canon and de facto

16

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
practice. The interplay of these three concepts will be used to better understand the role of
individual responsibility in the digital age.
The Civic Culture
In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. This cross-national study sought to examine the
conditions under which democracy might best be able to flourish. Their study examined “basic
issues in democratic government, especially on the role of ordinary citizens in such governance”
(Verba, 2015, p. 234). In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963) define a typology of
“political orientations—attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes
toward the role of the self in the system” (p. 13). They find that people can broadly be placed
into three categories: Parochial; Subject; and Participant (p. 17). The political culture of the
parochial is one of detachment and an ignorance and/or apathy in relation to the political system.
A parochial does not recognize the role of government in their life and does not participate
within the political system (Ibid, pp. 17-20). The political culture of the subject is one who is
aware of the impact of government and an understanding of the role it plays but takes no direct
action in trying to influence the way in which government operates. They may have pride or
disdain for political conditions, but they do not pursue any avenues that would give voice to
these positions (Ibid, p. 19). Finally, the political culture of the participant is one that both sees
the function and result of government and takes a role in advocating one’s beliefs about such
actions (Ibid, p. 19). These three broad classifications can be used to understand the ways in
which the individual interacts with the political system.
In their study of the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico,
Almond and Verba (1963) reached certain conclusions about each country, and this dissertation
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is interested primarily in the findings on the U.S. One of the unique characteristics of the U.S.
population was a strong feeling of ability to influence government at the local and national level
(p. 186). Even if Americans aren’t exercising their right to vote (or participating in other
traditional political activities) at very high levels, the important aspect is that if they choose to,
they believe they can have an impact. Almond and Verba (1963) also found that Americans are
the largest percentage of people who believe local and national government impact their lives (p.
91), the largest percentage of those who pay “much” attention to political campaigns and the
second most who follow political and governmental affairs regularly (p. 89). Americans were
more willing to discuss politics with others (p. 116) and they believed people should be engaged
in their community more than any other country (p. 169). These are the traits that led Almond
and Verba to call the United States “a participant civic culture2.” These traits are essential for a
vibrant and healthy civic culture, which in turn promotes a healthy and vibrant democracy. Yet
while these traits are critical, they are not static. Civic culture is developed over time, but is
subject to fluctuation, hence the need to reexamine changing circumstances in American civic
culture.
Their world, besieged by the Cold War and countries emerging from colonial rule,
witnessed a clash of ideologies and a stark question of whether communism or democracy would
be the defining political system of the future. The primary means of information at the time of
their writing still came through television and newspapers, which was filtered through
newscasters and editors before being transmitted to the public. Air travel was on the rise, but
international travel was not as accessible as it is today. Minorities faced widespread exclusion
from mainstream society in the United States. The world has undergone a transformation and

2

See Almond and Verba (1963) Chapter 14.
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globalization has created a society of globally connected individuals with a greater capacity to
affect change. While the Cold War has ended, democracy has emerged as the prominent political
system, and the internet has connected most of the world, Almond and Verba’s typology of
citizens within a democracy remains applicable today. It offers a way of understanding how
individuals relate to the political system around them, how they understand their own
responsibility, and how they exercise that responsibility.
Almond and Verba’s work was groundbreaking in both method and scholarship, creating
a long-lasting impression on political science and beyond. They are often credited with the first
cohesive definition of civic culture as: “[a] political orientation— attitudes toward the political
system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system” (Almond &
Verba, 1963, p. 13). Civic culture thus encompasses the role of the citizen within the political
system and the collective attributes of a political society. Noting the importance of the work,
Campbell and Conradt (2015) note, “On rare occasions…a text appears that is sufficiently
influential in its ideas and methods to contribute to shaping the development of the discipline”
(p. 217). Dahlgren (2000) expanded on the work of Almond and Verba and identified four
dimensions of civic culture: (a) relevant knowledge and competencies; (b) loyalty to democratic
values and procedures; (c) practices, routines, and traditions; and (d) identities as citizens (pp.
337-340). He simplified and expanded this list in his 2002 work in which he lists six dimensions
of civic culture: (a) civic values; (b) civic affinity; (c) civic knowledge; (d) civic practices; (e)
civic identities; and (f) civic discussion (pp. 20-23). While all are interrelated and
interdependent, these six items all help to explain the aspects that make up a civic culture. Civic
culture requires a basic acceptance of the system and a belief in its legitimacy (civic values). It
requires a minimum of tolerance and trust of the people around you (civic affinity) and the
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knowledge of how to communicate with others within the community (civic knowledge). It
needs an ability to communicate within the system (civic practices) and a sense of belonging and
personal identification (civic identities). Finally, people need to be able to communicate with
others (civic discussion). These elements all reinforce one another, and should be considered
when examining what civic culture entails.
Many scholars have reexamined various aspects of The Civic Culture since its first
publication in 1963. Conradt (2015) found that in the case of Germany the political culture
changed greatly from the original Almond and Verba study due to things such as the political
cleavages of the Second World War, the Cold War, reunification, and other drastic changes to
the system. Docherty, Goodlad, and Paddison (2001) examined how to foster participation, a key
aspect of civic culture, through various community level structures. Civic culture has been used
to understand local policy development (Reese and Zalewski, 2018), the role of religion (Lam,
2006), how it can help in understanding multicultural organizations (Chen and Eastman, 1997),
and numerous other avenues of inquiry. The Civic Culture has played a major role in many
fields, not just political science. The study, now over a half-century-old, remains one of the
predominant works on civic and political engagement.
Like any study, there were valid criticisms of The Civic Culture. Conradt (2015) and
Pateman (1980) criticized the focus on the Anglo-American style of democracy, especially as it
relates to examining the democratic countries within their study that do not have the same style.
A more pertinent critique to the study, as it relates to this current project, was made by Campbell
and Conradt (2015) who note, “The analysis of participation [was] largely confined to
conventional forms [and] neglected the more direct, confrontational ways in which individuals
participate” (p. 219). Just looking at methods of nonviolent action, Gene Sharp (1973) identified
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198 methods of such action. Political action takes on numerous forms and should not be limited
to the traditional methods of voting, petitions, protests, and others examined by Almond and
Verba. One criticism, or perhaps observation would be more apt, that this dissertation seeks to
address is the lack of an outward focus within The Civic Culture. Almond and Verba focused on
understanding how individuals relate both to each other and to their domestic political system.
Their goal was a better understanding of what made democratic society thrive and what values
contribute to democratic systems. Looking at attitudes towards other countries is not necessarily
a distinct component of democratic society, especially in the past. This oversight will be
addressed in Chapter VI, wherein the question of how individuals feel and act on their
responsibility towards those outside their communities and political systems. It will examine the
extent to which individuals feel a responsibility towards others and what actions they take based
on that.
One of the predominant concerns since the publication of The Civic Culture has been a
fear of decreasing rates of participation in civic and social associations. Putnam (2000) traced the
evolution of this decline and the resulting decrease of public and societal trust over the past
century. While he lists several possible reasons for this, among them is the fact that people have
supplanted civic life with the distraction offered by television and the internet. Some early
studies on internet usage supported these conclusions, such as Shah et al. (2001) who found that
“people’s use of the Internet for social recreation (i.e., participation in chat rooms and game
playing) was consistently and negatively related to their engagement in civic activities, trust in
other people, and life contentment” (p. 149). Borgida et al. (2002) found mixed results from a
study of two American cities in which they examined residents’ views on how technology
impacts society. But Skocpol (1999) reminds us that just because traditional membership in civic
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associations has changed, it does not mean that civic culture itself is in jeopardy. When scholars
see declining numbers in civic organizations, especially since the 1960s, they are often tempted
to view overall civic engagement as being on the decline. Skocpol (1999) notes that since that
time, the U.S. has witnessed the civic enfranchisement of a number of groups (women, African
Americans, the LGBTQ community, etc.) that had previously been excluded from much of civic
life, along with a ‘professionalization’ of associations that draw on permanent staff and financial
donations rather than community engagement. Even Shah et al. (2001) found that certain types of
internet usage, such as information seeking and information exchange, have a strong positive
relationship with social capital and civic engagement.
The changing circumstances brought about by the continuing spread of the internet has
given cause for scholars to question how civic and political life have changed with these new
technologies. In 1996, Gabriel Almond gave an address in which he reflected on some of the
more notable changes that have occurred since the publication of The Civic Culture. Among
those changes, he noted two critical aspects of modern life that have a major impact on civic
culture: the role of technology and globalization. Verba echoed those sentiments in 2015 and
noted that one of the most significant (and inter-related) changes to political culture has been that
“political culture now exists in a global world— of population movements of a communication
revolution. The internet is creating new ways of doing things, new ways of thinking” (p. 237).
Sanford (2007) offers an early testimonial to the changing nature of civic culture in her book,
Civic Life in the Information Age. Through interviews of Generation Xers3 she found that civic
engagement is only in decline if it is measured through the same institutions of previous
generations. With new generations there will be new ways in which they interact with the
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Sanford defines Generation X as those born between 1960 and 1981.
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community, and measures that defined civic engagement for Baby Boomers and the Greatest
Generation are incomplete to understand Generation X and Millennials. Ridlen Ray (1999)
points out, “Technologies offer choice in shaping associational life…Association as a matter of
individual choice, preference, and selection is more truly voluntary than ever before” (p. 324).
Engaging with others, on any level, is now no longer limited to one’s local community with the
internet expanding the reach of the individual. Shah et al. (2005) conducted a study to test the
relationship between the internet and civic participation and found that “Online information
seeking and interactive civic messaging—uses of the Web as a resource and a forum—both
strongly influence civic engagement, often more so than do traditional print and broadcast media
and face-to-face communication” (p. 551). Their results indicate that the internet can be used as a
way to further civic culture. However, it should be noted that this study took place in 2005 with
information collected during the 2000 presidential election. While many already feared the
capacity for distraction, this occurred during the relative infancy of social media. Much of social
media had either just begun or was not even developed yet. LinkedIn debuted in 2002, Myspace
in 2003, Facebook in 2004, Reddit in 2005, Instagram in 2010, and so on. The studies that have
examined civic culture in the modern period of the digital age will be discussed in Chapter III.
The typology of participant, subject, and parochial created by Almond and Verba remains
relevant for scholars in assessing the ways in which the individual interacts with the community.
By understanding how individuals are motivated and what actions they are willing to take,
political movements can focus their efforts on harnessing the strength of its members. This
typology also allows researchers and policy experts to examine both the motivations and actions
of the populous. Finally, this typology needs to be tested in relation to the changes that have
occurred since the 1960s. Communication technologies, in particular, have greatly expanded
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access to information that might eliminate the parochial. While Almond and Verba kept an
inward focus on the individual’s relation to local and national communities, in an increasingly
globalized world that typology can be expanded to include the relationship between the
individual and various aspects of a global community. This dissertation builds upon this typology
in order to address the changes brought upon by digital technology and adds an examination of
how the individual relates to the global community, particularly in the context of promoting
human rights. This provides an opportunity to advance both the understanding of civic culture
and identify opportunities to advance engagement both domestically and internationally. In order
to understand this relationship of the individual to the greater global community, it is critical to
first examine the growing trend of populist nationalism and then cosmopolitanism, a field of
philosophy, which has asked that question for millennia.
Populist Nationalism
Populist nationalism is the growing phenomenon of identity built upon one’s own
community and an affinity for leaders perceived to speak to their shared problems. Ignazi (2010)
notes, “These demands and needs converge in the defense of the natural community, at national
or sub-national levels, from alien and polluting presence—hence racism and xenophobia—and
respond to the identity crisis produced by atomization at the societal level, by globalization at the
economic level, and by supra-nationalism at the political level” (p. 2). While nationalism and
populism have been used by both sides of the political spectrum, populist nationalism has taken
on a distinctly rightwing orientation (Askola, 2017; Carpenter, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018; HafnerBurton et al. 2019; LePore, 2019). Dahlgren (2018) explains, “Right-wing populism has to a
significant degree managed to mobilise [sic] an array of deep grievances—economic, social,
cultural—that are often legitimate. Populism in a sense reflects the failures of democratic ideals,
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yet it also establishes discourses that set an abstract ‘us’—‘the people’—against ‘them,’
variously the government, liberal politicians, mainstream media, intellectuals, experts,
immigrants and so on, who are seen as the root of the problems” (p. 24). Populist nationalism
promotes unity within a shared commonality, in this case the state, which acts as a unifying force
against these threats.
As the term implies, elements of nationalism and populism combine to form a movement
aimed at a focus on domestic policies built on popular rhetoric. Like most theories, nationalism
does not have one simple definition. David Miller (2008) lists three beliefs as the main
components of nationalism: 1) “…nations are real: there is something that differentiates people
who belong to one nation from those that belong to its neighbors; 2) …membership in a nation
has practical implications: it confers rights and imposes responsibilities; and 3) …nationhood is
politically significant” (pp. 529-531). Nationalism is an ideology often associated with the state,
but the state is merely the existence of political institutions that provide a formal structure and
international legitimacy to the nation. Nations are often geographically bounded, but the
demarcations of a state do not necessarily represent those of a nation. Populism similarly has a
number of understandings. Kaltwasser et al. (2017) provide a very thorough history and
description of populism and its recent scholarship, noting that most research has focused on
populism as a cultural, economic, ideological, or strategic force. Canovan (2008) focuses on how
populism attempts to tap into the legitimacy offered by the people. Populism appeals to the
masses, who feel left out by elites who do not share their values. It emboldens the people with a
greater sense of being stakeholders in the movement compared to a feeling of being a bystander
in traditional politics. Populist movements from both the left and right have drawn legitimacy
through a claim of widespread support amongst the people. Populist nationalism draws on
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widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo perceived as caused by elites (NegreponiDelivanis, 2018). It then offers a solution to the ills of modern life (often blamed on
internationalism, foreigners, and other outsider elements) through isolationism, appeal to
traditional values, and promises of a renewed focus on domestic issues.
Efforts to understand the characteristics of this growing trend of populist nationalism in
modern global politics have produced a litany of descriptions including anti-globalist, nativist,
isolationist, and even racist and fascist. Largely the product of rightwing ideologies, this trend
has found a voice on nearly every continent. Leaders such as Donald Trump in the United States,
Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, Geert
Wilders in the Netherlands, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines,
Vladimir Putin in Russia, and others, have shown the growth and power of this movement.
Franke and Guttieri (2019) note that leaders such as these, and events such as Brexit “exemplify
the mounting public discontent by those who feel left behind by the global economy,
technological change, and growing inequalities” (p. iv). This phenomenon is also a growing part
of academic focus with studies on Finland (Askola, 2019), Argentina (Besoky, 2014), China (Xu,
2001; Yu, 2014), and of course, the United States and Europe (Johnson & Frombgen, 2009;
Shattuck, 2017), among many others.
One of the main drivers of populist nationalism is the reaction to an increasingly
globalized and connected world. Digital technology connects people in ever expanding ways, the
movement of goods and people across borders occurs with increasing frequency, and the actions
of neighbors have greater impacts on others. Fukuyama (2018) builds on the work of 19th century
theorist Ferdinand Tönnies’ idea of the conflict between identity formed through Gemeinschaft
(village community) and Gesellshaft (urban society). He writes, “The psychological dislocation
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engendered by the transition from Gemeinshaft to Gesellschaft laid the basis for an ideology of
nationalism based on an intense nostalgia for an imagined past of strong community in which the
divisions and confusions of a pluralist modern society did not exist” (Fukuyama, 2018, p. 65). If
nationalism pushes for Gemeinschaft through an active opposition to all things Gesellshaft, then
it creates an ideology of isolationism, antithetical to cosmopolitanism.
Populist nationalism has manifested in the United States with the rise of President Donald
Trump and his platform of America First. His actions have all the hallmarks of traditional
populist nationalism: a claim of an unresponsive government run by elites, casting a critical
media as an enemy of the people, challenging long established international alliances, unfounded
claims of persecution by political rivals, appeals to egoism, claims of an existential threat posed
by “outsiders” (undocumented immigrants and refugees), and a pledge to be the only person
capable of Making America Great Again. Guttieri (2019) examines the impact of Trump’s
policies (what she describes as exclusionary populism) and warns, “Populists seeking to
consolidate power are quick to identify enemies and opportunities to change the rules of the
game in their favor, including diversionary war” (p. 18). Trump’s foreign policy has challenged
the role of the United Nations and NATO, which has led to conflict within his own
administration. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis resigned, stating, “One core belief I have always
held is that our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and
comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships. While the U.S. remains the indispensable
nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without
maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies” (Mattis, 2018, p. 10). Rabel
(2019) places this manifestation of populist nationalism within the historical context of American
populist and nationalist movements, which he views not as an “idiosyncratic aberration” but
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something with “deep roots in American politics” (p. 10). Aspects of populist nationalism, as it
relates to Donald Trump and American policy has received increased focus (Kivisto, 2017;
Pierson, 2017; Skonieczy, 2018; Stone & Christodoulaki, 2018, Muller, 2019) which is likely to
only grow further.
Nationalism can be a reaction to the digital age because it brings images, sounds, and
ideas from around the world to every village, hamlet, and community with access to the internet.
The connectedness driven by the digital age has fostered greater bonds between people
regardless of distance, thus promoting cosmopolitan values, but the tensions of nationalism and
cosmopolitanism become more evident. De Matas (2017) explains the conflict between
cosmopolitanism and nationalism as seeming to represent two diametrically opposed forces,
explaining, “Where the latter works to create a structure based on a shared territory, uniformity,
and sameness, the former attempts to tear down such structures” (p. 23). Nationalism places a
premium on territoriality and the state and assigns a value to it. Warf (2012) explains, “If the
primary emotions associated with nationalism are pride and fear, the primary emotions
associated with cosmopolitanism are empathy and respect” (p. 281). In many ways, nationalism
is incompatible with cosmopolitanism because of competing responsibilities. Should the
individual be beholden to those who live in the same territory or does a shared humanity call for
a global reach? Scholars such as Pavel (2009) and Brennan (2001) have suggested that the two
ideologies are simply irreconcilable.
Cosmopolitanism
The principal basis of cosmopolitanism is the belief that people are part of a global
community, bonded not by geographical boundaries, but rather by a shared humanity. “In its
most basic form, cosmopolitanism maintains that there are moral obligations owed to all human
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beings based solely on our humanity alone, without reference to race, gender, nationality,
ethnicity, culture, religion, political affiliation, state citizenship, or other communal
particularities” (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 1). Cosmopolitanism claims a responsibility and shared
identity for all people, not just those who happen to be born into a certain location or group. The
lottery of birth, the random process that places a child into a particular set of circumstances,
through no merit or decision of the child, is no basis for defining a moral obligation. However,
this lottery has developed into isolationism, tribalism, nationalism, religious zealotry, and other
ideologies that promote one group over another. Cosmopolitanism seeks a redress for this
through the promotion of a common identity and shared responsibility.
The term cosmopolitan has been credited to Diogenes (known as Diogenes the Cynic and
Diogenes of Sinope), a Greek philosopher who was asked where he was from and replied, “I am
a citizen of the cosmos” (kosmopolites) in the 4th century BC (see Hasen, 2009). This concept,
however, can be traced to many other times and places. The belief that we are all citizens of the
world with a shared responsibility for all can be found in ancient Egypt under the rule of pharaoh
Anhnaton (1526 BC), and other writings throughout the ancient world by the “Phaeacians,
Hebrews, Chinese, Ethiopians, Assyrians, and Persians” (Brown & Held, 2010, p. 4). The South
African term Ubuntu (loosely translated as: I am because we are) is based upon the idea of a
universal connectedness that makes people responsible for one another. It defines and identifies
the individual as a relation to the greater community, rather than a geographical position.
Graness (2018) offers Ubuntu as both a critique and addition to cosmopolitanism by removing
the idea of boundaries that create the label of “others” and bringing the focus to a rational
relationship with all humanity. “Thus, individual human beings are what ultimately matter; they
matter equally, and every human being is the ultimate unit of concern for everyone—because,
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ultimately, we affirm our humanity by recognizing the humanity of others” (Graness, 2018, p.
404). In discussing the political philosophy of Nelson Mandela in post-apartheid South Africa,
Davids (2018) writes, “Mandela’s conception of cosmopolitanism is inextricably linked with
Ubuntu—you are human because of others, which connects the individual and society in
reciprocally responsible ways” (p. 28). While it is easy to focus on the idealist conceptions of
Ubuntu, Danso (2017) notes that “the centrality of interdependence to the concept of ubuntu [sic]
means that other members of society are linked to belligerents and affected directly or indirectly
by conflict” making it critical in the understanding of conflict management (p. 88). The tenets of
cosmopolitanism can be found in nearly every culture, showing the universal nature of the belief
that people are connected through their humanity rather than by the other bonds which create
both an in and out group.
Perhaps the most prolific cosmopolitan writer is Immanuel Kant, who authored, among
numerous other works, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose in 1784 and
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch in 1795. In Universal History, Kant explains the notion
of unsocial sociability, which is a conflicting set of desires that leads to societies governed by
law. This unsocial sociability is a contradictory desire for individuals to live within a society
whereby they might realize their talents and security while also wanting to live in isolation so as
to be governed by no one but themselves. In order to balance these tensions, laws are instituted
so that the competition between people is enough to foster innovation and growth but not so
much as to allow for violence. (See Propositions 4 and 5). States, too, are subject to this
antagonism between one another, and they will seek to develop systems that allow for the
greatest benefit for their citizens. (See Propositions 7 and 8). Human nature drives this balance
between freedom and competition at the individual and state levels, and “this encourages the
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hope that, after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of
nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realized as the matrix within which all
the original capacities of the human race may develop” (Kant, 1784/1991, p. 51). Thus,
cosmopolitanism is not only a preferred system, but also one that is driven by a rational human
nature.
Kant builds on this theme in Perpetual Peace in which he sets forward a number of
conditions that would create a more peaceful world. Among those conditions is the need for what
Kant calls a cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality (See Third Definitive Article). His
justification lies within the claim that all people have a “right to the earth’s surface which the
human race shares in common” (Kant, 1795/1991, p. 106). The ability to travel the world
unmolested brings numerous opportunities for building understanding and exchanging ideas.
Isolationism breeds insecurity and a fear of the other by limiting interaction among diverse
populations. Kant’s universal hospitality promotes dialogue and interaction, leading to more
cosmopolitan communities.
The tenets of cosmopolitanism also provide the rational foundation for human rights and
the responsibility to promote and protect those rights (Lamb, 2019; Moyn, 2014). Prominent
modern cosmopolitan theorists such as Seyla Benhabib (2002, 2006, 2009), Kwame Anthony
Appiah (2006), David Miller (2007), Jurgen Habermas (1995, 2007, 2008, 2010) Daniele
Archibugi (1998, 2009), David Held (1991, 1997, 2003, 2004), Ulrich Beck (2002, 2005, 2008,
2011), and others have built upon the tenets of cosmopolitanism, especially as it relates to
international law and global justice. Benhabib (2004) explains her connections to Kantian
Cosmopolitan, saying, “I follow the Kantian tradition in thinking of cosmopolitanism as the
emergence of norms that ought to govern relations among individuals in a global society…These
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norms are neither merely just moral nor just legal…They signal the eventual legalization and
juridification of the rights claims of human beings everywhere, regardless of their membership in
bounded communities” (p. 119). This focus on legal norms promotes adherence to a human
rights framework that protects individuals without the need for some sort of global government.
Warf (2012) explains cosmopolitanism as “an ethical, moral, and political philosophy that seeks
to uncouple ethics from distance, arguing that each person is bound up with, and obligated to,
humanity as a whole” (p. 272). Cosmopolitanism is not confined to the tenets of philosophical
consideration and normative formulations. The very existence of the human rights canon
presupposes the existence of a global commonality shared by all people, regardless of national
citizenship. Cosmopolitanism is not only a justification of human rights, but it also provides the
reasoning for why each individual has a responsibility toward them. Through greater interaction
and access to those from around the world, individuals ought to develop greater compassion and
care for people globally. “These Enlightenment principles have to do with the belief that
individual freedom (human rights) is a reflection of the ethical principle promoting mutuality
(the ethical responsibility to treat people the way we ourselves would want to be treated), the
vision of a League of Nations, the vision of Perpetual Peace, and the claim that the common
good is shaped in public discourse (an active civil society)” ( Miller, 2012, p. 10).
One of the main criticisms voiced against both cosmopolitanism and the leveling effect of
globalization, is the perceived threat to state sovereignty. Kant (1795/1991) explicitly promotes
the idea of a global federalism of independent states and even warns against the “impact as the
government increases its range and soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness,
will finally lapse into anarchy” (p. 113). Kant’s cosmopolitan purpose is not the elimination of
state sovereignty but rather a global unity promoted through a shared vision of rights. Some
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scholars have addressed this perceived schism between cosmopolitanism and the nation state.
Peterson (2011) sums up this separation, stating, “At the heart of the debate has been the extent
to which the nation-state remains the main location for the practice of citizenship” (p. 423).
Peterson and others4 have responded to this perceived incompatibility by developing a
“republican cosmopolitanism.” Peterson (2011) notes four tenets of republicanism that can also
apply to cosmopolitanism: “civic obligations, a commitment to the common good, civic virtue,
and deliberate forms of democracy” (p. 423). “Republican cosmopolitanism […] can be
understood as an attempt to ensure that cosmopolitan ideas […] incorporate an awareness of the
importance of civic obligation and citizen sovereignty within political institutions and practices
beyond the nation-state” (Ibid). Miller (2007) takes a similar approach of promoting global
justice through the existing framework of states, but also adds that each person bears a
responsibility for the actions (both current and historical) of that state.
However, while not dealt a deathblow by cosmopolitanism, the once sacrosanct principle
of sovereignty no longer provides an absolute license for world leaders to do as they please
within their own borders. Traditionally, the actions of a sovereign upon his or her citizens was
seen an internal matter, not subject to interference by other states. The power of a sovereign was
absolute, unless the actions crossed an internationally recognized border. The world, as seen by
Thucydides, treated rights as a luxury afforded to only the powerful. “Right, as the world goes, is
only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must.”5 The Social Contract established sovereignty as an agreement between the
government and the people, that latter of whom could abolish said contract if the government
failed to fulfill its end. The Social Contract placed a limit on sovereignty from within the state by
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Of particular note are Held, 2003; Bohman, 2001; Hudson, 2006, et al.
Thucydides “Melian Dialogue”
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ensuring an unprotected society had a legitimate right to revolt. Sovereignty was further eroded
when the international community adopted the R2P Doctrine and declared that legitimate
intervention could take place when a state was unwilling or unable to protect its own citizens.
Even prior to the adoption of R2P, the right for collective action to be taken against a sovereign
nation has been recognized in supranational treaties such as Chapter Seven of the Charter of the
United Nations (1945) and Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000).
Sovereignty has been limited, both from within and without. Now, the digital age has eradicated
state borders in terms of the flow of communication and information.
Yet the role of the state should not (and cannot) be ignored. The state is still the primary
source of legal institutions, both domestically and internationally, and remains a vast source of
economic and military power. The state ought to be an instrument for the realization of
cosmopolitan responsibilities, rather than a target of consternation. The spread of cosmopolitan
views is not antithetical to the existence of the state. Ypi (2008) proposes an “ethical
universalism and political particularism” in which human rights, and their accompanying
responsibilities, can be treated as universal, without requiring a global state to enforce them (p.
51). Ypi’s (2008) “statist cosmopolitanism” upholds the political unit of the state as a necessary
stable unit of social organization while also promoting cosmopolitan values within that system.
She goes on to note:
Political obligations are likely to be effective only if they are preceded, and
followed, by an attempt to establish cultural as well as a political hegemony.
However, this attempt to homogenize the public sphere is necessarily linked to a
historical sense of the collective, to the self-understanding of citizens as members
of a community of fate, to justified ways of reasoning and debating, to a national
literature, to dominant religious books, legal traditions and historical institutions
(Ypi, 2008, pg. 68).
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Stevenson (2005) offers the view that “A cosmopolitan political community should be based
upon overlapping or multiple citizenships connecting the populace into local, national, regional
and global forms of governance” (p.47). The state is but one level of social relationship and can
lay no reasonable claim to responsibility over other relationships. Cosmopolitanism is not meant
to necessarily replace the state, but rather to expand the traditional relations that develop within
the state. Globalization and digital technology have ways of creating connections that were
previously only formed through the common identity of the state. Yet this is not the sole path to
realizing such a shared identity and values. Face to face relations, religion, nationality, shared
history, and other commonalities have provided the basis for such relations throughout history.
For this dissertation, it is essential to look at the state as a means by which individual
responsibility is manifested, both domestically and internationally. While domestic responsibility
has largely been covered in the above section on the civic culture, cosmopolitanism still has
something to add. Engagement in civic discourse is the hallmark of any democracy, and
cosmopolitanism acknowledges the importance of public deliberation in which ideas may be
debated and exchanged. Benhabib (2009) describes democratic iterations as “a complex process
of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims are
contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and
political institutions as well as in the associations of civil society” (p. 37). Public discourse, the
sharing and debating of ideas, is what Kant sought for his cosmopolitan right. In any democratic
society, such debate is critical, and it can also be used to further connections both locally and
globally. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan values within human rights have been internalized
within the laws of many states. The codification of human rights in domestic politics has been
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examined by scholars such as Eriksson, 2013; Ngwena, 2016; Sloss & Sandholtz, 2019;
Simmons, 2009; Squatrito, 2016; and others.
The state also serves as a means by which individuals can fulfill their responsibility for
the promotion of human rights globally. From the Treaty of Westphalia to modern times, the
state has been the primary political actor in relation to the protection of its society, and human
rights have been an expected protection guaranteed by the state. In 1948, the United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration for Human Rights (UDHR) which proclaimed that the
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The supranational
organization of states used the UDHR to enshrine the dedication of all states to the protection of
human rights. The importance of the individual can also be found in the United Nations Charter,
which opens, “We the people of the United Nations…” rather than a preamble dedicated to the
states of the world. Habermas (2010) observes, “Human rights constitute a realistic utopia
insofar as they no longer paint deceptive images of a social utopia which guarantees collective
happiness but anchor the ideal of a just society in the institutions of constitutional states
themselves” (p. 476). The legal recognition of human rights and the enforcement of those rights
are made possible through state capacity.
Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect
The penultimate manifestation of state capacity to promote and protect human rights thus
far has come to fruition within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine. It is the latest in a
long history of attempts to achieve a universal norm of humanitarian intervention6. Although
R2P is less than two decades old, the journey from philosophical and moral principles to
For a detailed history of humanitarian intervention, see Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian
Intervention by Gary J. Bass.
6
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international practice is both long and continuous. Traditional political thought believed the
biggest threat to human rights would come from a force from outside the states, such as interstate
war. The Pact of Paris (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War) of
1919 sought to address threats to humanity. While often naively viewed as a failure, the Paris
Pact achieved a rare near universal consensus, and showed the power of international law. While
it failed in eliminating war, it would set a legal precedent that force was no longer sufficient for
establishing “right.” As Hathaway and Shapiro (2017) note, “Might still produced military
victories. But it could no longer provide lasting legal victories” (p. 316).
However, the events of the latter half of the 20th Century would make the world realize
that human rights were also threatened by the state itself. Between April and July of 1994, the
world sat idly by while between 800,000 and one million Rwandans were brutally murdered by
their neighbors with government support. Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, and genocide in
Timor-Leste and Cambodia, led the international community to reevaluate the absolute right of
sovereignty in the state system. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) released the report Responsibility to Protect. It emphasized the ideal that
sovereignty exists as a responsibility, and the state only maintains legitimate sovereignty when it
upholds the human rights of its citizens. If and when the state is unwilling or unable to provide
such protection, the state can no longer claim sovereignty, and the burden of responsibility for its
citizens falls to the international community. While the R2P Doctrine has been enshrined in the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the hope that atrocities like Rwanda, Yugoslavia,
Timor-Leste, and Cambodia would never again happen while the international community stood
idly by, has still remained an elusive dream. Although R2P is still in its infancy, the world
continues to witness the targeted annihilation of the people of Darfur, the Rohingya in
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Burma/Myanmar, and Syrian civilians. These failures of the international community underscore
the difficulties facing a true realization of human rights.
Numerous scholars (Badescu, 2014; Bellamy, 2009; Cooper & Voinov, 2009; Doyle,
2016; Evans, 2008; Hilpold, 2012) have covered the evolution of R2P, so only a cursory
summary will be provided here. The R2P Doctrine, as originally written, lays out three core
pillars: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.
These three interrelated concepts form a doctrine which “directs our attention to the costs and
results of action versus no action, and provides conceptual, normative and operational linkages
between assistance, intervention and reconstruction” (ICISS, 2001, p. 17). The R2P Doctrine is
meant to justify international action when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its own
citizens.
Norms, especially at the global level, take time to spread. Just as the Paris Pact helped to
establish a new international legal framework, R2P is contributing to a new global awareness of
how human rights are violated and how they may be protected. Archarya (2013) notes, “the
creation of international norms is never a one-way or a one-step process” (p.479). Additionally,
Badescu and Weiss (2010) caution that norm diffusion can be helped or hindered based upon the
use, or misuse, of values such as R2P. Gareth Evans, the co-chair of the ICISS, explains,
“Between 2005 and 2011 [the United Nations Security Council] had in fact passed only four
resolutions mentioning R2P…it had—by early 2017— endorsed over fifty other resolutions
directly referencing the responsibility to protect” (2017, p. 247).
Brown (2013) cautions against the view that many have taken towards R2P, that is exists
(or should exist) in a non-political realm as “an approach that all men and women of good faith
should identify with” (p. 425). Idealism is often couched in a higher moral authority which is
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hoped would be universally embraced by all rational beings. Whether or not the idealists are
correct, the policies still need to function within a system of realpolitik. Brown goes on to say,
“the future of Responsibility to Protect depends on its ability to transcend its anti-political
ambitions and become part of the framework of world and national politics, such that states may
define their ‘national interests’ as encompassing a concern for the victims of crimes against
humanity” (p. 442).
The enormity of what is proposed within R2P has naturally led to some concerns. Spain
(2014) argues that humanitarian intervention must follow the purposes of both international law
and sovereignty, which are the pursuit of a meaningful and lasting peace. Haslett (2014),
Sussman and Nicolaidis (2016), and others have warned that a misuse of the doctrine could lead
to it being viewed as another tool of the strong to dominate the weak. Other aspects of R2P have
also been questioned such as the role of regional organizations (Kingah & Seiwert, 2016), the
limitations on what rights it actually protects (Magnuson, 2010), and its conformity with existing
international law (O’Donnell, 2014).
For this dissertation, R2P is used as an example of an evolving international norm aimed
at the protection of human rights. While its development, application, and shortcomings are all
worthy of scholarly attention, they are beyond the scope of this work. The main fault within R2P
in this context is that it seeks to solve a problem at the same level in which the problem has been
created. Namely, it seeks to provide a redress for state shortcomings by appealing to the
international community of states. This is by no means a fatal flaw, but simply an area that has
room for improvement.
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Discussion
One of the central questions within civic engagement, populist nationalism,
cosmopolitanism, and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, is that of responsibility. What is the
individual’s responsibility within the polis and within the larger global community? Almond and
Verba (among others) and the ideology of populist nationalism asks the former question, and the
latter has been the central question of cosmopolitan philosophy for centuries. The R2P Doctrine
asks about global responsibility but keeps the question at the level of states rather than that of
individuals. The interplay of civic culture, populist nationalism, cosmopolitanism, human rights,
and the R2P Doctrine is an area ripe for exploration, especially with the changes brought about
by the digital age. In an ever-globalizing world, the issue of individual responsibility must be
examined as it relates to domestic issues as well as international. We can no longer pretend that
geographical distance can prevent the issues of one society influencing nearly all others. While
many of these areas have been explored individually or in conjunction with another area, this
dissertation seeks to incorporate aspects of each of them.
Brooke Ackerly (2018) proposes the idea of just responsibility, which she describes as “a
human rights approach to taking responsibility for injustice itself in ways that transform power
inequities by connecting those taking responsibility to each other” (p. 26). This entails not only
addressing the injustice itself, but also its root causes and the conditions in which it is created.
This is appealing for many reasons and applies to the heart of this dissertation, which seeks to
understand how individuals perceive their responsibilities. Responsibility, whether local or
global, requires the individual to accept their role in the system that either allows injustice or
fails to act. All people have some responsibility for human rights, such as helping a neighbor
when possible, ethical shopping, raising awareness, voting, all the way to those who have greater
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power taking greater actions. The power of the individual citizen and the power of the political
leaders are very different, but they all have responsibility to act within their capacities.
Furthermore, Ackerly (2018) calls for connecting people, which is one of the main strengths of
digital technology. Individuals can both learn about global human rights abuses and network
with others for the purpose of addressing these abuses. This addresses human rights abuses at the
root of the problem, rather than just addressing the manifestations of abuse. Another way digital
technology is able to enhance the efficacy of collective action is to provide a central forum for
organization and debate. Van Stekenburg and Klandermans (2017) found that the informational
and logistical support provided by formal organizations during collective action can now also be
provided by social media if those organizations are not present or inadequate. LeFebvre and
Armstrong (2018) point out, “Because social media platforms allow for speedy information
dissemination and low-cost forms of communication, they have been utilized by many groups
hoping to mobilize citizens for physical engagement in protest events. Additionally, social media
platforms serve as an outlet to those unable or uninterested in participating in physical protests
allowing them to remain engaged with the subjects and their broader social implications” (p. 12).
The literature thus far provides a solid foundation for the expanded examination of these
interrelated concepts. The Civic Culture was groundbreaking scholarship, but in the fifty-plus
years since its publication the conditions of the world have changed. It also was limited in its
inward-looking scope that examined the individual’s role in domestic politics but did not inquire
about any global outlook. As the world has gotten smaller, responsibility ought not be confined
to one’s local community. This shrinking world has also led to the competing ideologies of
populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Those who feel threatened by globalization have
sought out a return to what they perceive as a simpler time with certain moral and ethical
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implications. Political movements have drawn on this discontent. Conversely, those who
embrace a growing connectedness have to consider what responsibility these new conditions
entail.
The world has also changed with respect to conflict. Whereas the twenty-first century
witnessed some of the worst conflicts occurring between states, the new century has seen a move
towards more intrastate conflict (Waller, 2001). Human rights and international law now have to
address conflict that takes place within a state by actors not always clearly defined as
belligerents. Traditional thought focused on a concern for the horrors inflicted on civilians as a
byproduct of war between states, but now much of the threat comes from the state itself. When
looking specifically at the gravest of human rights atrocities, the Responsibility to Protect was
meant to address this previously ignored threat. However, among the flaws with R2P is the
expectation that problems within a state should be solved through the collective action of states.
When connecting these concerns with a greater cosmopolitan responsibility, new opportunities
emerge to aid in the protection and promotion of human rights.
At the forefront of these changes driven by globalization and digital technology are
digital natives, those who have come of age when the internet has been the standard rather than
the exception. Digital natives are poised to reshape the changing world. The central research
question is, how do the advancements of the digital age impact individuals’ sense of
responsibility at the local and global level and how do they act upon that responsibility?
Responsibility is a normative question, so rather than address the various ethical theories on it,
this project will seek to understand how digital natives view their responsibilities and what
actions they take in furtherance of them. The attitudes of digital natives must be examined within
the context of the human rights discourse. Human rights are only as real as their enforcement and
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for them to continue expanding, they must be supported by a growing number of people. As
cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism both offer a claim of responsibility, how are digital
natives responding to these changing conditions? Previously, inaction could be blamed on a
claim of not knowing about atrocities being committed in other places, but as the world becomes
more connected these excuses no longer offer any defense. Will digital natives feel a sense of
responsibility for those beyond their own borders, or will they decide that domestic claims are
more worthy of attention? This research sheds light on this debate and also offers a better
understanding of digital natives.
With the focus of this work being framed by digital natives, it is important to understand
the scope of the digital technology that is shaping their world. Beyond the generational shift,
digital natives are impacted by growing communication technologies that build bridges over
territorial borders. Digital natives are unique in having grown up within this new world, so in the
next chapter an extensive look will be taken into the history and evolution of the digital age.

43

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
Chapter III:
Digital Realities, Digital Possibilities
I know everyone here…even if I’ve never met them, never talked to them, may never hear from
them again…I know you all…
[…]
We exist without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias…
- The Conscience of a Hacker, 19867
The Conscience of a Hacker, more widely known as The Hacker Manifesto, written by
hacker “The Mentor” in 1986, was an angst-filled tirade against traditional society and a vision
of the meaning disillusioned youth were finding in the online world. The internet provides
anonymity, yet also fosters strong connections amongst various groups. It brings the entire world
into the screen of anyone with an internet connection. It transcends national borders and creates
groups that share a strong bond without ever meeting in person. The internet has created a means
by which people can connect globally in real time. But the internet is a means, not an end in and
of itself, and like any means, its utility is found in how it is used. It has the capacity to advance
both civil society and democratic responsibilities. It can also advance human rights through
greater awareness and avenues of international engagement. As access to the internet continues
to expand, it will bring these opportunities to new communities the world over. This chapter
details the development of the digital age and the technology that drives it. Understanding the
means available to digital natives allows for a better understanding of how they view and act
upon their responsibilities. The digital age provides a number of both opportunities and risks for
better civic engagement and global responsibilities, including immense implications for human
rights. This chapter is about the technology and trends that enable digital natives to have a
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greater means by which to exercise their civic and global responsibility and the challenges that
they also must endure.
The Digital Age
Arguably, the roots of the digital age (also known as the information age) can be traced
as far back as the 1930s with the work of Alan Turing at Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom
and Vannever Bush at the National Defense Research Committee in the United States (see
Campbell-Kelly et al. 2014). Driven by the needs of the defense industry, computers were
developed as an innovation of warfare. The modern digital age began to develop in the 1970s
and 1980s with digital communications replacing many of its analog counterparts. Credit cards
with magnetic strips, computer readable universal codes on products, and perhaps the most
critical innovation, personal computers, began to be ubiquitous. With the Altair 8800 (in 1975),
Apple II and TRS-80 (in 1977), and IBM Personal Computer (in 1981), personal computers and
their progeny became household fixtures with growing adaptation over the next two decades
(Campbell-Kelly et al. 2014). As the number of personal computers rose globally, so too did the
functions they could perform. In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee, working at the European Council for
Nuclear Research (CERN) in Switzerland, developed the World Wide Web, which enabled
online users to access global information sharing technology (Norris, 2001). With the rise of
connected networks (the internet) that allowed users to access the global store of digital
resources (World Wide Web), global connectivity became an ever evolving and expanding fact
of life. “In the fall of 1990 there were just 313,000 computers attached to the Internet; five years
later that number was approaching 10 million, and by the end of 2000 the number had exceeded
100 million” (Ibid, p. 137). The digital age represents a movement from a society shaped by
traditional industry to one shaped by global communications and access to information.
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Digital Natives and Digital Immigrants
The first generation born into the modern digital age, digital natives, also called the Net
Generation (N-Gen), Millennials, and Generation Y, are those born roughly between 1980 and
2000 and have grown up with the existence of the internet (Economist, 2000). For digital natives,
technology is the norm rather than the exception. They have grown up with digital technology
and have become the first users of many digital platforms. Tapscott (1998) discusses the unique
circumstances in which digital natives (or N-Gen as he prefers to call them) live and their
capacities: “from their fingertips they can transverse the world. They have new powerful tools
for inquiry, analysis, self-expression, influence, and play. They have unprecedented mobility.
They are shrinking the planet in ways their parents could never imagine” (p. 3). Friedman (2005)
also shares this vision of a smaller or “flatter” world in which global connections and
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been the driving force in creating
“Globalization 3.0” in which progress is largely driven by individuals and networks. Those who
have not been raised surrounded by digital technology are referred to as digital immigrants. “As
Digital Immigrants learn—like all immigrants, some better than others—to adapt to their
environment, they always retain, to some degree, their ‘accent,’ that is, their foot in the past. The
‘digital immigrant accent’ can be seen in such things as turning to the Internet for information
second rather than first” (Prensky, 2011, p. 5). Digital immigrants must learn new ways in which
things are done whereas digital natives embrace such technology as the status quo. Digital
natives speak, as their first language, what digital immigrants must learn as their second.
There are ongoing attempts to understand what exactly defines this generation of digital
natives, and if they share commonalities besides the period in which they were born. Many
observers wrongly associate digital natives with an innate competency of digital technology.
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While many digital natives may have a proficiency in digital technology, information literacy,
and general computer skills, it would be erroneous to assume that all digital natives will possess
such skills (Bennett, Maton, & Kervin, 2008; Sorgo, et al., 2017). The Economist (2010) notes,
“discussions about ‘digital citizens’ run into the same problems as those about digital natives:
there may simply be too much economic, geographic, and demographic disparity within this
group to make meaningful generalisations [sic].” Tapscott (1998) presents an optimist view of
digital natives, claiming, “They are more knowledgeable than any previous generation and they
are deeply concerned about social issues. They believe strongly in individual rights such as
privacy and rights to information. But they have no ethos of individualism, thriving, rather, from
close interpersonal networks and displaying a strong sense of social responsibility” (p. 9).
History shall be the final arbiter of the defining characteristics of this generation, but the modern
digital age is already having noticeable effects on society, which can be studied.
Internet as an Active Medium
One of the key innovations of the internet has been the capacity to not only passively
receive information, but the ability to create, disseminate, and interact with the information
received. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom
of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue (2011) stated, “with the advent of Web 2.0 services, or
intermediary platforms that facilitate participatory information sharing and collaboration in the
creation of content, individuals are no longer passive recipients, but also active publishers of
information” (p. 6). Tapscott (1998) further explains that “Time spent on the Net is not passive
time, it’s active time. It’s reading time. It’s investigation time. It’s skill development and
problem-solving time. It’s time analyzing, evaluating. It’s composing your thoughts time. It’s
writing time” (Tapscott, 1998, p. 8). Traditional media, such as newspapers, radio, and
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television, all provided a one-directional source of information with the viewer consuming the
information received. There was no way to participate in that creation, interact with it, or do
anything other than consume. The internet has changed the flow of information from passive
consumption to interactive exploration which changes the way people interact with information.
This offers new avenues by which information is created, shared, and consumed, as well as
offering an outlet for engagement.
Risks for the Digital Age
While the digital age has produced a great many benefits, which will be discussed in
detail shortly, there are always risks that accompany such opportunity. The digital age has
produced a generation with the greatest access to information in history, but not everyone has
access to this plethora of knowledge. Even when individuals have that access, they must sort the
labyrinth of misinformation, disinformation, false reports, and fake news. The quote ironically
misattributed to Mark Twain that “a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is
still putting on its shoes” has gained an even greater saliency in the digital age (Chokshi, 2017).
Finally, the two risks most relevant for what is being examined in this dissertation: negative
impacts on political engagement and a tool for the abuse of human rights, both of which will be
discussed shortly. When examining the attitudes of digital natives towards civic and global
responsibility, it is important to acknowledge the risks involved. As such, this dissertation will
examine digital natives’ views on both media consumption and trust, along with political
attitudes in order to determine the impact of these problems.
Digital Divide
The term digital divide has been used to describe the gap between educators (most of
whom are digital immigrants) and students (digital natives), focusing on how traditional
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pedagogy is no longer meeting the needs of current students (see Bauerlein, 2011). However, this
term has also been used to describe the wide disparity in access to the technology that has
defined the digital age. The digital divide is a broad term used to define several of the gaps in
internet access. “The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between
industrialized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap between information
rich and poor in each nation. And finally, within the online community, the democratic divide
signifies the difference between those who do, and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to
engage, mobilize, and participate in public life” (Norris, 2001, p. 4). Rifkin (2000) also writes
about the digital divide as a result of what he calls “Hypercapitalism,” which is the
commodification of everyday life. With more and more critical aspects of life (everything from
banking, to healthcare, to civic debate) moving to the digital realm, the digital divide is a very
real concern. In a digital world, the lack of access caused by the digital divide also means a lack
of access to markets, institutions, information, and more. The benefits, and risks, of the digital
age are only available to those able to access the possibilities offered by the internet.
In 2017, there were over 2.46 billion social media users worldwide, with 208.9 million in
the United States – or 78% of the U.S. population (Clement, 2018). These numbers are likely to
increase as digital technology becomes an ingrained part of everyday life. In the United States,
“Ninety-two percent of adolescents aged 13–17 go online daily, with 73% having access to a
smartphone and 45% reporting daily use of social media at an average of 2 hours per day”
(James et al., 2017, p. S72). However, while the overall statistics are encouraging for this
domestic population, there still exists a social divide in which the wealthy are more likely to
have access than the poor. “School-age children in lower-income households are especially
likely to lack broadband access. Roughly one-third of households with children ages six to 17
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and whose annual income falls below $30,000 a year do not have a high-speed internet
connection at home, compared with just 6% of such households earning $75,000 or more a year”
(Anderson & Perrin, 2018). The global divide is even more stark. From 1993 to 2015, global
internet access has moved from 1% to nearly 44% with almost every single country showing
drastic upward trends in access (World Bank, 2017). While internet access continues to favor
countries with greater wealth, the upward trends continue for all regions. Unlike the previous two
aspects of the digital divide, the democratic divide is a bit harder to measure. There is a wide
variety of ways in which an individual can use digital technology to be engaged in civic and
political life, from researching a topic online or signing an online petition, to coordinating
national protests. There are passive consumers of content and creators of content. Examining the
state of the democratic divide is beyond the scope of this chapter, but aspects of its impacts will
be discussed throughout this dissertation.
Separating Truth from Fiction
Another pitfall of social media is the echo chamber effect of self-selecting the opinions
and views wanted by users. This can lead to the user being exposed to a much greater amount of
information that is not critical of one’s own viewpoint. It can also lead to online social pressure
to not express unpopular or divergent opinions. Kim (2016) found that “Those with weak or
moderate levels of partisan strength were less likely to express their minority views, which led to
decrease their political participation in the real world…[however], for those with strong
partisanship, perceived opinion climates on Facebook do not have any impact on physical
participation” (p. 700). There is also cause for concern because of the susceptibility of those who
consume information on social networks without any critical assessment. Warner-Soderholm et
al., (2017) found that “Younger individuals trust social media more than older individuals in
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terms of integrity and competence [and those] who use social media the most trust social media
more than those who use social media only once a day” (p. 310). With such an excess of
information and opinion, those who seek to inform themselves via the internet must have the
capacity to separate truth from fiction. Objective news and biased commentary must not be
treated at the same level of reverence. Digital competency (understanding of the digital world
and the means by which to navigate it) must be a critical aspect of education in the digital age.
The issue of what constitutes actual information needed by citizens in a democratic
nation is not a new question. Writing in 1890, Warren and Brandeis bemoaned:
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is
potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative
importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of people. When
personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for
matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and
thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to
that weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the
misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps
the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once
robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no
generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence (p. 196).
Not all information is pertinent to one’s own life, much less that of a citizen in their deliberation
of the important issues of the day. Somewhat ironically, the digital age (the information age)
allows access to the near totality of all human knowledge, but the user is inundated with the
trivial and benign. Along with such useless information, the digital age presents a formidable
obstacle in the pursuit of truth, namely misinformation or disinformation.
For better or worse, the wealth of information provided by the digital age must be
deciphered between what is true and what is false. The effort required may seem taxing to some,
but it needn’t be. Kim (2016) offers a more optimistic view on the possible implications of social
media’s echo chamber:
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The results of this study suggest that if Facebook users are selectively exposed to
news content or postings with attitudinal congruence, no one may feel to be a
minority on Facebook. Selective exposure to congruent political content on
Facebook may lead Facebook users who support different political camps (liberals
or conservatives) to perceive opinion distribution on Facebook to be congenial or
supportive, which may increase voices from both sides of the political spectrum
on Facebook and promote political engagement in the real world (p. 700).
Jimmy Wales (2018), the co-founder of Wikipedia, also holds a more optimistic view of the
threat posed by misinformation on the internet. He notes that people have the ability to take
simple steps to check the accuracy of the information online.
Slacktivism
When examining how digital natives interpret and act upon their responsibilities, it is
important to remember that there are fears that the digital age will actually have a negative
impact on engagement. As a developing field, there have been many terms used to describe
activism that takes place online but has little to no effect on traditional civic engagement. This
phenomenon has been called slacktivism (Christensen, 2011), clicktivism (Lilleker & KocMichalska, 2017), among other terms. Christensen (2011) defines slacktivism as “political
activities that have no impact on real-life political outcomes, but only serve to increase the feelgood factor of the participants” (pg. 1). Things such as posting a political opinion on social
media without any real engagement or taking concrete steps to affect change are the activities
that may bring a feel-good factor but have no real political outcomes. Howard et al. (2016) put
forth the slacktivism hypothesis as “the supposition that if Internet or social media use increases,
civic engagement declines” (p. 57). In a survey of a sample of the British electorate, Lilleker and
Koc-Michalska (2017) found that online political participation is more the result of extrinsic
motivations in which the user seeks recognition from others rather than a desire to affect change,
which is more commonly observed with offline political behavior. (p. 35). Cabrera, Matias, and
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Montoya (2017) summarize the debate by pointing to two very differing perspectives:
“…conservative commentator Andres Sullivan (2009) proclaiming during the uprising in Iran
‘The revolution will be Twittered,’ as he saw social media playing a central role in fostering
social change. Conversely, Malcom Gladwell (2010) delivered a scathing critique of Internet
activism in ‘Small Change: Why the revolution will not be tweeted.’” (p. 400). Sullivan (2009)
viewed the campaign of Barack Obama for president in the United States and the popular
uprisings in Iran as evidence of the power of social media, Gladwell (2010) believed that
compared to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, social movements on social media lack
leadership, structure, and meaningful and lasting connections. The central argument in this
debate is whether online activism can provide a valuable substitute for in-person civic
engagement. This issue will be examined within this dissertation specifically by looking at
whether online traditional activism is coupled with traditional political action.
Several studies have refuted the claim that online activism is limited in scope and that it
has replaced traditional means of political engagement. Shah et al. (2005) conducted an early
study of the impact of the internet on political engagement. Using survey data from 1999 – 2000,
they found that “Online information seeking and interactive civic messaging—uses of the Web
as a resource and a forum—both strongly influence civic engagement, often more so than do
traditional print and broadcast media and face-to-face communication” (Shah et al., 2005, p.
551). Online political engagement supplements traditional political engagement rather than
supplanting it. Citing Dynamics of Cause Engagement, a 2011 study from Georgetown
University’s Center for Social Impact Communication, Dutt and Rasul (2014) explain,
“’slacktivists’ were twice as likely as others to engage in activities like volunteering, donating
and recruiting others for a cause. Their social media support supplemented offline activism.” (p.
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433). Skoric et al. (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 22 studies relating to social media and
civic engagement and found strong evidence of a positive relationship between the two. They
note, “this is consistent with the findings from an earlier meta-analysis by Boulianne (2009) who
argued that easy and expanded access to diverse political information might reinvigorate citizen
participation by improving political knowledge and stimulating political discussion” (Skoric et
al., 2016, p.1833). Studies involving British voters (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Segesten
& Bossetta, 2017), protesters in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2014), and Wisconsin protests
(Macafee & De Simone8, 2012) have all found that online activism does contribute to traditional
political participation.
Human Rights Abuses
For all the possibilities raised by digital technology, it can also empower those who
would use its capacities for evil. Repressive states can use technology to censor and monitor
public discourse. “It is true that the internet can provide an outlet for political expression for
people living under repressive regimes. But those regimes are also likely to monitor the internet
closely. And in some cases there is, in effect, a new social contract: do what you like online, as
long as you steer clear of politics” (Economist, 2010). Stories such as China being accused of
using facial recognition software to silence dissidents (Standaert, 2018), and hate speech that
drove the genocide against the Rohingya in Myanmar being spread via social networking sites
like Facebook (Al Jazeera, 2018) are becoming commonplace. Terrorist groups can use the
internet to spread their ideology of hate and recruit new members. The anonymity provided by
the internet can allow hate speech to flourish. However, the ability of governments to stifle and
suppress media does not always work out in their favor. “The protests [in Egypt during the Arab
8

It should be noted that Macfee and De Simone found a positive relationship between expressive online behavior
and political activism, but the same was not true for those who engaged solely in online informational behavior.
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Spring] gained momentum as a result of Mubarak’s electronic communication blackout, as the
loss of connectivity further alienated the generation of ‘Internet youth’ and served as a tipping
point for many previously unaffiliated citizens who began to sympathize with the movement”
(Cattle, 2016, p. 419). Like any tool, the power exists in how it is wielded.

Opportunities for the Digital Age
While the risks and pitfalls of the digital age may seem daunting, there also exists a
tremendous amount of potential. With the near infinite number of possibilities, this dissertation
will limit the focus to two specific avenues: the impact on civic and political engagement, and
the impact on the protection and promotion of human rights. The digital age provides access to
information; it provides ways to network with diverse communities and express opinions. It
challenges the narratives of state-controlled media and allows individuals to both create and
disseminate content. The internet can be both a democratizing force and a powerful ally in the
fight for human rights. This dissertation examines the extent to which digital natives believe in
the democratizing force of the internet, social media, and their smart phones.
The impact of the digital age on civic engagement and political participation is only
beginning to be understood. The literature thus far suggests a positive impact, but there are still
many unknowns. “Across most advanced industrial democracies, citizens use the online
environment to provide and gather information; to network with colleagues, friends, and
supporters; and to interact” (Koc-Michalska et al., 2016, p. 1807). These digital tools will only
spread as the technology is made available to more and more people globally.
The digital age has created a myriad of opportunities to further political participation.
“Access to social media per se usually does not turn people into engaged citizens; yet, to the
extent that the political can discursively arise, the Internet and social media take on an important
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public-sphere function of discussion” (Dahlgren, 2018, p. 2059). Social media, and digital
technology of all sorts, is not a sufficient condition to create participation, but it does create
conditions to further both participation and to introduce those who may not consider themselves
politically active to issues that may bring about their participation. Digital technology,
particularly social networking sites, facilitates political participation through lowering the
barriers to entry, disseminating information, providing access to a wider audience and greater
range of opinions, expanding the ways in which individuals can contribute to political affairs,
and uniting those who share common beliefs and causes. The importance of access to
information cannot be understated. Gil de Zuniga et al. (2012) found that “seeking information
via social network sites is a positive and significant predictor of people’s social capital and civic
and political participatory behaviors, online and offline” (p. 319). Traditional political
participation has been divided between latent and manifest activities (Ekman & Amna, 2012;
Segesten & Bossetta, 2017) but even those distinctions are being challenged by the digital age.
Latent action such as discussing political issues on a social networking site, even if it takes place
between two people, can become a manifest action in that others can see and reflect or take
action based on what would have once been considered a private conversation. Digital
technology also acts as a democratizing agent insofar as it offers greater inclusion and
opportunities to be engaged both locally and globally. Kavada (2016) states that “Digital media
are thought to facilitate more decentralized, dispersed, temporary and individualized forms of
political action that subvert the notion of the collective as singular, unified, homogeneous,
coherent, and mass” (p. 8). Lee and Chan (2014) examined the role of digital tools in the annual
protests remembering Tiananmen Square, and found that not only does online activism

56

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
contribute to successful in-person protesting, but it also contributes to individuals taking up
leadership roles.
Media play a significant role in shaping the discourse and message of any public topic.
The framing effect of media has had a tremendous impact on politics and the way a topic is
viewed by observers (Borah, 2018). In 1944, Vice President Henry Wallace warned of the
dangers of the manipulation of public information:
The really dangerous American fascist... is the man who wants to do in the United
States in an American way what Hitler did in Germany in a Prussian way. The
American fascist would prefer not to use violence. His method is to poison the
channels of public information. With a fascist the problem is never how best to
present the truth to the public but how best to use the news to deceive the public
into giving the fascist and his group more money or more power... They claim to
be super-patriots, but they would destroy every liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. They demand free enterprise, but are the spokesmen for monopoly
and vested interest. Their final objective, toward which all their deceit is directed,
is to capture political power so that, using the power of the state and the power of
the market simultaneously, they may keep the common man in eternal subjection
(p.7).
When the primary means of information was newspapers, radio, and television, the media could,
to a certain degree, be monitored or regulated by governments. Howard (2010) notes the
diffusion of media that has changed the ability of governments to control how discussions are
framed. He notes, “That mobile phones and the internet help political parties compete, journalists
investigate, and civic groups organize is a result of technology diffusion” (p. 180).
The digital age has the capacity to be the great democratizer in many ways. A mobile
phone with internet access is a tool with fantastic capacities. The public square, so long held as
the idyllic manifestation of a democratic society, is no longer a physically bounded space, with
all the limits that location creates; it is now a hand-held device that people carry with them.
Nearly the entire wealth of human knowledge exists within the storage of the internet. The
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mobile phone has become both a library and a megaphone, allowing the user to learn, discuss,
disseminate, and advocate.
Human Rights in the Digital Age
Much of the conversation surrounding human rights and the digital age centers on the
question of whether access to the internet is a human right. In 2011, Frank La Rue, submitted a
report to the Human Rights Council in which he reaffirmed the rights of freedom of opinion and
expression, and identified the internet as an “enabler” of rights which warrants human rights
protections9. Many news outlets interpreted this report as a call to make internet access a right in
and of itself (see LA Times, 2011; Kravets, 2011). In 2012, Vinton Cert, often considered the
father of the internet, penned an op-ed in the New York Times in which he argued “technology is
an enabler of rights, not a right itself.” Cert acknowledged that the UN Report did not label it as
such, but he sought to expressly state that any such human rights were those facilitated by the
internet, not the technology itself. He closed with the statement, “Improving the Internet is just
one means, albeit an important one, by which to improve the human condition. It must be done
with an appreciation for the civil and human rights that deserve protection—without pretending
that access itself is such a right” (Cert, 2012, A25).
However, there is also a strong foundation for why access should be considered a human
right. Mathiesen (2014) presents a convincing argument on the need to view access to the
internet as a derived human right, rather than a primary right. She says, “there are good practical
reasons to consider derived rights human rights. While Cerf is correct that we should not get too
focused on means at the expense of ends, we also should not get so focused on ends that we
forget that we must have the necessary means” (Mathiesen, 2014, p. 7). The internet is a vehicle

9

The importance of the internet as a means of protecting and promoting human rights was again affirmed in a nonbinding resolution of the Human Rights Council in 2016. See A/HRC/22/L.20.
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by which many rights are realized, such as, access to information, freedom of speech and
expression, freedom of assembly, and many others. Furthermore, Mathiesen emphasizes a need
for a “Declaration of Human Rights” in order to clarify “what human rights require in the digital
realm and how ICTs may enhance or threaten our ability to respect, protect, and fulfill a wide
variety of human rights” (Ibid, p. 7). Frank La Rue (2011), United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, has described
the internet as an enabler of human rights, warranting special protections. This question of
internet access (including freedoms of information, expression, censorship, etc.) has been
examined by a growing number of scholars (Crawford, 2003; Penney, 2011; Winter, 2013; Tully,
2014; Joyce, 2015). Advocates of treating access as a human right have pointed out that such a
right is necessary, especially in light of countries such as Syria and Turkey who have shut down
access to promote state interests (Howell & West, 2016). Viewing access to the internet as a
human right exists not only in the theoretical realm, but also in state policy. Realizing the
importance of internet access in the digital age, countries such as Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland,
France, and Spain have already taken legal steps to either make access a right, or at least increase
the availability of such access (Cattle, 2016). Suvi Linden, Finland’s communication minister in
2010, stated, “We considered the role of the internet in Finns everyday life. Internet services are
no longer just for entertainment” (BBC, 2010). The internet is critical for information, speech,
commerce and trade, and many other parts of everyday life and as such, more countries are
searching for ways to ensure open and affordable access.
For this dissertation, the more relevant issue surrounds the impact of the digital age on
the protection and promotion of human rights. Collaborators who may never meet in person can
plan social movements. Organizers can communicate through email, FaceTime, virtual
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meetings, or the hundreds of instant messaging platforms available to them. Social movements
often have a Facebook page to help with outreach and planning. They have events pages to
spread awareness about direct action. They promote the movement through planned hashtags on
Twitter. With any luck, their hashtag will become trending, bringing more awareness to the
cause. Photos of public demonstrations are posted on Instagram. Live streaming of events may
be broadcast simultaneously on Facebook, Instagram, and Periscope. All these social media posts
will likely be shared by supporters, casual observers, and even enemies criticizing the cause.
Supporters from around the world will send messages of encouragement, along with likes,
shares, and retweets. The traditional image of a protest, groups walking with signs and placards,
now has an additional element: the smart phone. Hands will rise above crowd, sharing images of
scene with friends and strangers online. Any altercation with authorities or opposition groups
will quickly bring about a sea of phones recording from every angle.
The internet has become a means through which the expression of fundamental human
rights may be both exercised and protected. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” Although written in 1948, the
UDHR still maintains its relevance for the protection and promotion of human rights. The
internet has become a means of “receiving and imparting information…regardless of frontiers.”
Cattle (2016) notes that the internet serves to “[protect] communication and affiliation—
including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association…[and has a
role in] addressing issues such as discrimination, equal access, and women’s rights” (p. 420).
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Messages can be conveyed to every person with access to the internet in real time. The
power of the internet to mobilize large segments of the population has not gone unnoticed by
governments seeking to subjugate dissidents. Countries such as Nepal in 2005, Myanmar in
2007, and Egypt in 2011, have all taken down internet access on a national scale during times of
perceived threat from popular uprisings (Cattle, 2016). La Rue (2011) explains, “The vast
potential and benefits of the Internet are rooted in its unique characteristics such as speed,
worldwide reach and relative anonymity. At the same time, these distinctive features of the
Internet that enable individuals to disseminate information in ‘real time’ and to mobilize people
has also created fear amongst Governments and the powerful” (p. 7).
The internet serves a critical role “in countries where there is no independent media, as
they enable individuals to share critical views and to find objective information. Furthermore,
producers of traditional media can also use the Internet to greatly expand their audiences at
nominal cost. More generally, by enabling individuals to exchange information and ideas
instantaneously and inexpensively across national borders, the Internet allows access to
information and knowledge that was previously unattainable” (La Rue, 2011, p. 7). Additionally,
traditional media no longer maintains a monopoly on information to which the public has access.
“Digital technology now enables people to directly advocate for fundamental human rights,
providing new models for engagement and community building. The Internet, mobile phones,
satellite television, and other digital technologies provide platforms on which individuals and
organizations employ combinations of images, audio, video and text to raise awareness about
social, political and economic struggles, mobilizing global audiences” (Dutt & Rasul, 2014, p.
427).
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Dutt and Rasul (2014) identify five ways in which digital technology is transforming
human rights protection: (1) transforming relations between human rights organizations and
constituents; (2) redefining who can be an activist; (3) giving voice to marginalized people; (4)
creating new methods for delivering help; and (5) transforming how human rights abuses are
documented and monitored (pp. 428-430). For this dissertation, redefining who can be an activist
will be a critical part of the development of cosmopolitan responsibility. The digital age allows
people to become activists by spreading awareness, contacting elected officials, engaging in
campaigns, and many other actions from their home, regardless of where they are. People who
are physically close to human rights problems can now become monitors and reporters through
the use of a cell phone. In many ways, digital technology breaks down the physical and
geographic barriers that previously divided society. Digital technology allows for little or no-cost
communication between organizations and members. It also creates new avenues in which the
public can interact with human rights organizations. Digital technology allows individuals to
play a greater role in the protection and promotion of human rights through access to
information, ability to document and report, and by creating networks for cooperation between
states, civil society, and the public. As it relates to human rights, digital technology is already
having a tremendous impact. The ICISS notes, “The revolution in information technology has
made global communications instantaneous and provided unprecedented access to information
worldwide. The result has been an enormously heightened awareness of conflicts wherever they
may be occurring, combined with immediate and often very compelling visual images of the
resultant suffering” (2001, pp. 6–7). The digital age has brought forth a wave of
communicational and organizational power that can be harnessed to both protect and promote
human rights.
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Electronic Empathy
One aspect of the digital age that impacts responsibility at the local and global levels is
the way in which it allows for contact between people. Allport (1954) found that various types of
contact between out-groups fostered better understanding and can “lead to the perception of
common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups” (p. 281). As
people interact with one another, they develop an understanding of the other, which can lead to
feelings of empathy and respect. Amichai-Hamburger et al. (2015) notes that “The numerous
open groups and the ease of creating groups online makes it easier than ever before to open a
discussion group where members have shared interests with the outgroup [sic]” (p. 521). Prior to
the digital age, such contact would require physical interaction with others. Even corresponding
with someone by mail or phone required having a preexisting familiarity with the other, or a way
to be put into contact with the other. The internet allows for people to search for others with
shared interests through websites, chat rooms, discussion groups, and other such mediums.
Discussion
The impacts of the modern digital age, the revolutionary expanse of information
communication technologies, and the attitudes of the digital native generation are still
developing. Optimists have heralded the digital age as the savior of democracy and a unifying
force in a divided world. Pessimists have bemoaned the idea of “armchair activists” and new
tools for dictators to oppress their people. “We have become accustomed to greeting the new,
including new technology, via the discursive polarities of utopia and dystopia” (Papacharissi,
2010, p. 7). The digital age is neither utopia nor one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. It
has the potential to enhance civic participation, but only if populations have access and are
willing to be engaged citizens. It also has the capacity to further global human rights. The digital
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age is a democratizing utility, but only to the extent individuals are willing to use it as such.
Digital technology is breaking down barriers between countries and cultures and allowing for
greater interaction between all connected peoples.
This chapter has detailed the advancements of the digital age and the opportunities and
risks present for digital natives in acting upon their responsibilities. In order to answer the central
research question posed herein—how do the advancements of the digital age impact individuals’
sense of responsibility at the local and global level and what actions do they take to act on that
responsibility—it is necessary to understand what the digital age means in terms of a changing
society. This chapter shows that along with numerous risks such as access, information overload,
misinformation, slacktivism, et cetera, there are also ample opportunities for digital natives to be
better informed and more engaged than any other generation in history. Having now detailed the
existing literature on these issues and explored the digital age, the next chapter will explain how
this research project was formulated and carried out, including the hypotheses that will be
answered in later chapters.
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Chapter IV:
Methods and Descriptives
Building on the existing literature discussed in the second chapter and the conditions of
the digital age discussed in the third chapter, Chapter IV will be a discussion of what questions
will be answered in this dissertation and the means by which those answers may be discovered.
The central question of this dissertation is one of responsibility. Empowered by the digital age,
people now have an ability to affect change through democratic institutions at home and abroad.
How do digital natives, those born into a world in which internet access is part of everyday life,
internalize that responsibility and what actions do they take to produce change? Broadly
speaking, this dissertation seeks to examine the opinions and attitudes of digital natives
concerning civic obligation and global responsibility for human rights. To that end, a survey was
created to test several hypotheses put forth in this dissertation:
H1: The typology of parochial, subject, and participant developed by Almond and Verba
(1963) will remain useful in understanding how individuals embrace their civic
responsibility, but with a lower number of parochials.
Almond and Verba (1963) believed that three types of citizens would be found in every
democracy. Democracy requires civic engagement, yet it does not mandate it. Citizens ought to
be involved in a meaningful way but there are no coercive measures forcing them to do so. As
such, Almond and Verba grouped citizens into three levels of engagement: subject, parochial,
and participant. I hypothesize a lower number of parochials because of greater access to
information in the digital age. Democracy still requires engagement, and it is not forced, but
having greater awareness of the impact of government should create an environment that drives
civic engagement.
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One of the unique hallmarks of the digital age is the unprecedented amount of available
information and the vast expansion of access. From word-of-mouth to newspapers, then radios
and television, to the cornucopia of instant media provided by the internet, information is coming
in greater quantities and at faster speeds. Digital natives have more information available to them
than any previous generation. While the quantity of information is greater in the digital age, it
does not necessarily indicate a greater quality of information. This greater quantity of
information also includes greater obstacles to discerning valuable information from everything
else. These obstacles include information overload (being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of
information available), misinformation (incorrect information), disinformation (purposely false
information designed to mislead or support a specific agenda), echo chambers (only accessing
information that fits a person’s preconceived beliefs and/or only associating with those who
share a person’s beliefs), and distraction (the banality of clickbait and gossip that entertains
rather than informs). Finally, the speed of information hinders contemplation and discernment.
Rather than giving careful consideration to information, people are encouraged to respond
instantly. This leads to emotional rather than reasoned responses. This atmosphere of seemingly
limitless information paired with chaos of information distortion presents both opportunities and
obstacles for civic engagement.
H2: Civic engagement will expand beyond traditional means and include new avenues of
engagement, such as digital means, available to digital natives. (Shah et al., 2005;
Boulianne, 2009; Skoric et al., 2016)
Common forms of civic engagement include voting, signing petitions, contacting elected
representatives, running for political office, participating in protest, and strikes. The digital age
has created new ways of engaging via digital means such as online networking, digital advocacy,
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online engagement with elected officials, and more. Traditional engagement (enhanced by digital
technology) combined with digital engagement creates a more robust arsenal for overall civic
engagement. This will lead to a new form of civic culture, with similarities to the one described
by Almond and Verba (1963), but with added layers of complexity produced by the opportunities
and risks in the digital age.
H3: The digital age has created capacities by which individuals will be empowered to be
more engaged at the global level, particularly as it relates to human rights. (CroninFurman, 2010; Luck & Luck, 2015; Piston Hindawi, 2016).
The digital age has created a means by which people are able to witness actions happening
globally. Human rights atrocities can be streamed in real time from virtually any locale with an
internet connection. The information is available to those who seek it. Social media has also
played a role in connecting people globally who can share their experiences and perspectives
with all their connections, exposing even parochials to global issues. Increased awareness of the
perils faced by many may lead to digital natives placing a greater importance on advocating for
human rights than previous generations. Along with this increased awareness, digital tools exist
for individuals to take action on issues of concern both locally and globally. There still exists the
counteracting forces of populist nationalism and cosmopolitanism, but individuals who embrace
a global responsibility will be better equipped to do something about it.
H4: Digital natives who display cosmopolitan traits will be more likely to have travelled
internationally, have more social media contacts from other countries, will be more
interested in international affairs, and will use a greater variety of news sources.
(Stevenson, 2005; Benhabib, 2009)
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Knowing people from other countries fosters understanding and compassion by humanizing the
other. Rather than people from other countries being nameless, faceless entities, knowing
someone creates the recognition of humanity and a familiarity. These connections, be it in person
or through social media, ought to create an interest in global affairs that is informed by a variety
of news sources, and conversely:
H5: Digital natives who display populist nationalism traits will be less likely to travel
internationally, have fewer social media contacts from other countries, will be more
interested in domestic affairs, and will use less of a variety of news sources. (Warf, 2012;
De Matas, 2017)
These hypotheses arise from the two interrelated concepts of civic culture and global
responsibility, and how they are both impacted by the digital age. As discussed in Chapter II,
these areas have never been explored in relation to each other, and even in their individual
examinations, there are many areas that still require further inquiry. Even Verba (2015) noted the
changes of the digital age calls for a reexamination of the civic culture. Furthermore, with the
impacts of globalization, in which the events happening in one locale impact other areas, the
question of civic responsibility must extend beyond the local community. This has long been the
argument of cosmopolitans such as Kant (1795), Ypi’s (2008) statist cosmopolitanism, and
Ackerly’s (2018) just responsibility. Particularly with the global events that necessitated the
creation of the Responsibility to Protect continuing to occur, the question of how to make it more
effective must be asked.
Creating the Survey
In order to examine these issues, a survey was chosen due to the ability to generalize
from a sample to a population, the ease of distribution, and the ability to reach the widest sample
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possible (Creswell, 2009). While the concepts are interrelated, there are two main areas of
inquiry, an examination of civic culture in the digital age and cosmopolitan responsibility. Since
both civic culture and cosmopolitan responsibility involve questions of changing circumstances
brought on by the digital age, many of the questions in the survey include elements of digital
technology. The research design for an examination of civic culture in the digital age is largely
based on the work of Almond and Verba in their 1963 book The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. They asked questions about news consumption,
political action, political attitudes, and engagement in social activities. Their questions on news
consumption were expanded to also include questions about digital media. While Almond and
Verba examined the civic culture of five countries, only their results from the United States are
being examined here. While they primary used interviews for their method, the questions they
created for the interview guide are easily transferred to a survey. The survey questions created to
measure international responsibility will be discussed shorty in the section on the creation of a
cosmopolitan/populist nationalism scale. Finally, a battery of demographic questions was asked
including age, gender, academic major, and social activity.
Creating A Scale
To assess the attitudes and opinions of digital natives towards their responsibility at a
global level, it is necessary to create a scale that measures individuals as cosmopolitan or more
aligned with populist nationalism. This scale makes it possible to identify survey respondents as
cosmopolitan or populist nationalist, and examine the implications of those worldviews. Leung et
al. (2015) created a Cosmopolitan Orientation Scale (COS) which they believe reflects the three
distinct factors of cosmopolitanism: “cultural openness, global prosociality, and respect for
cultural diversity” (p. 83). Their 15-question scale was narrowed down to six questions in order
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to keep the survey as brief as possible and in response to initial peer reviews that indicated some
perceived overlap in the scale. The seven questions that were omitted were deemed to be too
prone to a social desirability bias or too closely related to the six questions that were selected.
Questions were taken from all three factors identified by Leung et al. (2015). The six questions
included on this survey are:
(C1)
(C2)
(C3)
(C4)
(C5)
(C6)

I am willing to work abroad in another culture
I am willing to live abroad in another culture
I enjoy learning more about different cultures in the world
I get upset when people do not want to offer help when those in need are foreigners
I want to help those in need even if they are from other countries
We should celebrate cultural differences

Leung et al. (2015) focused on the relationship between cosmopolitans and environmental
concerns. While having a cosmopolitanism scale is valuable, it does not fully encompass the
range of attitudes that this dissertation seeks to examine. Cosmopolitanism and populist
nationalism are often understood as two ends of a spectrum (Pavel, 2000; Brennan, 2001), but a
low score on one end does not necessarily indicate strong feelings on the opposite end. To assess
the level of isolationism and nationalism, the cosmopolitanism scale needs to be expanded.
Franke and Tuschling (2019) examined national identity amongst college students in the United
States and their survey included several poignant questions that relate to populist nationalism
tendencies. Three of their questions that most directly related to the theme of this project were
included in this survey:
(PN1) Being an American is important to me
(PN2) International organizations are taking away too much power from the U.S. government
(PN3) Immigrants increase crime rates
In order to create a robust isolationism/nationalism scale, additional questions were needed.
These attitudes promote a responsibility for the nation above any international concerns and
views foreign affairs through the lens of what serves the domestic interest. There was also a need
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to address some of the common arguments that have been used against invoking the
Responsibility to Protect. In 1994, during the Rwandan genocide, Senator Paul Simon urged the
Clinton administration to act but was told the lack of public support for a humanitarian mission
in Africa prevented any such action (Simon, 1999). Power (2002) quotes as interview Senator
Simon gave on the NPR program All Things Considered in which he said, “If every member of
the House and Senate had received 100 letters from people back home saying we have to do
something about Rwanda, when the crisis was first developing, then I think the response would
have been different” (p. 377). For the Responsibility to Protect to succeed, or at least be
attempted, there must be domestic support for it; therefore, attitudes towards international
intervention must be examined. To these ends, the following questions were added based on the
values and beliefs of populist nationalism as defined by Ignazi (2010), Miller (2008), Johnson
and Frombgen (2009), Fukuyama (2018), and Shattuck (2017):
(PN4) I believe we should solve problems at home before helping other countries
(PN5) I believe my country usually does what is in the best interest of the world
(PN6) When there is widespread human suffering in another country, I believe the U.S. should
use military intervention if the country is important to the U.S.
(PN7) When there is widespread human suffering in another country, I believe the U.S. should
focus on its responsibility towards other Americans.
In order to ensure that respondents did not just select the same answers for all questions
in a grouping, these questions were interspersed with other questions throughout the survey.
Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the above items on a five-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Because the questions measuring populist
nationalism are antithetical to cosmopolitanism, the responses were reversed (5 = strongly
disagree, 1 = strongly agree). Respondents who showed strong cosmopolitan values and low
populist nationalist values would have a score approaching 5, whereas those scoring high on the
populist nationalist scale and low on the cosmopolitan scale would have a score closer to 1. Of
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the 834 digital natives sampled, when creating this scale, eight were discarded for not answering
three or more of the scale questions. Additionally, 29 respondents did not answer one of the
questions, and five did not answer two of the questions. For all 826 respondents who answered at
least 11 scale items, their aggregated score was divided by the number of questions answered to
calculate a mean scale score. Those who had a score of 4 and above were then coded as
cosmopolitans while those with a score of 2 and below were coded as populist nationalists.
While the literature review (Chapter II) already established that cosmopolitanism and populist
nationalism have contradictory and incompatible values, to confirm these findings, the
cosmopolitan and populist nationalism scales were compared and a strong and significant
negative correlation was found, (r (826) = -.40, p < .001).
Validity and Reliability of the Scales
Before changing the direction of the populist nationalism questions, it was necessary to
verify that cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism are in fact antithetical to each other. To
that end, a primary component analysis (PCA) was conducted to see if the cosmopolitan and
populist nationalism elements would come up as two distinct components. The cosmopolitanism
scale created by Leung et al. (2015) had already been validated through “Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA) with full information maximum likelihood estimation” (p. 83). However, as only
six questions of their original 15-question scale were used, and a new populist nationalism scale
was created, another round of validation was warranted. To that end, a primary component
analysis was conducted on the 13 items with an oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin). An oblique
rotation was chosen over an orthogonal rotation due to the correlation of the factors (see Table 4a
in Appendix A). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure, which establishes the suitability of data for a
Factor Analysis, verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .82, and all KMO
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values for individual items were > .72, which is well above the acceptable limit of .5 (Field,
2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2 (78) = 3751.17, p < .001 indicated that correlations between
items were sufficiently large for PCA. As two factors were predicted (cosmopolitanism and
populist nationalism), the fixed number of factors was set to two, and both had eigenvalues over
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 48.9% of the variance. The results of the
PCA with oblique rotation can be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2:
Table 4.1: Pattern Matrix

C2
C1
C3
C5
C6
C4
PN7
PN1
PN6
PN4
PN3
PN5
PN2

Component
1
2
.82
.80
.80
.67
.64
.63
.69
.68
.66
.61
-.32
.58
.58
.49

Table 4.2: Structure Matrix

C2
C3
C1
C5
C4
C6
PN1
PN3
PN7
PN4
PN6
PN5
PN2

Component
1
2
.80
.77
.76
.71
.70
.66
.68
-.49 .67
.66
.64
.61
.59
-.39 .57

The reliability of the scales was tested and found to be reliable with a Cronbach’s α score
of .83 for the cosmopolitanism scale and .76 for the isolationism/nationalism scale. The
exclusion of any item from either scale would not increase the level of internal consistency, the
results of which can be seen in Tables 4b and 4c in Appendix A. The minimum corrected itemtotal correlation was .42. Having established the validity of two opposing concepts, the responses
for the questions relating to populist nationalism were then reversed and added to the
cosmopolitan questions to form a Cosmopolitan/Populist Nationalism (CPN) scale. The
individual respondents could then be classified as a cosmopolitan (with a CPN score of 4 and
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above, for a total of 167 people), populist nationalist (with a CPN score of 2 or below, for a total
of 165 people), or neutral (with a CPN score of 3, for a total of 494 people). The full CPN scale
retained the high Cronbach’s α score of .83, and the exclusion of any item would not have
increased the score (See Table 4d in Appendix A). Multicollinearity is often a problem in
parametric testing, so during the analysis, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was observed to
always be under 10, and the intercorrelations between predictor variables never exceeded .80
(Pituch & Stevens, 2016).
Distributing the Survey
Prior to launching the survey, test surveys were distributed to an expert panel of 20
fellow Ph.D. students to check for clarity, accessibility, and overall design. Changes were made
based on their feedback. The full survey questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B. The survey
was then sent out to college students in the United States between April 26 and August 18, 2018,
using the program Qualtrics. The Kennesaw State University Institutional Review Board10
approved the survey (Study #18-479) and it was distributed via an anonymous link to ensure
confidentiality. No identifying information was collected. Distribution began through the
author’s classes as Kennesaw State University and connections at other universities in the United
States. The anonymous link to the survey was also posted on social media sites Facebook and
LinkedIn. Both university connections and respondents were asked to forward the anonymous
survey link to others to help gain a wider distribution. This snowball method allowed for a large
sample to be collected.
The target population of those surveyed was digital natives, those born roughly between
1980 and 2000 in the United States, therefore a snowball convenience sample was sought with

10

See Appendix B
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the intention of producing a large enough sample to make it representative of the population at
large. (Bernard, 2006). The traditional age of college students is 18-24, so universities provide an
adequate population to study. Additionally, non-traditional students include all age groups,
which would include the older segments of digital natives. Unfortunately, targeting colleges and
universities does omit those digital natives who are not pursuing an academic degree11. An
attempt to correct for this was made by also distributing the survey via social media, but because
of the anonymity it is not clear how many responses came from college students and how many
came from others. To address possible confounding variables, an extensive comparison of the
survey respondents was made to the general public, the results of which are discussed later in
this chapter. A total of 1283 responses were collected, and of those, five were excluded for
nonacceptance of the consent form, 101 were excluded for answering less than five questions,
and 225 were excluded for being less than half complete. The remaining 952 responses were
further narrowed down by those that indicated they belonged to the age group that is considered
a digital native, 18-38, for a total of 834 responses. All statistical analysis was performed using
IBM SPSS StatisticsTM Version 25 (IBM, SPSS, Chicago, IL).
Exploring the Sample
One of the most important aspects of survey research is understanding the sample,
especially in relation to the population as a whole. Since this research builds upon the results
from Almond and Verba (1963) their findings will be discussed when relevant. In order to
examine the question of generalizability, the results of this survey will also be compared the
current demographics of the United States, as reported by the United States Census Bureau. One
distinction unique to this survey is that the survey conducted for this dissertation focused

11

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that approximately 69.1% of high schoolers move on to higher
education, as of October 2018. See: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm
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specifically on digital natives, so unlike Almond and Verba, the age range is limited to 18-37.
Almond and Verba12 (1963) had a more even age distribution: 51 or over 40.8%; 31-50 37.4%;
18-30 21.8%. Respondents were largely white in both surveys, 89.4% for Almond and Verba
and 71.6% in this current study (compared to 75.1% of the U.S. population). For the full
breakdown of ethnicity, see Table 4e in Appendix A. Gender is another variable examined (see
Table 4f in Appendix A). Almond and Verba had a slight female majority (53.1%), while this
survey had a greater majority of female respondents at 59.5% (compared to 50.8% of the U.S.
population). The final commonality between Almond and Verba and this study involves region
of residence (see Table 4g in Appendix A). Almond and Verba had a more diverse regional
response whereas this survey had a very heavy southeast skew at nearly 85%. Overall, it should
be noted that this survey has a sample bias favoring whites, females, and those from the
southeast region of the country.
In order to justify any measure of generalizability, it is also critical to compare the sample
collected with the population as a whole. The comparison of questions asked by Almond and
Verba and this study have been discussed above, but with this study going beyond Almond and
Verba, other demographics can be compared to the current U.S. population. Since the target
population was ages 18-38, the age will not correspond to the larger population, but other factors
can be examined. One important factor is political attitudes in the United States. A 2018 Gallup
poll found that those aged 18 to 29 identified as 26% conservative, 40% moderate, and 31%
liberal. For ages 30 to 49, 29% identified as conservative, 37% moderate, and 30% liberal (Saad,
2019). In this survey, 34% (281) of respondents identified as conservative, 26.3% (217) as

12

For a more nuanced breakdown see Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 521.
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moderate, and 38.7% (320) as liberal. When asked about how democratically respondents think
the United States is being governed today, the results showed a somewhat pessimistic view:
Table 4.3: Views on the state of U.S. democracy
180
160
140

120
100
80
60
40
20
0

How democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?

The majority of respondents indicated that they did not believe the United States to be
democratically governed, with 57.2% answering with a 5 or below. This is similar to the findings
of a PEW Research study, which found only 18% of Americans say that democracy is working
very well in the United States (Doherty, 2018). The pessimism regarding government is
unsurprising at a time where the U.S. is increasingly divided by partisanship (Schaeffer, 2020).
There were also a number of demographic questions asked in this project that do not
relate to Almond and Verba or the current U.S. population as a whole. Nevertheless, these
questions were included to give a better understanding of the sample population. When asked
about the type of community where they spent most of their life, 51.3% (428) said it was semiurban, 27.9% (233) said urban, and 20.4% said rural. When asked about the community where
they currently reside, 47.1% (393) said semi-urban, 39.8% (332) said urban, and 12.7% (106)
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said rural. Since college-age students were the primary target demographic, the current academic
status was asked. Freshmen/First Year students were the largest group at 32.4% (270) with
Sophomore slightly behind at 27.0% (225), and Juniors at 17.6% (147). Seniors, Graduate
Students, and Unclassified all came in under 10% (9.7% (81); 6.6% (55); and 6.5% (54)
respectively. Respondents were also asked about their extracurricular activities and participation
in various organizations outside of school. Over 62% (519) indicated they were in at least one
student club, and nearly 64% (530) participate in outside organizations. It should be noted that
these results may be impacted by a social desirability bias in which respondents wanted to
present a more engaged image of themselves. Only 21.4% (179) said they were not a part of
activities at school or in their community. Academic clubs and honor societies were the most
popular, with 201 members each, and outside of university, church and religious groups had the
highest reported membership at 248. Full results can be seen in Tables 4h and 4i in Appendix A.
Finally, respondents were asked about their majors. The results can be seen in Table 4.4:

Table 4.4 Majors
Arts & Humanities
8%

Other
13%

Biological Sciences
13%

Undeclared
4%

Social Sciences
19%
Business
20%

Other Professions
5%
Education
6%

Engineering
8%

Physical Sciences
4%
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Addressing Limitations
There are inherent strengths and weaknesses within any research design, and as such, for
the questions posed by this dissertation, it was determined that a survey of digital natives would
supply the information needed to answer these questions. Self-administered online surveys allow
for the greatest number of responses in the least time for the lowest cost. Surveys also have
advantages such as avoiding interviewer bias and having more expansive questions, such as long
lists that would be awkward in a face-to-face interview (Bernard, 2006, p.258). While a survey
may be the best method for this particular project, it is important to address the shortcomings and
how they may be addressed (if possible). The first limitation is the distribution itself. Although
this survey targeted digital natives, by using an online survey instrument to conduct the survey, it
limits responses to those who have internet access. Digital natives are the target for this specific
research but excluding those without internet access makes comparisons between the two
populations difficult, so generalizability is an issue. Digital natives should not be assumed to be
technologically savvy nor should it be implied they have access to the internet. The views of
digital natives who are not online could not be examined with this survey. However, since there
is such a high rate of digital penetration in the United States (see Chapter III), this limitation is
relatively minor. Furthermore, with the purpose of the dissertation being to understand the
impacts of digital technology, the responses of those without internet access would not be able to
inform the discussion.
Another issue that had to be addressed was the sample. It consists primarily of college
students since the survey was primarily distributed through universities. While the survey was
shared through other platforms such as social media sites, the questions presupposed college
enrollment and, regrettably, there was no measure to distinguish between students and non-
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students. It is possible that respondents who took the survey through social media or had it
forwarded to them were not students. However, a sample comprised of college students is not
inherently problematic, especially because it is comprised of the target age group of digital
natives. This survey did not ensure a completely random sample of digital natives, but every
effort was made to ensure a wide representation that would be as random as possible. As
Peterson (2001) suggests “researchers should be encouraged to report more fully on the
characteristics of their samples so that independent, informed judgments can be made as to the
possible influence of these characteristics [samples comprised of college students] on research
results” (pp. 458-460). It is for this reason that an in-depth discussion of the sample was
presented later in this chapter.
Discussion
The demographic characteristics of the sample are important to allow the reader to be
able to draw conclusions about the dataset. These characteristics will also allow for a deeper
analysis of some of the issues relating to this dissertation. In order to examine civic and global
responsibility amongst digital natives in the US, a survey provides the ideal method for gathering
information. The data collected will allow for an examination of the hypotheses put forth in this
chapter. Guided by the existing literature and cognizant of the gaps in that literature, this
dissertation will expand on the existing knowledge of individual responsibility as it has been
impacted by digital technology.
The examination of civic responsibility at the local and national level begins next in
Chapter V. This chapter includes the testing of hypotheses one and two which focus on digital
natives and their attitudes towards domestic responsibility. Almond and Verba (1963) defined
the civic culture for their generation, but the digital age requires a new examination of how
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people view their roles and the actions they take in the age of information. Chapter VI expands
the scope of responsibility to the global community. It tests hypotheses three, four, and five,
looking specifically at the influence of cosmopolitan and populist nationalist attitudes towards
responsibility beyond borders.
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Chapter V:
A Digital Civic Culture?
At the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, James McHenry, one
of the delegates, recorded as interaction between a fellow delegate Benjamin Franklin and a
passer-by, Mrs. Powel. She asked Dr. Franklin, “Well Doctor, what we got [sic], a republic or a
monarchy,” to which Dr. Franklin replied, “A republic…if you can keep it” (McHenry, 1787).
Since the inception of the United States, the responsibility for its maintenance has fallen not on a
ruling class, but on a well-informed and engaged citizenry. The notion of citizenship in a
democratic republic carries with it a charge of responsibility. All the legal rights given to a citizen
are made possible by the responsibilities of the citizenry to the community. While rights have a
long tradition of elaboration in democratic societies, responsibilities have received far less focus.
Stewart (1995) has distinguished between citizenship as a legal status and citizenship as “shared
membership of a political community, in which conception citizens are political actors
constituting political spaces” (p. 63). It is this latter conception of citizenship that is the focus of
this present work. This chapter examines the attitudes of digital natives towards domestic or
national responsibility, manifested through their views on civic culture.
The historical roots of democracy, and of democratic responsibility, are often traced back
to the Athenian city-state. The democratic system of Athens in the middle fifth century BCE was
one of the most rigorous and demanding examples of civic engagement. Government participation
was the norm, and most posts were filled by lot or election, thus placing an immense
responsibility on the citizenry. Raaflaub (2007) (referencing Hansen, 1999) contends that “several
thousand citizens were politically active every year, and many of them for years on end—out of a
population of adult male citizens that in the fourth century comprised hardly more than 30,000”
(p. 5). He further contends that “It is thus clear that [Athenian democracy in the fifth century
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BCE] was not only ‘direct’ in the sense that decisions were made by the assembled people, but
the ‘directest’ imaginable in the sense that the people through assembly, council, and law courts
controlled the entire political process and that a fantastically large proportion of citizens was
involved constantly in public business" (Ibid). While the growth of populations and expanding
territories has made such direct democracy a near impossibility, some form of participation
remains an imperative in any democratic system.
The overall theme of this dissertation is a study of digital natives’ conceptions of
responsibility, and how digital technology both informs that responsibility and allows individuals
to take action. This chapter focuses on the manifestation of that responsibility at the national or
state level. It addresses the first two hypotheses from Chapter IV (The typology of parochial,
subject, and participant developed by Almond and Verba (1963) will remain relevant, but with a
lower number of parochials, and that civic engagement will be more robust with new avenues of
engagement available to digital natives). The typology developed by Almond and Verba is
important in understanding how individuals relate to the government and society in which they
live. The relevance of this typology will likely continue to inform how we understand this
relationship, but there will be few, if any, parochials (those who are not engaged nor informed)
because of the abundance of information in the digital age. While the categorization of someone
as a participant, subject, or parochial is subjective, the level of engagement individuals show can
make this into a testable hypothesis. There will also be more a more robust arsenal for
engagement because along with the traditional methods of civic engagement, the digital age has
created new conditions that enable a greater array of civic engagement through available
information and communication technology. This chapter presents an investigation into the civic
culture of digital natives in the United States.
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The Civic Culture
In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Their central question in this comparative study was
to understand the nature of civic culture within a democracy. They defined the civic culture as “a
pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity,
a culture that permitted change but moderated it” (p. 8). When they published their study, they
examined a world much different from the one in existence today, over 55 years later. While
many of the questions and observations remain relevant (see Chapter II), there is cause to
reexamine some of their findings. Also, and perhaps more significantly, their study provides a
useful foundation upon which to build a new understanding of civic and political culture in the
digital age. In seeking to understand how individuals relate to their government and act within
their society, they developed the typology of participant (someone informed and engaged),
subject (someone moderately informed and sometimes engaged), and parochial (someone neither
informed nor engaged) (see Chapter II). This typology can contribute to the understanding of
how individuals today relate to an increasingly globalized and connected world. The means of
being informed and the ways in which people are able to share and communicate their beliefs
have changed significantly in the digital age. Almond and Verba’s original purpose, to “study the
political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it,” has
contributed to a number of fields, most notably studies of democracy and culture, and the field of
political science in general (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 3). Their classification of citizens as
either participant, subject, or parochial can provide a useful foundation for understanding
political and civic participation in the digital age.
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Almond and Verba (1963) did not set out to identify what the citizen in a democracy
ought to be, rather, they set out to understand the realities of what citizens actually believe and
do within a democracy. Similarly, this dissertation does not seek to offer a treatise on the ideals
of democratic citizenship, but rather offer an examination of the implications of the digital age
on the attitudes of digital natives as they examine their own actions and responsibilities, both
nationally and globally. Almond and Verba (1963) identify three broad areas to aid in
understanding civic and political culture: (1) belief in an ability to influence the political system
(2) access to information, and (3) action taken to influence the political system. As discussed in
Chapter III, the digital age has influence in each of these areas, especially as communications
and access to information continues to expand exponentially. Digital natives were born into a
new world in which information and communication exist nearly universally. How they make
use of these new opportunities should be examined.
What makes a person likely to be engaged within their community is also an important
area of inquiry. To examine this, Almond and Verba (1963) asked respondents about their
membership in various organizations because of a possible connection to civic and political
behavior. They used this information to analyze both the impact on the respondents’ civic nature
and also as a way of delving into social psychology. For this dissertation, only the prior motive
will be examined. Their findings indicated that “membership in an organization, political or not,
appears…to be related to an increase in the political competence and activity of the individual”
(Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 310). Any study focusing on college students will have a presumed
higher rate of participation in clubs and activities given the opportunities available on many
campuses. In this study 78.7% (656 of 834 respondents) reported being a part of at least one
organization compared to Almond and Verba’s findings where 57% of respondents indicated
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such (p. 302). This can further be broken down into campus activities and non-campus activities.
There are similar results for both on campus (62.8%) and off campus (63.8%) membership. This
level of participation through organizational membership is a sign that digital natives may
actually play an active role in their political community. One topic for future research ought to
be whether participation in these types of activities continues past college, thus addressing
Putnam’s (2000) fear of a declining civic culture. Simply having the early proclivities for such
civic and political action is insufficient without also understanding how that culture manifests
within one’s interactions with the world around them. The ability to influence the political
system, having access to information, and engaging in political acts are all ways in which civic
culture comes to fruition.
Ability to Influence
The first aspect of political and civic culture concerns how individuals view their ability
to influence the political system. This awareness of impact opportunity upon the system is a
prerequisite for any ability to participate within it. Furthermore, the belief in an ability to
influence the system is important for every level of civic culture. The participants must have a
belief that their actions will have an effect, and the subject and parochial must believe that they
could participate and affect change if they ever had a compelling reason to do so. The legitimacy
of the democratic system rests on the ability of the individual to be able to have an effect upon
the system.
In assessing the relationship between the individual and the state, the first item measured
by Almond and Verba was the individual’s view whether or not they feel the government
impacts their lives. They found that 35% said it had a great effect, 53% said some effect, and
10% said no effect (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 81). In this study, 74.7% of survey respondents
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believe that the government has a great deal of impact on their lives, and only 9.1% showed
some disagreement with that statement (the full results can be seen in Table 5a in Appendix A).
Given that most, if not all, colleges and universities require some basic government course, it
would be expected to see a very high level of at least a basic understanding of how the
government system works among respondents. Whether or not those classes are effective in
conveying how the individual is impacted by the government is a question for another study but
given that only 9.1% of respondents disagreed with the government having “a great deal of
impact,” it indicates these classes are working. This measure contributes to the understanding of
the respondents’ views of the “Output Object” as a scale in determining one’s role in the political
culture. As Almond and Verba (1963) explain it, “We were concerned with whether people
perceived government as having an effect on them, their families, and their communities” (p.88).
If people do not believe the government has an impact on their lives, then there would be no
reason to try and influence that government. This attitude shows a belief in the ability of the
government to impact lives, as a measure of power through capacity. People participate in
democracy because they believe their voice will have an impact. Democratic government is
rendered meaningless if it is unresponsive, or even perceived to be unresponsive, to the wishes of
the citizenry. This is not a value statement of positive or negative impact, simply an
acknowledgment of the role of the government.
Another important measurement of trust within the political system is the belief that the
individual will receive the same treatment as others. When asked if they agreed with the
statement “I believe I receive the same treatment under the law as anyone else,” 41.1% (340)
agree, 20.7% (171) said they neither agree nor disagree, and 38.2% (316) said they somewhat
disagree. The ambivalent and somewhat negative response to this question is likely the result of
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the racial discrepancies within the criminal justice system. The Black Lives Matter movement
that started with the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2012 highlights what many see as a
disproportionate treatment by law enforcement. When looking at the survey results through a
racial lens, those who identified as Black or African American were more likely than those who
identified as White or Caucasian to believe they receive the same treatment under the law, x2 (8,
N = 823), 70.17, p < .001. Only 17.5% (21) of African Americans believed they received the
same treatment under the law compared to 47.2% (279) of Caucasians. While a more robust
inquiry into the reasons for this distrust would be a good area for future research, this present
work can only speculate on such reasons. The importance of this, for this dissertation, is its
impact on civic culture. Participation within the system requires a perception of fairness.
To further examine digital natives’ attitudes towards a belief in the ability to impact the
political system, several questions were asked to gauge their trust in the responsiveness of
elected officials. The first of these questions asked to what extent the respondent felt that their
elected representative cared about their views. Digital natives showed a mixed view towards
elected officials with 46.5% agreeing with that statement and 32% in disagreement (full results
can be seen in Table 5b in Appendix A). Respondents were also asked whether or not they
thought elected officials would respond to them if they contacted them. Only 26.7% of
respondents agreed with this statement and 44.4% disagreed (full results can be seen in Table 5c
in Appendix A). A greater number of digital natives believe that their elected representatives
care about their views, yet only a minority believe they would hear back from those same
officials. Democracy is predicated on a feedback system between the general public and the
people who represent them. Given the 46.5% of digital natives who believe representatives care
about their views, it is surprising that only 26.7% believe they would hear back from those
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representatives. It is possible that these respondents believe in more of a trusteeship model of
representation in which the representative does what they believe to be in the best interest of the
people, caring about their constituents’ opinions, but not necessarily being able to respond to
them individually. A delegate model of representation places a greater emphasis on
representation of the majority and would, presumably, mean a greater focus on individual
feedback.
Access to Information
The second area of inquiry identified by Almond and Verba, and perhaps the aspect most
impacted by the digital age, is that of access to information. Digital technology empowers
anyone with internet access to nearly the entire wealth of human knowledge. Information can be
shared and viewed in real time and citizens have greater access to their elected representatives.
The digital age is marked by a communications revolution in which the means of being
connected and informed are seemingly limitless. Awareness of the political system and political
actors is an integral part of being an active participant in the system. “We may assume that if
people follow political and governmental affairs, they are in some sense involved in the process
by which decisions are made” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 88). Being engaged in the political
system not only requires an understanding of the impacts of that system but also an informed
knowledge and understanding of the components of such a system. Looking solely at traditional
media (newspapers, radio, television, and magazines) it would seem that digital natives have a
much lower score of political awareness. Very few respondents indicated that they follow public
affairs daily through traditional media. Television (both local and cable news) used to be the
most popular source for following public affairs, but barely 15% of respondents said they
watched them daily. However, when including new media (various online news sources), the
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proportion of those who follow public affairs at least weekly through one or more sources raises
to over 96%13. The full results of the reported media consumption can be seen here:
TABLE 5.1: Media Consumption14

Newspaper
Printed magazine
Cable news
Local television news
Radio
Talking with friends
Online traditional news15
Online agenda-based
news16
Email newsletters
Social media

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

4.7%
(39)
1.4%
(12)
15.6%
(130)
14.6%
(122)
16.2%
(135)
55.9%
(467)
30.8%
(257)
11.5%
(96)
6.7%
(56)
68.3%
(570)

7.2%
(60)
6.0%
(50)
29.0%
(242)
27.4%
(229)
20.0%
(167)
31.3%
(261)
27.9%
(233)
10.5%
(88)
9.8%
(82)
13.4%
(112)

7.7%
(64)
9.5%
(79)
20.6%
(172)
18.7%
(156)
17.4%
(145)
7.5%
(63)
18.7%
(156)
12.8%
(107)
12.7%
(106)
5.9%
(49)

Less than
Monthly
23.0%
(192)
30.9%
(258)
19.6%
(164)
19.8%
(165)
21.2%
(177)
2.3%
(19)
10.3%
(86)
16.4%
(137)
15.1%
(126)
5.0%
(42)

Never

N

56.0%
(468)
50.8%
(424)
13.9%
(116)
17.6%
(147)
23.0%
(192)
1.3%
(11)
10.7%
(89)
47.2%
(394)
54.3%
(453)
6.3%
(53)

823
823
824
819
816
821
821
822
823
826

The wide variety of media sources now available offers a range of ways in which people
can be informed in the digital age. Digital natives have access to a much greater variety of media
than previous generations. Television alone has undergone radical changes from three channels
(ABC, NBC, CBS) in 1963 to hundreds in 2019. Digital natives now have access to everything

13

96.1% of respondents (N = 826) report following at least one source of traditional or new media at least weekly.
Actual text of question: “People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For
each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less
than monthly, or never.”
15
CNN, Fox, and MSNBC were given as examples of online traditional news websites
16
Occupy Democrats, Inforwars, and Breitbart were given as examples of online agenda-based news sites
14
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their forebearers did, plus social media, email, internet-based news sources, and so on. Digital
natives have the most expansive access to public affairs ever known and the capacity to be
informed has never been so great. Over 80% of respondents said they learn about public affairs
through talking with friends or on social media weekly or daily, well eclipsing the reports of
other sources of information. This shows that their opinions are heavily informed by peer groups
and social media contacts.
One unique aspect of the digital age is the transformation of media from a passive to an
active form of political participation. Almond and Verba (1963) considered exposure to political
communication through media to be a passive activity in which one could not engage with the
information they were consuming (pp. 115–116). The digital age enables media consumption to
be both passive and active. People are now able to read a news story, share it through social
media, and comment on the content. Only 16.8%17 of digital natives said they would never share
a political news story online, while 30.9% said they had never done so in the past year18. Even
traditional news organizations are embracing a more active form of broadcast with various ways
in which the audience can interact with the newscast. There are now instant polls that are
reported live, comments taken by phone or social media, and even stories submitted by the
public.
With information so readily available to the public, it should ideally mean a betterinformed populace. However, the quality of that media must be called into question. While there

Actual text of question: “Here are some forms of political action that people can perform online. For each of these,
please indicate if you have done any of these, would do them, or never would do them: Sharing a political news
story.” The results were: Have done (37.5%; 313); Would Do (13.8%; 115); Might Do (26.8%; 224); Would Never
Do (16.8%; 140); No Answer (5%; 42); N = 835.
18
Actual text of question: “Thinking about those political actions that you can perform online, please consider how
many times you have performed these actions in the last year: Sharing political news story” The results were: Very
often (10.7%; 89); Often (12.1%; 101); Sometimes (22.6%; 189); Rarely (18%; 150); Never (30.9%; 258); No
Answer (5.6%; 47) N = 835).
17

91

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
is a fair distribution in trust among the various media platforms, daily newspapers and local
television news had the highest level of trust (59.8% and 54.5% respectively) and online agendabased media (such as Occupy Democrats, Infowars, and Breitbart) and social media showed the
most distrust (46.9% and 48.7% respectively). One striking result is the level of ambivalence
regarding the trust of various media sources. With the exception of daily newspapers, local
television news, and (barely) online traditional news, the most common response to other media
types was “neither trust nor distrust.” The full results can be seen in Table 5.2:
Table 5.2: Trust in Media
Very
TrustTrust- worthy
worthy
Daily Newspaper
Printed Magazine
Cable News
Local TV News
Radio News
Talking with
Friends
Online Traditional
News
Online Agenda
Based News
Email Newsletters
Social Media

10.5%
(87)
2.7%
(22)
5.7%
(47)
7.7%
(64)
4.7%
(39)
3.6%
(30)
5.6%
(46)
3.4%
(28)
2.7%
(22)
3.1%
(26)

49.3%
(409)
17.7%
(146)
28%
(232)
46.7%
(387)
36%
(297)
24.1%
(199)
32.6%
(269)
11%
(91)
14.9%
(123)
11.4%
(94)

Neither
UntrustVery
Unsure
Trustworthy
worthy UntrustNor
worthy
Untrustworthy
26.9% (223)
5.9%
1.6%
5.9%
(49)
(13)
(49)
37.2% (307)
27%
8.5%
6.9%
(223)
(70)
(57)
32.4% (269)
22.3%
8.4%
3.1%
(185)
(70)
(26)
29% (240)
10.3%
3.1%
3.1%
(85)
(26)
(26)
38.2% (315)
12.4%
3.4%
5.2%
(102)
(28)
(43)
47.5% (393)
17.5%
4.4%
2.9%
(145)
(36)
(24)
32.4% (268)
19.7%
6.8%
2.9%
(163)
(56)
(24)
28.9% (239)
20.2%
26.6%
9.8 %
(167)
(220)
(81)
37.6% (311)
19.6%
9.7%
15.6%
(162)
(80)
(129)
34.1% (282)
27.4%
21.3%
2.8%
(227)
(176)
(23)

N

830
825
829
828
824
827
826
826
827
828

One possible explanation for the high level of ambivalence towards trusting media is the
current political climate in which political leaders and pundits decry certain media as “fake,” and
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truly fake news is able to spread quickly on social media. This is supported by the fact that
48.7% of respondents had an unfavorable opinion of the trustworthiness of social media, and
only 14.5% indicated a favorable opinion. It is paradoxical that while 68.3% of respondents said
they get their news from social media daily, only 3.1% find it to be very trustworthy. One
possible explanation is that people are already on social media for other reasons (entertainment,
distraction, networking, etc.) and just happen to also get news from it. Social media may also not
be their sole source of news. Social media is a platform where news can be actively sought out or
it can be passively observed when social media contacts post links to news stories or comments
on certain issues. Future research should continue to expand on understanding the ways in which
social media is used as a source of news. However, this low confidence in the press is not a new
phenomenon. The World Values Survey has been tracking confidence in the press since 1981,
and with the exception of the first year measured, only 20-25 percent of respondents reported
having confidence in the press. See Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Confidence in the Press19
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
Confident

40.00%

Not Confident
30.00%
20.00%

10.00%
0.00%
1981

1995

1999

2006

2011

Another possible reason for the ambivalence in trust may be the ability to manipulate
information in the digital age. The speed at which false news stories and misinformation can
spread across social media has become so disconcerting that top officials from Facebook,
Twitter, and Google were called to testify before Congress (Barrabi, 2018). Not only is false
information spread easily, but it can be manipulated into appearing more legitimate through a
mirage of widespread support. “For many years now, automated bot armies have artificially
amplified perspectives and manipulated trending algorithms. These small, coordinated groups
have deliberately gamed algorithms so that a handful of voices can mimic a broad consensus”
(Diresta, 2018). Technology, meant to ensure a democratic promotion of ideas based on popular

19

World Values Survey: Wave 1 (1981) Variable 138; Wave 3 (1995) Variable 138; Wave 4 (1999) Variable 149;
Wave 5 (2006) Variable 133; Wave 6 (2011) Variable 110. Actual text of the question: “I am going to name a
number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all: The Press” (Confident is defined
as those who responded a great deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence and not confident is defined as those
who responded not very much confidence or none at all)

94

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
liking, sharing, and commenting, can now be manipulated to give a false sense of popularity.
Nearly half (48.3%) of digital natives in this survey reported sharing memes, news stories, and
posts without verifying whether the information was true. That number increases to 63.4% when
the original post is coming from a source that they personally trust. The plethora of
disinformation acts as a counterbalance to what should be the most well-informed generation in
history. In his farewell address, President Barack Obama (2017) highlighted some of the most
pressing obstacles currently facing democratic society. He said:
For too many of us, it’s become safer to retreat into our own bubbles, whether in
our neighborhoods or on college campuses, or places of worship, or especially
our social media feeds, surrounded by people who look like us and share the
same political outlook and never challenge our assumptions. The rise of naked
partisanship, and the increasing economic and regional stratification, the
splintering of our media into a channel for every taste—all this make this great
sorting seem national, even inevitable. And increasingly, we become so secure in
our bubbles that we start accepting only information, whether it is true or not,
that fits our opinions, instead of basing our opinions on the evidence that is out
there.
While access to information has greatly increased, so has access and exposure to misinformation
and disinformation. For a society to be informed, it must be able to distinguish between
legitimate facts and falsehoods.
The importance of accurate information in a democracy cannot be overstated. In 1975,
James R. Schlesinger remarked that “everybody is entitled to his own views…everybody is not
entitled to his own facts” (Wyant Jr., 1975, p. 7). Democratic government should be based upon
competing ideals, not competing conceptions of reality. Even though respondents showed a
general distrust of media, they did indicate that they learn about issues from more than one
source. When asked about their agreement with the statement: “When I see a story I am
interested in, I will read about it from a variety of news sources,” 61.5% (486) agreed and only
14.5% (115) disagreed. Even with biased news and distorted summaries, when someone reads
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about a story from a variety of sources, the facts ought to become apparent. Distrust in media, or
skepticism, can be healthy if it drives a curiosity that seeks out the truth. Democracy requires
debate, but it cannot function if the basic facts of the matter are in dispute.
Taking Action
The third area in examining civil and political culture is the extent to which a person is
active within the political system. One of the most basic aspects in understanding an individuals’
level of involvement is their interest in politics. This dissertation seeks to examine the attitudes
on both national and global issues, so the question was broken up to measure interest in both.
When asked about their level of interest in national and global affairs, the most common
response for both was “interested” at 37.6% and 39.3% respectively. Over half of all respondents
indicated some level of interest in political issues (53.2% in domestic politics, and 56% in
international issues). Given that domestic politics plays a larger role in their lives, it is surprising
that there would be a greater interest in international politics. It is possible that globalization has
made people more aware of the impact of the world around them. This, coupled with the
increased ability to hear about international events, has likely driven this increase in interest.
Digital natives reported a disinterest in domestic politics at only 27.5%, and 21.9% for global
affairs. The full results can be seen in Table 5.4:
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Table 5.4: Interest in Domestic and Global Affairs
Domestic Political
Affairs20
Very interested
15.6% (129)
Interested
37.6% (312)
Neither interested nor disinterested 19.3% (160)
Not very interested
17.1% (142)
Not interested at all
10.4% (86)
N = 829

International/Global
Affairs21
16.7% (139)
39.3% (326)
22.0% (183)
13.5% (112)
8.4% (70)
N = 830

Along with being aware of what is going on in one’s world, one of the most critical
attributes of input cognition regarding political awareness is following the affairs of elected
officials. Knowing the positions and issues being addressed by one’s elected officials is
necessary for being involved in the political affairs of the community. The digital age adds a new
dimension to this by increasing the number of ways in which the individual can follow political
and governmental affairs. Forty-one percent of digital natives in this sample reported that they
follow an elected official on social media. This allows elected officials to communicate directly
with the people they represent on a wide scale. Additionally, 18% of digital natives said they
would follow the social media account of an elected official and 24% said they might do so.
Only 17% said that they would never follow an elected official on social media. This direct line
of political communication better enables individuals to follow the actions of their government.
Another measure of political action is engaging in civil discourse with other members of
the community regarding political issues. Almond and Verba (1963) noted the importance of
political discourse by saying: “If ordinary men and women are to participate in a democratic
political process, they must have the feeling that it is safe to do so, that they do not assume great

20

Actual text of question: “Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in domestic political affairs,
with 1 being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested”
21
Actual text of question: “Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in international/global
affairs, with 1 being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested”
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risks when they express political opinions, and that they can be relatively free about whom they
talk to” (p. 115). Civil discourse is essential in the democratic process, and citizens ought to be
able to express their views and engage with others on topics of political importance. Political
communication is an area that has been greatly enhanced by the digital age. People now can
communicate in person, over the phone (with voice and/or video), or online. As digital
technology connects more people, political communication can take place irrespective of
physical proximity. Somewhat surprisingly, even with this greater capacity for communication,
when digital natives were asked about the frequency with which they discuss politics and
national and global issues, they seem to prefer in-person communication. Twenty-four percent of
respondents indicated they would never engage in an online political discussion while 76% said
they either might or have done so. When asked about whether or not they recently engaged in
such discussion, 34% replied that they had not engaged in an online political discussion within
the past year. However, although the frequency of discussing politics with others has not
changed with the evolution in communication technology, another question asked of digital
natives revealed there may be more to this issue. When asked how often they discuss current
national or global issues with friends and colleagues, only 1.3% replied that they had never done
so. This may indicate a bias towards the idea of talking about “politics.” Certainly not all
national and global issues will have a political component, but most will. When nearly 90% of
respondents indicate that they discuss national and global issues with friends and colleagues
either weekly or daily, it certainly seems to be a strong indicator for this component of civic
culture among digital natives (see Table 5.5). It is possible that the term “politics” has a negative
connotation to it, which would explain the difference between talking “politics” and talking
about “national and global” issues.
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Table 5.5: Discussing Politics
Frequency of people who
learn about national and
global issues through talking
with friends or colleagues
Daily
56.9% (467)
Weekly
31.8% (261)
Monthly
7.7% (63)
Less Than
2.3% (19)
Monthly
Never
1.3% (11)
N = 821

Frequency of people who
would engage in online
political discussions
Have Done
Would Do
Might Do
Would Never
Do

38.0% (302)
12.1% (96)
26.2% (208)
23.7% (188)

Frequency of people who
have engaged in online
political discussions in the
last year
Very Often
15.6% (124)
Often
10.6% (84)
Sometimes
20.9% (166)
Rarely
19.0% (151)
Never

N = 794

33.9% (269)
N = 794

Perhaps the most widely used measures of political participation in a democracy include
actions such as voting, contacting elected officials, engaging in protests, signing a petition, and
other areas of participation. Almond and Verba (1963) explained the crucial nature of
participation for the functioning of democracy by saying: “Certain things are demanded of the
ordinary citizen if elites are to be responsive to him: the ordinary citizen must express his point
of view so that elites can know what he wants; he must be involved in politics so that he will
know and care whether or not elites are being responsive, and he must be influential so as to
enforce responsive behavior by the elites” (p. 478). Elected representatives cannot be said to
truly represent the people if the people are not willing to make their opinions known.
One of the clearest examples of political action within a democracy is that of voting in
local and national elections. Democratic governance is based upon the consent of the governed
conveyed through a popular vote to determine who will represent the populace in government.
Voting has long been a contentious issue in the United States considering its relatively low voter
turnout compared to other nations. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
reports on voter turnout around the world, and the U.S. has seen relatively low rates of Voting
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Age Population22 (VAP) with turnout not breaking 60% since the 1992 presidential election. The
more recent elections exemplify these low turnouts: 2016 (55.98%); 2014 (32.98%); 2012
(51.80%); 2010 (38.51%), (IDEA, 2018). Digital natives report 37.5% claiming to always vote in
national elections and 15.4% in local elections. While these numbers do not bode well for
democracy, another 31.3% (and 29.9% for local elections) report that they were not old enough
to vote, but plan to vote in future elections. If those numbers hold true, that would bring the voter
turnout to 68.8% for national elections and 45.3% for local elections23 (See Table 5.6). These
numbers would be slightly higher than past averages, but there is still the social desirability bias
to be concerned about, especially for those who say they plan to vote when they are old enough.
Table 5.6: Voting24

Always
Usually
Sometimes
Never
Not old enough, but plan to
Not old enough, do not plan to
No Answer

National Elections
37.5% (313)
13.3% (111)
9.6% (80)
6.0% (50)
31.3% (261)
1.9% (16)
0.5% (4)
N = 835

Local Elections
15.4% (129)
17.4% (145)
20.7% (173)
13.2% (110)
29.9% (250)
2.6% (22)
0.7% (6)
N = 835

Yet a vibrant democratic society requires much more than simply voting. There are
numerous other methods of traditional political action, such as signing petitions, calling elected
officials, joining in a boycott, attending peaceful demonstrations, and joining in strikes. As with
any action, individuals often weigh risk versus reward. Actions with potential higher risks or

22

Some measures of voter turnout are based on the percentage of registered voters, but VAP is based upon those
who are of legal age to vote.
23
The exact turnout for local elections is often less than for national elections, sometimes upwards of 50% less, so it
may be overly optimistic to assume that those who say they were not old enough to vote but plan to vote would still
vote at the same rate for both national and local elections. The 45.3% reported would likely be less in practice.
24
Actual text of question: “When (national/state and local) elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or
never?”
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lower chances of achieving their objectives (rewards) are less likely to be taken. When asking
digital natives about their participation in such actions, signing a petition had the highest
response of have done or would do at 77.5%. Signing a petition has relatively little cost in terms
of time, effort, or risk. Contrast that with an action such as joining a strike with a high cost of
time, effort, and potential risk, and only 26.6% of digital natives indicated that they have or
would participate in a strike, whereas 35% said they would never engage in one. Full results can
be seen in Table 5.7:
Table 5.7: Traditional Political Action25
Signing a
petition
Have Done
Would Do
Might Do
Would Never Do
N

61.9%
(511)
15.6%
(129)
16.7%
(138)
5.8%
(48)
826

Calling an
elected
official
14.1%
(116)
24.1%
(198)
37.9%
(197)
23.9%
(197)
823

Joining in Attending a
a boycott peaceful
demonstration
11.2%
14.3% (118)
(92)
25.1%
34.2% (282)
(206)
37.3%
32.0% (264)
(306)
26.3%
19.5% (161)
(216)
820
825

Joining a
strike
4.3% (35)
22.3%
(183)
38.4%
(315)
35.0%
(287)
820

Along with traditional or conventional political action, the digital age has enabled people
with even more avenues for political engagement. There are several areas that involve both
access to information and taking action, such as following elected officials, traditional media
groups, and issue advocacy groups on social media. Nearly 40% of digital natives reported
following an elected official on social media, 29.1% followed traditional media (such as CNN,
MSNBC, Fox, etc.) and 18.9% follow issue advocacy groups (National Rifle Association, Sierra

Actual text of question: “Here are some of the forms of political action that people can take. For each of these,
please indicate If you have done any of these, would do them, might do them, or never would do them: Signing a
petition, calling an elected official, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, joining strikes”
25
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Club, etc.). An even greater percentage of respondents indicated they might follow each of the
three groups on social media (39.9% for political officials, 43.7% for media, and 47.5 for issue
advocacy groups). Additionally, the digital age provides avenues for the dissemination and
discussion of ideas and information. The vast majority of digital natives (79.1%) reported that
they had or might share a political news story on social media. Similarly, 77.5% had or would
share a political meme. Actions like these serve the function of spreading information, which
could possibly lead to a more informed discussion on important issues. The digital age also
brings new ways to directly communicate with elected officials. Nearly 63% of digital natives
said they had or might comment on an elected officials’ social media post and 67.5% reported
that they had or might email an elected official. The ability to engage in preference expression is
critical in a democracy and a requirement for classification as a participant. The full results of
responses to online political action can be seen in Table 5.8:
Table 5.8: Online Political Action
Have
Done
Commenting on an elected 20.2%
official’s media post
(169)
Following an elected
38.9%
official on social media
(325)
Sharing a political news
38.5%
story
(313)
Sharing political memes
38.2%
(319)
Emailing an elected official 15.7%
(131)
Following traditional
29.1%
media accounts
(243)
Following issue advocacy
18.9%
groups
(158)

Would
Do
14.5%
(121)
17.0%
(142)
13.8%
(115)
15.9%
(133)
19.9%
(166)
17.2%
(144)
15.6%
(130)

Might
Do
28.0%
(234)
22.9%
(191)
26.8%
(224)
23.4%
(195)
31.9%
(266)
26.5%
(221)
31.9%
(266)

Would
Never Do
32.1%
(268)
15.9%
(133)
16.8%
(140)
17.2%
(144)
27.1%
(226)
21.9%
(183)
28.6%
(239)

No
Answer
5.1%
(43)
5.2%
(44)
5.1%
(43)
5.2%
(44)
5.5%
(46)
5.1%
(43)
5.0%
(42)

N
835
835
835
835
835
835
835
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Discussion
This chapter sought to reexamine the tenets of the civic culture, as described by Almond
and Verba in 1963, in light of new opportunities brought upon by the digital age. Prior to the
digital age political engagement was limited to acts such as voting, signing petitions, call or
writing elected officials, striking, boycotts, protests and riots. Political information was
transmitted through newspapers, radio, television, magazines, and talking with others. Following
domestic and/or international affairs could only be done through one or more of these media.
Civic life itself was relegated to local communities. Engaging with others based on a shared
interest was only possible if it took place within a distance someone was willing to travel. If
someone wanted to join a book club, a political advocacy group, or a bowling league, it would
have to be within a local community. People were more connected through interpersonal contact,
because that was the only option available to them.
The digital age revolutionized many things, including how individuals relate to the
community around them. Political engagement now includes various forms of online activism.
Petitions can be signed online, representatives can be contacted through email, and political
action can be organized online. Perhaps the greatest advancement comes through access to
information. Traditional media has expanded to digital content available to anyone with internet
access. Media has gone global and it has also bypassed the traditional gatekeepers such as editors
and program directors. Anyone with a camera phone and access to the internet can share live
images anywhere in the world. Elected officials now have various social media accounts where
they can address the public directly. When Theodore Roosevelt referred to the office of the
presidency as the bully pulpit, something that gave him both legitimacy and a wide audience by
which to spread his message, it is unlikely that he (or anyone) could have imagined the reach that
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social media gives to everyone. However, there is the dangerous precedent of popularity being
mistaken for legitimacy. Speaking of the political struggles of populist nationalist leaders such as
Donald Trump (U.S.), Boris Johnson (UK), and Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel), Graham (2019)
notes that, “A common denominator is that once in office, these politicians have found that
charisma does not translate smoothly to power.” Populist nationalism often relies on a critique of
the status quo and a claim of representing those who have been ignored by elites in power.
Finally, civic life itself has been transformed, and is no longer bound by geography.
People can engage in civic activities from their computers, and it also provides a greater diversity
of activity. In 1963, if someone wanted to join a book club to discuss Fahrenheit 451 by Ray
Bradbury, there was a risk of being ostracized. Unless the community happened to be
enlightened enough to read a book that had been banned in many places, such a book club would
have been unthinkable. Today people can connect through shared interests freely online without
fear of judgment.
Underlying the discussion of civic culture, in 1963 or 2018, is the question of how
individuals interpret and exercise their responsibility within the political community. Almond
and Verba (1963) used the typology of parochial, subject, and participant to understand the levels
of involvement by people in the polis. One of the biggest possible changes from 1963 is whether
or not parochials still exist, or more aptly, can they still exist? In an age in which information is
available via so many media, the ability to be removed from or ignorant of the system, to be a
parochial, becomes somewhat of a conscious choice rather than de facto position. Parochials do
not know how government impacts them, they do not follow governmental affairs, and they do
not see themselves as playing any role within the political system. With 96% of digital natives
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indicating that they follow governmental affairs, at least occasionally, one must ask if there is
still cause for including parochials in the classification.
But the question of whether or not there still is a civic culture in 2018, and what that
looks like, remains. This was the central question of this chapter. The first hypothesis tested
assumed that the typology of participant, subject, and parochial would remain relevant, although
parochial would be much less relevant. For the most part, this hypothesis has been confirmed.
Digital natives can still be understood as those who are actively engaged in the political
community (participants) and those who may be slightly active but remain largely on the
outskirts of such political activity (subjects). The vast majority, 74.7%, of digital natives believe
that the government has a great deal of impact on their lives. When it comes to discussing
politics, there is a similar trend with 66.1% of digital natives saying they have engaged in online
political discussions. Finally, when it comes to following the accounts of political and global
affairs, only 16.8% of digital natives said they would never follow an elected official on social
media. It is clear that digital natives are aware of the impact of government on their lives and at
least some are active in shaping the civic life around them.
One critical aspect of civic culture is the ability to be informed. A subset of the first
hypothesis is that digital natives would be more informed but would also face greater obstacles
to discerning between legitimate news, misinformation, and disinformation. There is no question
that there are more sources available to digital natives than there were to people in 1963, but
quantity should not be confused with quality. Digital natives don’t get their information from
newspapers, magazines, television, or radio at the same rates found by Almond and Verba, but
many of them get their information from new media such as online traditional news, email
newsletters, and social media. Almond and Verba did not indicate how many people in their
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study followed public affairs in total; they only reported how many did so through various media
sources. This study did tabulate how many people followed public affairs through at least one
medium, and at 96%, it would appear that the civic culture of digital natives is quite healthy.
Digital natives also show a healthy skepticism for many of those same sources of
information. The three most often viewed sources of information are social media, talking with
friends, and online traditional news sites, but, ironically, they are not the most trusted sources.
Nearly 49% of digital natives reported viewing social media as an untrustworthy source of
information (compared to 14.5% that found it trustworthy). Similar results are seen with friends
(27.7% trustworthy; 21.9% untrustworthy) and online traditional news sites (38.2% trustworthy;
28.5% untrustworthy). These sources are beaten out by daily newspapers and local television
which both are found trustworthy by over 50% of the sample. Presumably, individuals would get
their information from the source they believe to be most credible, but these results suggest
otherwise. However, only 13.7% of digital natives said that they rarely or never read a story from
more than one source. Even if digital natives don’t place much trust in where they get their news,
it would seem they counter that by following the story on a variety of mediums.
Even with all the obstacles presented by the digital age, there are still several reasons for
continued optimism for the civic and political engagement of digital natives. With the plethora of
media available to digital natives, there is always the risk of information overload and an
inability to discern truth from fiction. According to the Pew Research Center, “those with high
political awareness, those who are very digitally savvy, and those who place high levels of trust
in the news media are better able than others to accurately identify news-related statements as
factual or opinion” (Mitchell, et al., 2018). Digital natives have shown a predilection for
obtaining their news from a variety of sources, better enabling an informed public.
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The second hypothesis tested here was that civic engagement will be more robust with
new avenues of engagement available to digital natives. Almond and Verba did not ask
respondents to disclose various forms of political action, but they did ask how respondents might
try to influence government. They asked about writing letters, signing petitions, contacting
elected officials, voting, protests, and violent actions. Along with these actions, digital natives
also have the ability to write emails, organize online, comment on news stories or posts by
representatives, share information, and so on.
The three areas that aid in an understanding of civic and political culture, (1) belief in an
ability to influence the political system, (2) access to information, and (3) action taken to
influence the political system, all seem to be present for digital natives. While their civic culture
is not the same as the one studied by Almond and Verba in 1963, it is still a vibrant civic culture.
Technology has brought neither damnation nor salvation to the civic culture, but it has created
new ways for people to be engaged. Like all things, whether it has a positive or negative impact
is dependent on how it is used. Digital natives believe they have the ability to influence the
system. They have access to information. They are taking action to influence that system. While
the methods by which civic engagement had traditionally been understood have changed, that
does not mean the civic culture is any less robust.
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Chapter VI:
Cosmopolitan Responsibility
No man is an island,
Entire of itself.
Each is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main.
[…]
Each man’s death diminishes me,
For I am involved in mankind.
Therefore, send not to know
For whom the bell tolls,
It tolls for thee.
John Donne, 162426
Writing in 1624, John Donne elegantly put into poetry the idea of a universal
connectedness that embodies the philosophy of cosmopolitanism. No human exists without
impacting, and being impacted, by others. No human survives in absolute solitude.
Cosmopolitanism promotes the recognition of the dignity within all, regardless of where a person
is born. There is a commonly recognized belief in some level of individual responsibility towards
those in one’s community. The critical question arises of how far that community extends and
how far that obligation extends. Geographical and political conditions have defined communities
for millennia, but that was based on the technological capacities of the time, which limited
communication and interaction.
Just as the digital age changed the way in which individuals interact with their political
community, so too did it change the way in which they relate to the world. Expanded
communications and global social networking have led to greater interaction between people
from around the globe. Unlike previous generations in which physical distance created barriers to
interaction, the digital age both enables and enhances communication. Digital natives have

26

Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII.
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grown up in a world where interaction routinely takes place across borders. With this interaction
comes both empathy and understanding along with a capacity to have an impact on events
around the world.
This chapter will examine the attitudes of digital natives as they relate to both
cosmopolitan and populist nationalism attitudes. While globalization has created greater global
connections, the Western world has witnessed a growing trend of populism grounded in
nationalist and isolationist sentiments. Digital natives are being torn between these two
fundamentally opposed ideologies. The previous chapter examined the manifestation of
responsibility by digital natives within their community, but the next step requires understanding
how (or if) they view a responsibility beyond their own countries. Both cosmopolitanism and
populist nationalism provide arguments for where the individual’s responsibility ought to lie.
Cosmopolitan responsibility today is the premise that individuals, connected by the digital age,
will feel responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights for all people,
regardless of geographic proximity. This theory also believes that individuals will act within
their capacity to affect change at the global level. This chapter seeks to both identify the
differences between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists and examine whether there is
evidence of the existence of a cosmopolitan responsibility.
Cosmopolitans and Populist Nationalists
As discussed in Chapter II, cosmopolitans and populist nationalists differ in a number of
areas, most obviously in their outlook towards the outside world. Populist nationalists have an
inward focus on their own community. They prefer a homogenous culture, state focus on
domestic concerns, protection from outsiders, and promoting a strong nationalism (Ignazi, 2010).
Populist nationalists often favor a strong military and open trade, but otherwise show disdain for
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a globalizing world (Fukuyama, 2018). Cosmopolitans, broadly speaking, focus upon global
society with a fondness for diversity and cultural heterogeneity. They focus on cooperation rather
than competition and dismiss the lottery of birth that placed them in a bounded location (Brown
& Held, 2010). They reject the noble lie of Socrates that binds the individual to the land in which
they are born (Plato/Bloom, 1991, p. 94). As citizens of the world, cosmopolitans see their
responsibility as including all people, whereas populist nationalists direct their responsibility
towards others in their own country27 (De Mattas, 2017).
As discussed in Chapter IV, a Cosmopolitan/Populist Nationalism (CPN) Scale was
created to measure both cosmopolitan and populist nationalism attitudes. This scale, comprised
of six questions favoring cosmopolitan values and seven favoring populist nationalism values,
allowed for respondents to be identified as favoring one of the two outlooks or being neutral. Of
the 826 respondents, 20.2% (167) were identified as cosmopolitan, 20.0% (165) as populist
nationalist, and 59.8% (494) as neutral28. Having identified the respondents, their disposition to
political ideology, media, and political action could be investigated. The attitudes measured in
the CPN Scale can be seen in Table 6.1:

27

The incompatibility of cosmopolitan and populist nationalism is discussed in the literature review in Chapter II
and is confirmed by this study, the results of which are discussed in Chapter IV.
28
As discussed in Chapter IV, those who scored 4 and above on the CPN were coded as cosmopolitan, a score of 2
and below were coded as populist nationalists, and those with a score in-between were coded as neutral.
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Table 6.1: Cosmopolitan/Populist Nationalism Scale
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cosmopolitan Attitudes
I am willing to work abroad in another
culture
I am open to living abroad in another
culture
I enjoy learning more about different
cultures in the world
I get upset when people do not want to
offer help when those in need are
foreigners
I want to help those in need, even if
they are from other countries
We should celebrate cultural
differences

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Populist Nationalism Attitudes
Being an American is important to me
International organizations are taking
away too much power from the U.S.
government
Immigrants increase crime rates
I believe we should solve problems at
home before helping other countries
I believe my country usually does
what is in the best interest of the world
When there is widespread human
suffering in other countries, I believe
the U.S. should focus on its
responsibility towards other
Americans
When there is widespread human
suffering in other countries, I believe
the U.S. should intervene if the
country is important to the U.S.

Won’t You Be My Neighbor?
One of the main questions this dissertation seeks to examine is to what extent
relationships with those from other countries, and particularly through global social media
connections, influences attitudes. In theory, the more connections people have with those from
around the world, the more compassion, understanding, and empathy they are expected to have
for others. In the digital age, these connections are easier to establish with technology removing
many of the traditional barriers to interaction with those around the world. The past century has
witnessed tremendous innovation, not only in physical travel, but also in the ability to
communicate with others regardless of geographical proximity. Communication has evolved
from only taking place between those living locally, to the written word being carried over great
distances, to physical travel almost anywhere, and now real-time visual and aural
communication. For millennia, people could only interact with those who lived in their
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communities, but now digital technology allows for access to and communication nearly
everywhere.
One of the hypothesized relationships described in Chapter IV is that people with more
connections to those from other countries will hold greater cosmopolitan values (H4).
Presumably international travel would contribute to creating those connections. The more people
travel, the more they will interact with other cultures. Respondents were asked the binomial
question of whether or not they had traveled overseas (1 = yes, 0 = no). An independent t-test
showed that cosmopolitans were more likely to travel internationally (M = .72, SE = .035) than
populist nationalists (M = .61, SE = .038). The difference was significant t (326.82) = -2.18, p <
.05, however, it only represented a small effect size29 d = .23. Surprisingly, there was only a
small correlation between international travel and being cosmopolitan or populist nationalist.
However, the survey asked about international travel, but only as a binary yes or no question. It
is plausible that such a broad question could not capture the quality of travel compared to its
quantity. If someone travels internationally on a cruise in which they only visit touristy ports for
a few hours, it may be international travel, but it is certainly not the same experience as someone
who spends a few months or years living abroad. Hull et al. (2019) found that even short stays, if
well planned, can have a positive impact on cosmopolitan attitudes. The notion of increased
travel leading to more cosmopolitan feelings has been found in numerous studies (Mau et al.,
2008; Gu & Schweisfurth, 2015; Kishino & Takahashi, 2019). Future research should take a
more complex look at how travel impacts cosmopolitan and populist nationalist attitudes by

The measure of effect size, Cohen’s d was established by Cohen (1988) setting the threshold of small, medium,
and large at 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 respectively. Sawilowsky (2009) recommends the expansion of this scale to include
very small starting at 0.01, very large (1.20) and huge (2.0). Sawilowsky’s additions will be used in this dissertation.
29
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looking at factors such as duration of travel, the kinds of interaction with the native population,
the purpose of the travel, and other factors that may better explain this relationship.
A better measure of global connections may come through friendships with those from
other countries. When it comes to developing empathy for those in other countries, one of the
simplest methods is to have contact with people from those countries. It is easy to not feel any
responsibility or connection to a nameless and faceless public that an individual has never had
any experience with. When people experience other cultures, especially through friendship, it
would likely result in a greater connection with those in that culture. Knowing others, seeing
their experiences, hearing their opinions, and witnessing a life outside of one’s own can foster
empathy. Metro-Roland (2018) notes that the presence of foreign students on college campuses
can help foster cosmopolitan attitudes.
To examine the extent to which personal relationships impact cosmopolitan or populist
nationalist attitudes, this study asked respondents about the number of friends they have from
other countries, the number of close friends from other countries, and finally, the number of
friends on social media from other countries. When asking about the total number of friends
from other countries, respondents with greater number of friends from other countries were more
likely to be identified as cosmopolitan (M = 3.00, SE = 1.03) compared to populist nationalists
(M = 2.25, SE = .89). The difference was significant t(329) = -7.10, p < .001; with a medium,
bordering large, effect size d = .78. When it comes to having close friends from other countries,
we see similar results. The more close friends people have, the more likely they are to be
identified as cosmopolitan (M = 2.55, SE = 1.23) compared to populist nationalists (M = 1.95, SE
= .95). The results were significant t(309) = -5.00, p < .001, and had a medium effect size d =
.55.
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Social media presents an interesting case because of the new nature of these online
relationships. So-called real, in-person friendships are likely to create better understanding
between people as they are exposed to the life and views of each other. But virtual friendships
have thus far not been tested in terms of how much of a bond is created and how much is shared.
While in-person friendships require a measure of geographical proximity, at least during some
point in the friendship, the digital world suffers no such confines. Connections can be made
without ever actually meeting the person with whom you are now friends. Platforms like
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and others are predicated on establishing friendships, both through
real-world relations and through finding others who share similar interests. McEwan and SobreDenton (2011) explain it by saying that “there is evidence that social media facilitates virtual
spaces where individuals can co-construct third cultures, develop cosmopolitanism, and transfer
cultural and social capital” (p. 257). Social media creates a space in which people can “live” and
exist together regardless of geographic locations. People who live on opposite ends of the earth
can be neighbors in cyberspace. Results of the survey indicated that the more friends from other
countries people have on social media, the more likely they are to be classified as cosmopolitan
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.01) compared to populist nationalists (M = 2.41, SD = .87). This difference
was significant t(325) = -9.25, p < .001, and represented a large effect size d = 1.02. As this
study has shown, friends and contacts from other countries on social media do contribute to
cosmopolitan attitudes rather than feelings of populist nationalism.
Politics
One of the strongest relationships between cosmopolitan or populist nationalism values is
how someone identifies on a spectrum of liberal to conservative. In the survey of digital natives,
respondents were asked to rate their political views on a seven-point scale, with 1 being
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extremely conservative and 7 being extremely liberal. Respondents classified as cosmopolitan
were more likely to identify towards the liberal side of the scale (M = 5.63, SD = 1.10) compared
to those identified as populist nationalists who identified with the more conservative side of the
scale (M = 2.79, SD = 1.40). The difference was significant t(309.4) = -20.60, p <.001, and
represented a huge effect size d = 2.26. Cosmopolitans were much more likely to identify as
politically liberal, populist nationalists were much more likely to identify as politically
conservative. The more liberal a person is, the more they will exhibit cosmopolitan values, and
conversely, the more conservative a person is, the more they will reflect the values of populist
nationalism.
There is a marked difference between American conservatives and liberals in a number of
key policy areas, but for this chapter, the differences in ideology are the paramount concern.
Gries (2014) explains, “Trusting liberals are more inclined towards cooperation; wary
conservatives, by contrast, are predisposed towards competitive interpersonal and intergroup
relations” (p. 40). This fundamental tenet of political ideology would naturally play an important
part in developing populist nationalist or cosmopolitan attitudes. If life is about competition,
there seems to be little to no benefit in placing a great care for the welfare of those beyond one’s
local community. Conversely, when cooperation is seen as a benefit for all parties involved,
there is value in caring for the well-being of others, regardless of geographical proximity.
Respondents were also asked to rate their level of interest in domestic politics and
international affairs. As explained in Chapter IV, I hypothesized that those cosmopolitans would
be more interested in international affairs and populist nationalists would be more interested in
domestic politics. Hypothesis H4 stated that those exhibiting cosmopolitan traits would be more
interested in international affairs and H5 stated that those exhibiting populist nationalism traits
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would be more interested in domestic affairs. The survey results for this were mixed. Interest in
domestic politics, measured on a scale from 1 (not interested) to 7 (very interested), revealed that
cosmopolitans were significantly more interested in domestic politics (M = 3.78, SD = 1.11) than
populist nationalists (M = 3.26, SD = 1.31). The difference was significant t(317.67) = -3.91, p <
.001, but produced only a small effect d = 0.43. These findings contradict the expected results
described in H5, which predicted that populist nationalists would have a greater interest in
domestic politics than cosmopolitans. However, as the literature described in Chapter II, populist
nationalism often includes an element of disdain for elites and the political system itself. A
dislike, or distrust, for the system would likely result in low levels of interest in domestic
political issues. Although this study did not test for this directly, future research should include
an examination of populist nationalists towards the state and the mechanisms of government to
see the level of such distrust.
Respondents were also asked about their level of interest in international and global
affairs. Cosmopolitans again showed a greater interest (M = 4.10, SD = .93) than did populist
nationalists (M = 2.99, SD = 1.26). The difference was significant t(298.84) = -9.09, p < .001,
and represented a large-sized effect d = 1.00. As theorized in H4, those interested in international
and global affairs were significantly more likely to be cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitans may be
more interested in both domestic and international affairs because they feel a greater
responsibility for things in general. Populist nationalists may be more accepting of the status quo,
especially at a time when a populist nationalist such as Donald Trump is president. If their
beliefs are not supported by the political leadership, they may not follow the affairs of state with
such vigor.
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Age of Information?
Speaking to a convention of news directors in 1958, Edward R. Murrow behooved them
to embrace the incredible responsibility conferred upon them by their position. He said, “Our
history will be what we make it. And if there are any historians about fifty or a hundred years
from now, and there should be preserved the kinescopes for one week of all three networks, they
will there find recorded in black and white, or color, evidence of decadence, escapism and
insulation from the realities of the world in which we live” (Murrow, 1967, p. 355). The role of
media in society, the responsibility it bears for informing a society, is a subject that has received
much attention (Sanders, 2015; Bednarek & Cape, 2017; Coe, 2018; Scammell & Semetko,
2018). A robust media is essential for any free society. As Murrow pleaded, the media often fails
in its mission when it provides entertainment and distraction rather than providing the critical
information needed by citizens. In an ideal democracy, the citizenry must be aware of the events
of the day, the affairs of state, the actions of their representatives, and other such information that
allows them to perform their duties as citizens in the most informed way possible. Voting and
other political participation require informed reasoning, and the media has traditionally been a
critical source of such information. The media are not entirely blameworthy in this, given that
gossip and infotainment often provide greater ratings than actual news. However, when Murrow
gave this admonishment in 1958, the news received by the public was largely the purview of
news directors and editors. With limited options, the public only had a few sources of critical
media.
One of the hallmarks of the digital age is the unprecedented access to information,
including access to news through a variety of sources. As discussed in the previous chapter,
digital natives have a wide breadth of media through which they consume information. With
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over 96% of survey respondents indicating that they follow public affairs at least weekly through
one or more news sources, the importance of examining the type, factual consistency, and
political leanings of those sources becomes a critical issue. The sheer plethora of information
available does not negate the fact that all information is not delivered equally. All news sources
have some bias in what they report and how they report it, but some go so far as to completely
distort information to serve their agenda. One hypothesis (H4) is that cosmopolitans will be more
likely to get their news from a variety of sources, and more legitimate news sources. Conversely,
H5 posits that populist nationalists will get their news from more agenda-based sources.
The information available can influence a person’s view of the world. Biases from media
and the way information is presented (or not presented) will undoubtedly factor into
cosmopolitan or populist nationalist attitudes. The relationship between what people watch and
their global outlook is a contentious one. Lindell (2012) explored the idea that increased media
consumption would cause cosmopolitan feelings through what Hannerz (1996) called “electronic
empathy.” Lindell found no significant increase in cosmopolitan attitudes between those who
consumed media via radio, television, or internet amongst those in Scandinavian countries,
although reading the news did show a significant effect in three of the four countries studied. In
this dissertation, media is not treated as a monolithic entity. The question being asked here is
whether or not there is any relationship between cosmopolitan or populist nationalist values and
various sources of media.
Respondents were asked about their consumption habits (Never (1), Less than Monthly,
Monthly, Weekly, or Daily (5)) of ten different sources of media. There was no significant
difference in the average time spent reading newspapers or magazines, listening to the radio,
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viewing online traditional news30 (CNN, Fox, MSNBC, etc.), and getting news via email
newsletter and social media between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists. Populist
nationalists were more likely to watch cable news31 (M = 3.33, SD = 1.32) than cosmopolitans
(M = 2.96, SD = 1.35). The difference was significant t(328) = 2.5, p = .013, but it only had a
small effect size d = 0.28. Populist nationalists were also more likely to watch local television
news (M = 3.26, SD = 1.33) than cosmopolitans (M = 2.75, SD = 1.43). The difference was
significant t(324) = 3.33, p = .001, but again only had a small effect size d = 0.37. Local news
may have an appeal to populist nationalists because it covers more local and regional issues.
Seeing the plight of neighbors may make one more inclined to want to help those at home rather
than those far away. It also promotes a sense of community by keeping people apprised of local
events. Populist nationalists were also more likely to watch agenda-based news sources (Occupy
Democrats, Infowars, Breitbart, etc.) (M = 2.44, SD = 1.44) than cosmopolitans (M = 2.01, SD =
1.35). The difference was significant t(324.1) = 2.86, p = .005, and it did represent a small effect
d = 0.31. This does confirm H5 that predicted populist nationalists would be more likely to get
their news from agenda-based sources, even if the effect was not as strong as expected.
As hypothesized in this dissertation, and supported by the literature review, connections
with other people from around the world, fostered by the digital age, ought to produce a sense of
cosmopolitan responsibility. If a person gets their news through friends, who may be from other
countries, and can offer different perspectives, that may be the reason it contributes to
cosmopolitan leanings. Cosmopolitans did show a greater predilection for getting information
from friends (M = 4.49, SD = .675) compared to populist nationalists (M = 4.29, SD = 1.03). The

30

While there is an important ongoing debate about media bias, separating traditional news into all the top media
companies would have made the survey too burdensome, so they were grouped together. This is not meant to
downplay the importance of such debates, but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
31
Examples given of cable news were CNN, Fox, and MSNBC.
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difference was significant t(275.1) = -2.13, p = 0.34, but the effect size was small d = 0.23.
While there may be only a small difference between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists, it is
worth noting that cosmopolitans were more likely to have a greater number of international
friends. If cosmopolitans have a greater likelihood of getting news from friends, and those
friends are from other countries, it is likely that that news will include a more global perspective.
Similarly, social media can include global connections that also inform on international issues.
These connections that bring people together may be part of what Hannerz (1996) considered
electronic empathy. Lindell (2012) did not find any connection between media and
cosmopolitanism, but it may be because he failed to differentiate between types of media.
However, without having produced any evidence to the contrary, Lindell’s conclusions might be
supported. A deeper investigation into how people get their news, whether it is active or passive,
may shed further light on this issue and warrants further research.
To answer the assertion that cosmopolitans would be more likely to get their information
from a variety of sources (H4) their responses to frequency of news consumption were changed
to simply reflect whether or not they consumed that source of news. Surprisingly, this hypothesis
was unconfirmed, with no significant difference between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists
who both viewed an average of 7 sources of news (6.99 for cosmopolitans and 6.96 for populist
nationalists). There was also no indication that cosmopolitans or populist nationalists viewed
media (as a whole) with greater frequency than the other. This indicates that both groups do get
their news from a variety of sources, and consume news with a relatively equal frequency,
indicating the source of news that appears to have greatest impact. This also shows a need for a
more nuanced study of media and the impact on cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism. This
study treated mainstream media as a monolithic source, which it clearly is not. Future research
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should seek to understand what specific news sources are being viewed, not just the medium by
which they are viewed, which was the method used here.
In addition to understanding where people get their news, it is also important to examine
the level of trust people have in various sources of news. Scheuer (1999) warns that a blanket
distrust of the news undermines the fabric of an open and democratic society. Media is a conduit
by which those in power are kept in check. When elites make promises and claims, the media is
responsible for holding them accountable and ensuring the public is aware of what does or does
not transgress. Tocqueville (1835/1994), described the importance of a free press to democracy
saying, “When the right of every citizen to a share in the government of society is acknowledged,
everyone must be presumed to be able to choose between the various opinions of his
contemporaries and to appreciate the different facts from which inferences may be drawn” (V1,
p. 183). Access to various sources of media is critical, as long as a certain level of trust can be
presumed from those sources. Kalogeropoulos et al. (2019) studied media trust in 35 countries
and found that trust remained highest with newspapers and television news, and it has been
growing with online “nonmainstream” news sources, but social media remained at a lower level
of trust.
While the focus of this chapter is the comparison between cosmopolitan and populist
nationalist attitudes, the overall trust amongst digital natives in different media outlets needs to
be examined. Media has an impact on the development of both cosmopolitanism and populist
nationalism. Taken as a whole, digital natives show a mix of trust and skepticism in a variety of
news sources.
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Table 6.2: Trust in Media32
News Source
Daily Newspaper
Printed Magazine
Cable News
Local Television News
Radio News
Talking with Friends or Colleagues
Online Traditional News Websites
Online Agenda-Based News Websites
Email Newsletters
Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)

Trustworthy
59.8 % (494)
20.4% (168)
33.4% (276)
54.1% (447)
40.2% (332)
27.6% (228)
37.9% (313)
14.3% (118)
16.6% (155)
14.4% (119)

Untrustworthy
7.5% (62)
37.3% (291)
30.8% (254)
13.4% (111)
15.7% (130)
21.8% (180)
26.4% (218)
46.6% (385)
29.2% (241)
48.5% (401)

As discussed in the previous chapter, there has been a marked decline in the public’s trust in the
media. Sadly, the information age has also become the disinformation age. In 2016, the Oxford
English Dictionary’s word of the year was “post-truth” which it defined as “relating to or
denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion
than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” The resulting skepticism in journalistic integrity
has only been inflamed with the recent political climate, which has witnessed the President of the
United States repeating the accusation of the mainstream media being “fake news” and even
making suggestive threats against members of the media. “More than once a day, on average,
[President Trump] has publicly assailed ‘fake news,’ ‘fake polls,’ ‘fake media,’ and ‘fake stories’
[and] between January 10, 2017 and today [January 17, 2018], Trump has used the word ‘fake’
at least 404 times in tweets and public appearances, sometimes more than once in the same
sentence” (Stelter, 2018). This could offer some explanation as to why such a high number of
respondents believed all media sources to be neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy. This survey

32

Questions of trust were answered on a Likert scale (0 = unsure, 1 = very untrustworthy, 2 = untrustworthy, 3 =
neither, 4 = trustworthy, 5 = very trustworthy). For this table, trustworthy was defined as a response of very
trustworthy and trustworthy, while untrustworthy was defined as a response of very untrustworthy and
untrustworthy.
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had between one quarter and nearly one half of respondents having such an opinion on every
form of news. In a 2018 Gallop poll, 83% of respondents said they believed there to be either a
fair amount or great amount of political bias, and 66% believe that “most news media don’t do a
good job of letting people know what is fact and what is opinion” (p. 11). It is likely that the
younger portion of the digital native generation would be unsure about their trust in various news
sources because they are reaching their political coming of age in a time when debates take place
not over interpretations of facts, but over what “facts” are accepted.
Taking a closer look at trust in media by cosmopolitans and populist nationalists, only
two sources of news showed a significant difference. Populist nationalist were slightly more
likely to trust local cable news (M =3.49, SD = 1.02) compared to cosmopolitans (M = 3.20, SD
= 1.04). The difference was significant t(329) = 2.57, p = .011, but represented a small-sized
effect d = .28. This is unsurprising considering populist nationalists were also more likely to get
their information through this medium. There was also a significant difference between the levels
of trust in agenda-based news sites. Populist nationalists were more likely to trust agenda-based
sources of news (M = 2.38, SD = 1.37) than cosmopolitans (M = 1.79, SD = 1.09). The difference
was significant t(309) = 4.32, p < .001, and represented a near-medium-sized effect d = .48.
Again, this is unsurprising when paired with the fact that populist nationalists are more likely to
get their information from agenda-based news sources. However, this should be concerning
because agenda-based news sources, by definition, pursue a narrative. While news is meant to be
informative, not subjective, agenda-based news frames information in a way that suits its
ideological leanings. Falcous, Hawzen, and Newman (2019) examined this trend even in
something as neutral as sports reporting. They found numerous of examples in which Breitbart
Sports made value statements and political judgments in sports analysis with headlines such as
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Where Are the Christian Athletes? and UnAmerican! Animal Rights Activists Protest Dodger
Dogs on Fourth of July Weekend (Falcous et al., 2019, pp. 596-599). Watching agenda-based
news is likely to reinforce one’s own views because it presents information within a
predetermined frame. Even though populist nationals are more likely to find it trustworthy, they
still do not have a high level of trust within this medium.
Even with the plethora of misinformation, disinformation, biased coverage, and the
ability to manipulate images, soundbites, and videos, digital natives are not giving up on the
Fourth Estate. The pessimistic view of these statistics could easily suggest being on a precipice
of a complete breakdown of the media, but like most things, this new generation is not
destroying it, only refashioning it. When asked if they will read a news story from a variety of
different sources, 81.8% responded that they do. Over 30% said that they do so very often. The
past century has witnessed the evolution of media from printed material only, to radio, to
television, the expansion of television, to online platforms, and now interactive forums in which
news can be shared and discussed. As media platforms have expanded, so too have the ways in
which people may access information. When asked about other sources of news, survey
respondents added a great number of options such as podcasts, specific news sites not mentioned
in the survey (NPR, The Economist, etc.), YouTube, Reddit, and others. One respondent, a male
under 21 years old, stated that he would watch events filmed by people directly. This aspect of
the digital age enables individuals to be both producers and consumers, avoiding the traditional
gatekeepers (editors, news directors, etc.) that have at times limited or manipulated the spread of
information.
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Taking Action
Another question this dissertation seeks to explore is what cosmopolitans and populist
nationalists will do with the information they have. Will they use the information they have to
influence the political system? Will their values translate to political action? With a populace
with the capacity to be the most informed generation ever, the question thus moves to how that
information can be used within the polis. As discussed in the previous chapter, digital natives
have an ever-increasing barrage of ways to be involved with the political system. However, the
mere existence of means does not guarantee their use.
There are traditional methods of political action such as voting, signing a petition,
contacting an elected official, participating in a boycott or strike, or demonstrating. However, the
digital age has introduced new methods of political engagement that can be done independently
or in concert with traditional political action. These digital means of engagement include
following current events through the social media accounts of news organizations, advocacy
groups, and elected officials. They can also engage in online discussions and share and reflect on
issues they deem important.
As part of the survey, respondents were asked about both their traditional political action
and their online political action. The results show that digital natives are taking advantage of all
methods of political participation, but there are still those that remain apathetic. The general
trends have been discussed in the previous chapter, so this chapter focuses on the differences
between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists. Respondents were asked to consider if they
would never do (1), might do (2), would do (3), or have done (4), various traditional political
actions. Cosmopolitans were more likely to call an elected official, sign a petition, join a strike,
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engage in a boycott, and/or participate in peaceful demonstrations. The full results can be seen in
Table 6.3:
Table 6.3: Political Action
Cosmopolitans
Calling an elected
official
Signing a petition
Joining a strike
Engaging in a boycott
Participate in peaceful
demonstrations

M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD

2.66
(1.03)
3.77
(.64)
2.44
(.88)
2.84
(.91)
2.98
(.91)

Populist
Nationalists
2.11
(.95)
2.98
(1.07)
1.53
(.72)
1.75
(.82)
1.87
(.86)

t-value

p

d

326.6 = -11.39

<.001

.55

267.24 = -8.16

<.001

.9

315.83 = -10.34

<.001

1.13

328 = -11.39

<.001

1.26

330 = -11.41

<.001

1.26

The digital age has expanded the ways in which people can be politically active. It has
not replaced traditional action, only adding new means that enable citizens to be engaged in their
community. To address these changes, survey respondents were asked to consider their online
political activism on the same scale as traditional political action, discussed above. Following
elected officials on social media, following traditional media accounts, and following issue
advocacy groups (examples of the NRA and Sierra Club were given), showed no significant
difference between cosmopolitans and populist nationalists. In the other online political
activities, the same trends found within traditional political action were shown in which
cosmopolitans were more active. Cosmopolitans were more likely to engage in online political
discussions (M = 3.02, SD = 1.2) compared to populist nationalists (M = 2.59, SD = 1.21). The
difference was significant t(316) = -3.2, p = .002, and it represented a small-sized effect d = .36.
Cosmopolitans were also more likely to comment on elected officials’ social media posts (M =
2.61, SD = 1.22) compared to populist nationalists (M = 2.11, SD 1.11). The difference was
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significant t(311.71) = -3.83, p < .001, and it represented a small-sized effect d = .43.
Cosmopolitans were more likely to share a political news story (M = 3.07, SD = 1.1) compared
to populist nationalists (M = 2.7, SD = 1.19). The difference was significant t(309.11) = -2.88, p
= .004, and it represents a small-sized effect d = .32. Cosmopolitans were also more likely to
share political memes (M = 3.04, SD = 1.16) than populist nationalists (M = 2.69, SD = 1.18).
The difference was significant t(315) = -2.7, p = .007, and it represented a small-sized effect d =
.3. Finally, cosmopolitans were more likely to email an elected official (M = 2.76, SD = 1.04)
compared to populist nationalist (M = 2.06, SD = 1.04). The different was significant t(311) = 5.98, p < .001, and it represented a medium-sized effect d = .67.
Overall, the results suggest that those identified as cosmopolitans are more politically
active both through traditional means and online. As previously mentioned, populist nationalists
may be less active because of a distrust or aversion to elites and government, or they may simply
be satisfied with the status quo and do not feel a need for things to change. If populist
nationalism is becoming more mainstream and becoming the status quo, its supporters may not
feel the need to be as engaged in political action. Political action is often sought to change the
status quo, not reinforce it. Cosmopolitans may be more active because they seek a change to the
status quo or feel a responsibility to be engaged in the political system. They may feel the need
to be proactive in advocating for change rather than preserving the current state of affairs. People
with progressive ideologies often pursue their vision of a better system whereas conservatives
seek to preserve the way things are.
Discussion
This chapter has presented evidence that digital natives have a sense of cosmopolitan
responsibility and that the digital age plays a role in its promotion. In the ideological battle
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between cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism, global events will continue to pull people in
both directions. Ironically, the changes brought about by the digital age drive both these
ideologies. For populist nationalism, there is a fear of change brought by changing demographics
and economic integration. They see traditional society threatened by the pluralism driven by
globalization. They also show a general disdain for government. Conversely, cosmopolitans see
these same forces as a natural evolution in which the rights accorded to their geographical
neighbors ought to be the same for their global neighbors. This compassion is driven by contact,
both in-person contact with those from other countries and online connections. This contact
fosters both compassion and empathy that is at the root of human rights.
This chapter reveals several characteristics about digital natives who are either
cosmopolitan or populist nationalist. Hypothesis H4 posited that cosmopolitans would be more
likely to travel internationally, more likely to have friends from other countries, more likely to be
interested in international affairs, and more likely to get their news from a variety of sources. For
the most part these hypotheses were confirmed. The only hypothesis that was not confirmed was
that cosmopolitans were unique in getting their news from a variety of sources. They were no
more likely to use a variety of sources than populist nationalists, which may be more of a
testament to the digital age. With so much information available, digital natives seem to be
taking advantage of the variety of sources to gather information rather than being limited to one
or two sources. Hypothesis H5 posited that populist nationalists would have less international
travel, fewer friends from other countries, more likely to be interested in domestic affairs, and
would use fewer sources of news. As previously mentioned, there was no significant difference
between the number of news sources used by either group. The survey did confirm that the
populist nationalists surveyed would be less likely to travel internationally, and they were likely
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to have fewer friends from other countries. The results also counter the assertion that populist
nationalists would be more interested in domestic affairs.
The center issue of this chapter has been the idea of international responsibility. While
the previous chapter dealt with digital natives as a whole, while examining their conceptions of
local and national responsibility, this chapter offers insights into the two dominant global
outlooks of cosmopolitanism and populist nationalism and how they view their global
responsibility. The idea of cosmopolitan responsibility put forth in this dissertation, is the idea
that responsibility for human rights extends to all people, regardless of their physical proximity
to those suffering. All people bear a responsibility for those suffering from systemic and
widespread abuse. This responsibility, and ability to respond, is made possible by the digital age,
which enables people to connect with others from around the world. The ability to be unaware of
human rights abuses is nearly impossible in this globally connected world. But these possibilities
also bring backlash, specifically the fear that globalization is threatening local communities
leading to a belief that responsibility is best manifested locally.
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Chapter VII:
Developing a Digital Conscience
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home—so close and
so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the
individual person: The neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory,
farm, or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks
equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have
meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold
them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.
- Eleanor Roosevelt, remarks to the United Nations, March 27, 1953
In an age of near limitless information, why is there so little wisdom? The digital age has
produced the ability for every citizen to make informed decisions on political and community
issues. It has created a means by which human rights atrocities can be confirmed as they happen,
and an appropriate response can be planned. Yet misinformation and disinformation continue to
spread, and far too many people believe false information because it aligns with their political
views. And human rights atrocities continue to happen in full view of the world community with
little global effort to alleviate the suffering. Much of this is occurring in a world where growing
populist nationalist sentiments are appealing to those who feel left behind by an increasingly
globalized world. While this stark reality may seem daunting, there is an even greater force
empowered by digital technology, and that is a growing embracement of responsibility. Digital
natives are connecting to their peers around the world without regard for national boundaries.
Their compassion extends to those who are suffering, no matter where they live. They are
finding new ways to be engaged in their local communities and the world as a whole.
The question, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” asked in Genesis 4:9, is a question of
responsibility. To whom do we owe our concern? Who should we care about and why? Society
is predicated upon the cooperation and shared responsibilities that allow a community to
function. This dissertation seeks to provide a glimpse into what civic and global responsibility
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entails in the digital age. With ever-expanding connections, digital technology connects people in
ways never before imagined. Of particular interest is how digital natives, those born into a world
in which the internet has been the norm rather than the exception, interpret their responsibility. In
order to investigate these topics, a survey of 834 digital natives in the United States was
conducted to better understand their attitudes towards a number of topics relating to civic
engagement, online activities, political outlook, human rights, and other areas ripe for inquiry.
No right exists without a corresponding responsibility. This maxim has been recognized in
numerous philosophical texts and formal treaties. The U.S. Declaration of Independence
maintains that opposition to tyranny is both a right and a duty. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 29:1, states, “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the
free and full development of his personality is possible.” The promotion of rights, both at home
and abroad, requires the exercise of responsibilities. Digital technology has created an
environment in which the exercise of these responsibilities is enabled through greater access to
information, the ability to form advocacy networks, and a capacity to be heard globally.
The Power of the Digital Age
Digital technology has been condemned as the death of society and praised as the savior
of it. It has been derided as a tsunami of misinformation and disinformation and heralded for
bringing information to the masses. Critics and supporters alike are quick to paint an image of
one extreme or the other, but like all things its value is found in how it is utilized. When Ridlen
Ray (1999) examined previous innovations such as newspapers, telephones, cars, and television,
she found the same fears and the same eventual acceptance of these as a means to achieve what
the user desires. Dewey (1946) even mentions the hope of those at the beginning of the 20th
century who believed that “the revolution which was taking place in commerce and
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communication would break down the barriers which had kept the peoples of the earth alien and
hostile and would create a state of interdependence which in time would insure lasting peace” (p.
23). Putnam (1996) places blame on television as an isolating device that contributes to
decreasing social connections. All innovation holds the potential for greatness and destruction. If
people are willing, the internet can be a source of information, a means of associating and
organizing, and a way to further human rights, but only if individuals choose to use it in such a
way.
Yet digital technology offers numerous opportunities for civil and global society. The
public forum has long been a hallmark of any republic, and an open and free space for people to
come and debate ideas and issues has always been of the utmost importance. From the glistening
white togas debating the meaning of democracy in the Agora to the three-hour long LincolnDouglas debates on slavery and union to the town halls in every American community, the
public forum is an essential civic element. The internet has the capacity to revolutionize the
conception of the public forum. This addresses one of Dewey’s main concerns, that “it is
impossible for a highly industrialized society to attain a widespread high excellence of mind
when multitudes are excluded from occasion for the use of thought and emotion in their daily
occupation” (1999, pp. 64-66). In the fast-paced modern world, much of civic life has been
relegated to a lower status of importance. As this study has shown, nearly 90% of digital natives
discuss national or global issues with friends or colleagues, and much of that can be done online.
This is the foundation of democratic iterations as defined by Benhabib (2006). Seventy-six
percent of digital natives also reported engaging in online political discussions. As Dahlgren and
Alvares (2013) discussed, participation must go beyond a perfunctory performance in which it is
often dismissed as slacktivism. Participation must be meaningful.
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Much to the consternation of political theorists and philosophers, politics and civic
engagement are not on the forefront of daily concern to the average citizen. In 1961, Dahl noted
that “one of the central facts of political life is that politics—local, state, national, international—
lies for most people at the outer periphery of attention, interest, concern, and activity. At the
focus of most men’s lives are primary activities involving food, sex, love, family, work, play,
shelter, comfort, friendship, social esteem, and the like” (p. 279). While questions of the public
good, the proper direction of government, and how to advance global human rights may not rise
to the level of near obsession found in the author and those like him, they are questions that need
at least occasional consideration by members of any free society. Dewey (1946) notes the
difficulty within such a seemingly easy request when he writes, “human beings do get tired of
liberty, of political liberty and of the responsibilities, the duties, the burden that the acceptance of
political liberty involves” (p. 34). Dewey is in no way advocating for authoritarianism or any
other such similar form of government, he is simply pointing out the work involved in keeping a
free and open society. Far too often the focus of democracy is on the freedoms it provides
without due consideration of the responsibilities such a society requires. No freedom exists
without a corresponding responsibility.
The digital age offers tremendous opportunities to connect people, but those connections
have also sewn the seeds of dissent against an expanding community. Populist nationalism has
risen, in part, thanks to those connections driven by globalization and the digital age. It seeks a
return to an imagined past in which borders provided near absolute security, not only from actual
violence, but also from perceived threats to changing cultures. The world glorified by
nationalists and isolationists in which countries and societies exist independently from one
another is a fiction. As Appiah (2006) observes, “Cultural purity is an oxymoron. The odds are
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that, culturally speaking, you already live a cosmopolitan life, enriched by literature, art, and film
that comes from many places, and that contains influences from many more” (p. 113). While the
vision of populist nationalism may be a farce, its impact on domestic and global politics remains
a very real influence.
It Is Not Enough to Know
The digital age, the age of information, has created a plethora of avenues by which
information can be obtained and transmitted. A more critical question is found in asking what
individuals do with that information. In the film Hotel Rwanda (2004) there is a fictional account
of an interaction between hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina (played by Don Cheadle) and a news
cameraman, Jack Daglish (played by Joaquin Phoenix). Daglish had just filmed the brutal
murder of Tutsis and apologizes to Paul for letting him see the horrific images. Paul says, “I am
glad that you have shot this footage and that the world will see it. It is the only way we have a
chance that people might intervene. How can they not intervene when they witness such
atrocities?” Jack looks back at him, and says, “I think if people see this footage, they’ll say, ‘oh
my God, that’s horrible,’ and then go back to eating their dinners.” This imagined interaction
was all too real as the international response to the Rwandan genocide played out on major news
channels without any intervention taken by the outside world. It wasn’t for lack of knowledge
that the international community stood idly by. Even under the obligations set forth in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide33 the United States
publicly obfuscated and denied any responsibility. In 2004, it would be revealed that as early as
16 days after the start of the genocide, U.S. officials knew the details and even referred to the
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The United States would not ratify the convention until November 05, 1988.
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situation as a genocide (Carroll, 2004). We saw, and we did nothing. We knew, and we did
nothing.
Unfortunately, this is not the first time (nor the last time) the United States would ignore
massive human rights abuses. During World War II, the extent of the Holocaust may not have
been yet realized, but it was known that the Nazis were undertaking a systematic extermination
of the Jewish people. In a 1942 broadcast, Edward R. Murrow said, “The phrase ‘concentration
camps’ is obsolete…It is now possible to speak only of extermination camps” (Murrow, 1967, p.
57). On December 17, 1942 the Allied Nations released condemnation of the extermination of
the Jews and it made the front page of the New York Times the next day. We heard, and we did
nothing. We knew, and we did nothing.
Samantha Power (2002) poignantly describes the willful ignorance that has often driven
U.S. foreign policy:
In an age of instant information, U.S. officials have gone from claiming that they
“didn’t know” to suggesting—as President Clinton did in his 1998 Rwanda
apology—that they “didn’t fully appreciate.” This, too, is misleading. It is true
that the atrocities that were known remained abstract and remote, rarely acquiring
the status of knee-buckling knowledge among ordinary Americans. Because the
savagery of genocide so defies our everyday experience, many of us failed to
wrap our minds around it. We gradually came to accept the depravity of the
Holocaust, but then slotted it in our consciousness as “history”; we resisted
acknowledging that genocide was occurring in the present. Survivors and
witnesses had trouble making the unbelievable believable. Bystanders were thus
able to retreat to the “twilight between knowing and not knowing” (p. 505).
So how does information influence people if it can be ignored or questioned? Populist
nationalism, especially in the United States, has seized upon a strategy that does not involved a
debate over the facts, but rather a debate about the facts. In 2018, while speaking at the Veterans
of Foreign Wars (VFW) annual convention, President Trump said, “Stick with us. Don’t believe
the crap you see from these people, the fake news. What you’re seeing and what you’re reading
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is not what’s happening” (Cillizza, 2018). For information to be meaningful, it must be
understood and acted upon. This dissertation began with the stories of Salek Kuenstler, those in
hiding at the Hotel des Mille Collines, and Bana al-Abed. Their stories illustrate that it is not just
knowledge, but knowledge in the hands of people who care and embrace a responsibility that
ultimately makes an impact. Taken alone, each of their stories could have been tragic had it not
been for the actions of others. Information by itself is neutral; it has no position. But when put
into the hands of the individual, it takes up a life of its own and lives on through the action it
inspires.
Embracing Responsibility
The power of responsibility is found in its ability to harness the collective action of
individuals willing to use their democratic advantages for the benefit of others. Small actions,
voting for candidates who protect human rights, advocating for those without a voice, even just
raising awareness, all have immense power when combined with the actions of others. Almond
(1996) reminds us “if democracy means anything, it means that in some way governmental elites
must respond to the desires and demands of citizens” (p. 3). Democracy provides a means by
which citizens can have an impact on what they care about. Former President of South Korea,
Kim Dae-Jung, warned, “An apathetic attitude is effectively on the side of evil, letting alone a
submissive attitude for a dictator and an attitude of flattery to buy a position with influence and
power” (2018, p. 303). Embracing responsibility, be it civic or cosmopolitan, is a personal act of
ethical conduct that can change the course of history. Those more cynical will doubt the power
of change at the individual level, but history has shown that movements, springing from the
collective work of individuals, have been the main source of change throughout time. Rawls
(2003) addressed this concern by saying, “I recognize that there are questions about how the
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limits of the practicably possible are discerned and what the conditions of our social world in fact
are. The problem here is that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a
greater or lesser extent change political and social institutions and much else” (p. 12).
Traditional civic engagement allows for relatively obvious signs of success: laws are
passed, officials are elected or ousted, democratic machinery functions. Even though it may
sometimes feel like democratic institutions do not respond to the popular will, history has
already proven otherwise. What is harder to see are the successes of cosmopolitan responsibility.
Cases such as the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade and the end to apartheid in South
Africa are historically clear, but only in reflection. The timetables of regular elections do not
exist with global campaigns.
Cosmopolitan responsibility is not simply an idealistic formulation of individual
responsibility in a globalized world. It follows the historical dialectic in which international law
moved from collective responsibility to include individual responsibility. The First World War
was blamed on Germany, and as a collective, the people of Germany were indebted for their
crime. Following the Second World War, Germany was once again an aggressor, but it was no
longer the entire country at fault. The Nuremburg Trials singled out those most responsible for
the crimes committed during that war and they were punished rather than assigning blame to all
Germans. Just as international law expanded from collective to individual liability, so too does
responsibility for protecting rights expand from the collective state to the individual. As capacity
and circumstances change, so to must our understandings of responsibility.
Cosmopolitan responsibility entails the promotion of an international norm dedicated to
making the protection and promotion of human rights a priority. It addresses the advice offered
by Brown (2013) that rather than attempting to remove norms, like Responsibility to Protect,
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from a perceived political consideration, these norms should be embraced and reformulated in
terms of national interest. Cosmopolitan responsibility asks individuals to view human rights as a
national priority that can be expressed through domestic and foreign policies. Individuals have
the power to advocate and network globally, while also taking definitive action locally. The
protests over the killing of George Floyd began in Minnesota but spread across the United States
and many other countries around the world. From German soccer players to Syrian graffiti
artists, people have acted within their capacity to affect change. “The power of ideas is an
important factor that contributes to legal change, and ideas do not respect national boundaries”
(Sloss & Sandholtz, 2019, p. 1184). As support builds for ideas, and they become embraced by
an ever-growing global audience, they take on an immense power. Every movement begins with
a simple idea. From Black Lives Matter to the R2P to the global movement for environmental
sustainability, every movement begins with a simple hope for a better world. Stimson (1932)
noted, “Moral disapproval, when it becomes the disapproval of the whole world, takes on a
significance hitherto unknown in international law” (p. viii). Revolutions may be suppressed, but
the ideas that drive them can never be silenced.
Key Findings
Throughout this dissertation I have endeavored to illustrate what responsibility looks like
in the digital age. I have done so within the competing ideologies of populist nationalism and
cosmopolitanism, both of which are driven by globalization and digital technology. Bala (2014)
explains how digital technology allows individuals to exercise their responsibility (both legally
and extralegally). She writes, “Digital civic engagement leads to a wide range of phenomena,
from organizing protests using social networks (e.g. Occupy Wall Street) to the use of digital to
access institutions’ information unlawfully (e.g. Anonymous) to the use of mobile application
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made locally to access government services or the use of digital platforms for exchanging views”
(2014, p. 768). The exercise of responsibility, locally and globally, was described at length in
Chapters V and VI respectively. The main findings can be summarized as such:
Civic Responsibility
Almond and Verba’s (1963) The Civic Culture provided the groundwork for over five
decades of study of how individuals interact within their community and government. As
hypothesized (H1), their typology of the participant, subject, and parochial mostly remain
relevant today as a way to categorize civic engagement. There are digital natives who understand
the role government plays in their lives, how it is set up, who the main actors are, and they
engage with that system (participants). The digital age has created new means by which
participants can engage in the system. The traditional means of participation studied by Almond
and Verba, such as voting, discussing issues with others, calling elected officials, and so on, are
still being used by digital natives, but they now have a more expansive arsenal for participation.
This confirms H2 ,which said that there would be more robust avenues for civic engagement.
Participants in the digital age are able to create and disseminate information online, find likeminded people and groups from all over their countries and the world, organize and plan political
action, and make connections that geography had previously prevented. The traditional methods
for civic engagement coupled with these new digital methods create this robust collection of
means of civic engagement. There are also those who are moderately aware of the impact of
government but take little or no action to influence it (subjects). Subjects, or people who identify
as apolitical or “just not interested in politics” also benefit from the advances of the digital age,
but just as with traditional means of engagement, they choose to be minimally involved. Finally,
there may be those who have no idea of how government impacts their lives and would not know
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how to participate if they ever chose to do so (parochials), but those are becoming more and
more rare with expanding education and access to information.
Parochials, as a classification, may no longer be useful in understanding how people
relate to government. Almond and Verba viewed them as people who were genuinely unaware
and disinterested. By and large, this is no longer possible in the digital age, but there still remains
a group of people who remain willfully ignorant. This group might best be called bystanders, as
Samantha Power (2002) described, since they ignore the information they see. Exemplifying this
was one survey respondent, a White female, 21 or under, who watches news from a variety of
sources, is active in campus activities, and when asked about an issue that made her take political
action, responded, “To be honest, I’m not very politically active.” This respondent is informed
and understands the impact of government (even strongly agreeing with the statement “I believe
the actions of government have a great deal of impact on my life”), but just doesn’t show a desire
to participate in the system. The definitions of participants and subjects remain valid, but there is
a strong case for replacing parochials with something more in line with people who are informed
and aware, but simply apathetic.
Additionally, the plethora of misinformation and disinformation created by the digital age
may give cause for a fourth group. There are people who have access to information but choose
to only seek information that reinforces their previously held beliefs. The internet can be an echo
chamber in which to seek information that confirms a bias, rather than being open to information
and opinions that would challenge that. This group might best be described as blind partisans
who reinforce their views and dismiss any challenges as false news. Exemplifying this category
was a survey respondent, a White male aged 22-37, who is politically active, who, when asked
about types of news consumption he viewed, responded, “More reputable sites than those listed
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above.” The news sites that were listed were daily newspapers, printed magazines, cable news
(CNN, Fox, MSNBC, etc.), local television news, radio news, talking with friends and
colleagues, online traditional news sites (CNN, Fox, MSNBC, etc.), online agenda-based news
sites (Occupy Democrats, Infowars, Breitbart, etc), email newsletters, and social media
(Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Unfortunately, this category arises as a result of the study so there were
no questions asked about being open to opposing points of view, but this respondent and others
like him, suggest that there is a group dismissive of information that does not fit their already
held beliefs. Several other respondents showed similar views about traditional and new media,
indicating they find most media to be untrustworthy, but they follow current affairs through
“alternative media,” “independent news networks,” and other such responses. One respondent
even explicitly stated, “I trust nothing.” This category has emerged as an area ripe for further
research.
Like any group, digital natives are quite diverse in their opinions and predilections.
Popular stereotypes paint them as ignorant and apathetic, self-absorbed, and forever hidden
behind the screen on their smartphone. While they have yet to show up as a reliable voting bloc,
these stereotypes vastly underestimate an influential generation coming into their own. The vast
majority (90.9%) believe government has an impact on their lives and as such, they almost
universally (96%) follow public affairs weekly through one or more news sources. Just as new
technology outpaces or replaces the old, digital natives have adapted their information gathering
in the digital age. The respondents to Almond and Verba heavily utilized radio, newspaper, and
television for their information, whereas digital natives have expanded this to include social
media, internet news sites, email, and other digital media. However, while there is a plethora of
information available, public confidence in the media continues its decades-long decline. One
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stark contrast between 1963 and 2018 is the drop in trust in equal treatment before the law. In
1963 nearly 90% believed they would receive the same treatment as anyone else, but in 2018 that
number was just 41%. As discussed in Chapter V, this is likely the result of a more diverse
sample than that of Almond and Verba.
The digital age also provides the means by which users move from passive consumers of
news and information to active reflection with it. Digital natives can comment on news stories,
share them with others, interact with elected officials online, network with like-minded others,
and even create news using a camera phone. Similarly, digital natives have an abundance of
methods by which they can take political action beyond traditional means such as voting, writing
to elected officials, signing petitions, and so on. While their use of traditional means of activism
is on par with previous studies, they are also able to discuss politics with friends online, organize
and network through digital means, and engage in new ways.
This dissertation advances the literature on civic culture in the digital age by providing a
current analysis of the attitudes and actions of digital natives in the United States. As discussed
in Chapters II and III, the implications of the digital age on civic engagement are only starting to
be understood. Much of the previous literature was written prior to digital natives entering
political maturity. Social networking has only become the norm within the past two decades,
leaving its impact ripe for exploration. The results of the survey show that civic culture is alive
and well and has taken on a multitude of new forms. While the obstacles faced by digital natives
are substantial, so too are the opportunities. Digital natives have the capacity to be the most
informed generation ever, yet the results of this survey show that not all are up to the task. Just
like the participants studied by Almond and Verba (1963), the digital age participant must be
willing to put forth an effort to be both informed and engaged. Along with actively seeking
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information and participating, the digital age participant must also be willing to navigate through
the myriad of misinformation, disinformation, and break free from the echo chamber that all
create an impediment to actually being informed. Civic engagement, at any level, remains a
choice.
Cosmopolitan Responsibility
Human rights are enshrined in international law, yet enforcement of those laws relies
upon the individual and collective actions of states. Action, or more often inaction, occurs solely
at the state level. As the duty bearer, states have been the focus of attempts to both codify
international law and create better enforcement mechanisms, such as R2P. The failure of states to
live up to these ideals calls for the diffusion of responsibility to include individuals.
Cosmopolitans have long argued that individual responsibility must extend beyond the artificial
borders of the state (See Chapter II). Other philosophical schools of thought, such as anarchism
and communism, also shared consternation with the limits of ethical responsibility created by the
state. Mikhail Bakunin explained, “The State then is the most flagrant negation, the most cynical
and complete negation of humanity. It rends apart the universal solidarity of all men…It takes
under its protection only its own citizens, and it recognizes human right, humanity, and
civilization only within the confines of its own boundaries” (Maximoff, 1953, p. 138). The social
contract binds individuals to a connection with a particular state, and those within that state,
creating an other to which they owe no consideration. Bakunin argues that patriotism and the
state exist antithetical to a universal human connection because to recognize a universal equality
would undermine the logical foundations of the social contract that created individual states. If
all of humanity is deserving of the same rights, there is no reason for individual states to protect
the universal rights of only a small fraction of people (Ibid, pp. 136-146).
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The philosophical foundations of the state aside, the legitimate concerns of a universal
responsibility for human rights, or a cosmopolitan responsibility, are no longer threatened by a
state-centric system. Whereas the traditional notion of cosmopolitanism included a selfidentification as a citizen of the world, cosmopolitan responsibility does not require such
identification, merely the acceptance that civic duty extends beyond one’s own borders. Those
who consider themselves patriotic, with a strong bond to their state, can act upon their
cosmopolitan responsibility with the same fervor of a traditional cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitan
responsibility acknowledges interdependence and the universal nature of rights and can be
carried out within the traditional system of states. With a hallmark of the digital age being a
smaller, more closely connected world, responsibility ought to expand to cover those beyond
one’s immediate geographical proximity. Specifically, the area of human rights ought to be
examined to see how these digital connections impact advocacy and concern. Building on Luck
and Luck’s (2010) call for an individual Responsibility to Protect, and Ackerly’s (2018) concepts
of just responsibility, this survey sought to examine how individuals interpret their cosmopolitan
responsibility, especially given the opposing trends of populist nationalism.
This study found that those digital natives classified as having greater cosmopolitan
attitudes were more engaged with the political system. They showed greater interest in both
domestic and global issues. They were also more likely to sign a petition, join in boycotts, attend
peaceful demonstrations, join strikes, and email elected officials than their counterparts who
favored more populist nationalism attitudes. One of my main hypotheses was that being
connected with others from around the world would promote cosmopolitan responsibility. While
travel did not have any significant relationship, having friends from other countries (both in
person and online) did have a positive correlation with cosmopolitan attitudes.
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Limitations
With survey research, there is always a concern of a social desirability bias in which the
respondent will give the answer they believe to be right rather than what they actually believe.
Holbrook and Krosnick (2010) suggest that anonymous surveys help mitigate this risk because
the respondents are less likely to worry about judgment. Additionally, a large sample size
reduces the risk of the results being impacted by this bias. This survey also had an overrepresentation of respondents from the southeastern part of the United States. Finally, all politics
are personal. As Kaltwasser et al. (2017) note about populism, “populism scholarship is bound
up with practical politics. The term is used to advance or undermine political causes in the media
but also sometimes within academia” (p. 2).
Future Research
Like any good research (or bad research for that matter), I have created more questions
than I have answered. This dissertation has created a great deal of intrigue in future research,
which I endeavor to briefly offer here. As with Almond and Verba’s original study, there is great
benefit in expanding these questions beyond the United States. Civic culture in the digital age
ought to be a cross-national study. There is also a great need to better understand exactly how
digital natives use technology for political purposes. This dissertation briefly examined some of
the basic questions of what actions are taken, but future research ought to go deeper into various
digital advocacy tools, how they are used, and why users prefer them to other action. From apps
developed for specific actions to people who believe online activism to be more effective than
other traditional forms of participation, there are many new methods created by the digital age. It
would also be interesting to address some of these issues from the perspective of elected
officials. What means of communication and action do they respond to best? What influences
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their decisions? Furthermore, the area of media trust and perceptions of truth in the digital age
needs greater attention. There is a growing body of literature examining these issues, but with the
growing influence of populist nationalism that emboldens this distrust, the circumstances are
changing rapidly.
In terms of global responsibility, I would propose that future research inquire into the
level of importance digital natives place on things such as human rights. While I have shown
there is a relation between friends from other countries and cosmopolitan values, I have not
shown exactly how these issues manifest. What types of friendships or contact impact
cosmopolitan attitudes? How do various degrees of foreign travel (living abroad, working
abroad, longer duration of stays, etc.) impact these attitudes? How do foreign exchange students
on U.S. campuses impact these values? How can human rights advocacy organizations promote
such attitudes and harness their political power? Given the evidence of cosmopolitan
responsibility developed by this project, further research should focus more specifically on what
actions are taken in furtherance of those values. How might the Responsibility to Protect be
strengthened through individual civil engagement?
Concluding Thoughts
We stand upon a precipice of possibility. The digital age has created the capacity for this
generation to be the most informed and most engaged ever. Their impact can be felt on the other
side of the world with just a few clicks on a keyboard. Human rights have long existed merely as
an ideal, but the digital age creates a very real means by which they can be meaningfully
advanced. From local government to global affairs, digital natives are positioned to be the
generation that redefines participation. They are creators and consumers of information,
witnesses and participants for world events, global travelers in person or online, and they desire a
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better world. These digital citizens are transcending national boundaries while also being more
engaged in their local communities. The only limitation to the digital frontier is the willingness
of each person to act upon his or her beliefs.
The digital age has provided a myriad of opportunities and obstacles that are only
beginning to be understood. The struggle of the individual to find an identity amongst the
community is an eternal one, but the modern circumstances have again changed these
relationships. One of the unifying themes between civic engagement, populist nationalism, and
cosmopolitan responsibility is the concept of dignity. The belief that every person has intrinsic
worth through a shared humanity is the basis of human rights. Recognizing the dignity in others
and striving for ways to protect and ensure that dignity is one of the reasons people enter into
community. If everyone is equal in dignity, then it follows that everyone is deserving of those
rights predicated on dignity and a society in which those rights have legal protections.
Schopenhauer34 lamented the idea of dignity, which he saw as an empty vestige used to justify
morality. He wrote, “Only this expression ‘Human Dignity,’ once it was uttered by Kant, became
the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind that formula they
concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which possessed of
an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their readers would be so pleased to see
themselves invested with such a ‘dignity’ that they would be quite satisfied” (Schopenhauer,
1840/1903/2014, p. 101). His criticism is based on the perceived axiomatic existence of dignity,
which he saw to be vapid and egotistical. But the value of ideas like dignity derive their
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Schopenhauser believed compassion to be the foundation of morality. See Part III, Chapter V in The Basis of
Morality.
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substance from the truths they are able to describe. Dignity35 captures the essence of what
connects us all.
It is necessary to address dignity because it contributes to understanding how digital
natives relate to the world around them. Their conception of who ought to be protected and what
their responsibility entails reflects their understanding of dignity. Fukuyama (2018) invokes
Hegel, saying, “He argued that the only rational solution to the desire for recognition was
universal recognition, in which the dignity of every human being was recognized. Universal
recognition has been challenged ever since by other partial forms of recognition based on nation,
religion, sect, race, ethnicity, or gender, or by individuals wanting to be recognized as superior”
(p. xvi). Some people find dignity in the universal and some in the particular. Digital natives are
developing an identity in a changing world. The forces of globalization, driven by digital
technology, push some to embrace a cosmopolitan responsibility and others to retreat to the
security of the known, through nationalism and isolationism. In many ways, this is a search for
personal identity, and personal dignity. If digital natives can suspend their torpor and continue to
be exposed to and learn from those from other countries, they have the chance to reshape the
world in a way that has not been seen since the great wars of the 20th century. The digital age has
created a means by which to amplify the individual voice as well as created forums to bring
together individuals around a common cause. Political leaders, both domestic and foreign, can
now appeal directly to populations, bypassing the gatekeepers of traditional media. Human rights
abuses can now be streamed as they happen, reaching billions of people. Digital natives are
primed to be able to react to these abuses in ways the international community of states has so far

For a detailed examination of the concept of dignity, see Michael Rosen’s Dignity: It’s History and Meaning
(2012).
35

148

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
mostly failed to do. The identity of the digital native is one of informed action, but only if they
choose to embrace that responsibility.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 4a.
Inter-item correlation matrix

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
PN1
PN2
PN3
PN4
PN5
PN6
PN7

C1
.83
.52
.37
.33
.31
-.17
-.25
-.22
-.19
-.17
-.08
-.06

C2

C3

C4

C5

Items
C6
PN1

PN2 PN3

PN4 PN5

PN6

PN7

.54
.37
.35
.34
-.18
-.25
-.25
-.18
-.19
-.11
-.07

.39
.47
.46
-.11
-.20
-.27
-.14
-.15
-.07
-.04

.67
.47
-.23
-.30
-.48
-.39
-.17
-.11
-.23

.47
-.17
-.26
-.43
-.29
-.16
-.04
-.16

-.12
-.24
-.40
-.12
-.17
-.09
-.10

.47
.36
.29
.16
.20

.24
.21
.36

.43

-

.31
.39
.30
.40
.33
.29

.42
.34
.24
.26

.28
.21

Table 4b.
Corrected item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha if item is excluded –
Cosmopolitanism Scale
Items
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

Corrected item-total correlation
.65
.67
.64
.59
.60
.52

Alpha if item deleted
.79
.79
.80
.81
.81
.82
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Table 4c.
Corrected item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha if item is excluded –
Populist Nationalism Scale
Items
PN1
PN2
PN3
PN4
PN5
PN6
PN7

Corrected item-total correlation
.52
.47
.54
.49
.45
.42
.45

Alpha if item deleted
.72
.73
.71
.72
.73
.74
.73

Table 4d.
Corrected item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha if item is excluded –
Cosmopolitan – Populist Nationalism Scale
Items
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
PN1
PN2
PN3
PN4
PN5
PN6
PN7

Corrected item-total correlation
.49
.52
.48
.60
.54
.46
.45
.49
.61
.47
.40
.31
.35

Alpha if item deleted
.81
.81
.82
.80
.81
.82
.82
.81
.80
.81
.82
.83
.82
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Table 4e.
Ethnicity
Almond & Verba, 1963
White
89.4%
Non-White
10.6%

ACS37, 2018
White
75.1%
Black or African
14.1%
American
American Indian
1.7%
or Native Alaskan
Asian
6.8%
Native Hawaiian
0.4%
or Pacific Islander
Other
5.5%

N = 970

N = 327,167,439

Gethings, 2018
White
71.6% (597)
Black or African
14.5% (121)
American
American Indian or 0.5% (4)
Native Alaskan
Asian
3.6% (30)
Native Hawaiian or 0.1% (1)
Pacific Islander
2+ Races
6.0% (50)
Other
3.6% (30)
N = 833

Table 4f.
Gender
Almond & Verba, 1963
Male
46.9%
Female
53.1%

Male
Female

ACS, 2018
49.2%
50.8%

N = 970

N = 327,167,439

Gethings, 2018
Male
38.7% (323)
Female
59.5% (496)
Other
0.8% (7)
Prefer not to answer 1.0% (8)
N = 834

Table 4g.
Region of Residence
Almond & Verba, 1963
Northeast
Midwest
South
West

N = 970

37
38

25.8%
27.7%
32.4%
14.1%

US & World Population Clock,
201938
Northeast
17.1%
Midwest
20.8%
South
38.3%
West
23.9%

N = 328,239,523

Gethings, 2018
Northeast
Midwest
Southeast
Southwest
West Coast & HI, AK
Pacific Northwest
N = 828

8.4% (70)
3.0% (25)
84.8% (707)
2.2% (18)
1.0% (8)
0.0% (0)

2018 American Community Survey
https://www.census.gov/popclock/
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Table 4h.

Table 4i.

Student Clubs

Other Organizations

Activity
Academic
Civil/Political
Diversity/Cultural
Honor Societies
Sports/Recreation
Religion Spiritual
Other

24.1% (201)
9.9% (83)
11.5% (96)
24.1% (201)
19.1% (166)
12.5% (104)
9.2% (77)
N = 834

Organization
Democratic Party
Republican Party
Other Political Party
Church/Religious Groups
Sports/Athletics
Civic Engagement
Other

15.7% (131)
16.8% (140)
4.7% (39)
29.7% (248)
15.2% (127)
5.6% (47)
2.5% (21)
N = 834

Note: column totals will not add up to 100%. Respondents could select more than one activity.

Table 5a.
Impact of government
Question: Please rank your agreement with the following statement: I
believe the actions of government have a great deal of impact on my life.
Strongly agree
38.2% (316)
Somewhat agree
36.5% (302)
Neither agree nor disagree
16.3% (135)
Somewhat disagree
9.1% (75)
Strongly disagree
0
N = 828
Table 5b:
Elected Representatives Care
Question: Please rank your agreement with the following statement: I
believe my elected representatives care about my views.
Strongly agree
8.3% (68)
Somewhat agree
38.2% (315)
Neither agree nor disagree
21.5% (177)
Disagree
32.0% (264)
Strongly disagree
0
N = 824
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Table 5c:
Elected Representatives Respond
Question: Please rank your agreement with the following statement: I
believe my elected representatives will respond to me if I contact them.
Strongly agree
5.5% (46)
Somewhat agree
21.4% (177)
Neither agree nor disagree
28.7% (238)
Disagree
44.4% (368)
Strongly disagree
0
N = 829
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Appendix B: Survey

ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT FORM
Study #18-479
Title of Research Study: Digital Conscience: Civic Culture, Cosmopolitan Responsibility, and
the Protection of Human Rights in the Digital Era
Researcher's Contact Information:
David Gethings 201-707-9711 Dgething@kennesaw.edu
Introduction
You are being invited to take part in a research study conducted by David Gethings, a PhD
student in the International Conflict Management program at Kennesaw State University. This
research is being supervised by Dr. Volker Franke at KSU, who may be contacted at
vfranke@kennesaw.edu. Before you decide to participate in this study, you should read this form
and ask questions about anything that you do not understand.
Description of Project
The purpose of the study is to understand how individuals view their responsibility to
community, country, and world in an increasingly connected world. With the power of digital
technology and social media platforms, this research aims to evaluate participants’ connections
to others.
Explanation of Procedures
This survey will ask you a number of questions relating to civic and political participation, and
about the diversity of your social media network.
Time Required
This survey should take approximately 10 to 15 minutes and is completely
voluntary. Participants may stop at any time without penalty.
Risks or Discomforts
There are no known risks or anticipated discomforts from taking this survey.
Benefits
While there may be no direct benefits to you for taking part in the study, the answers you provide
will help researchers and policy-makers better understand the changing dynamics of civic
engagement and responsibility for human rights. As people become more connected through
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social media, it becomes increasingly important to understand these connections and their impact
on civic and political attitudes.
Confidentiality
The results of this participation will be anonymous. No identifying information will be asked
nor will any internet protocol addresses be collected. Survey responses cannot be linked to the
participants email address.
Inclusion Criteria for Participation
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study Research at Kennesaw State
University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional
Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the
Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw,
GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.
PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS CONSENT
DOCUMENT FOR YOUR RECORDS, OR IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PRINT CAPABILITIES,
YOU MAY CONTACT THE RESEARCHER TO OBTAIN A COPY

o
I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I understand that participation
is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty. (1)
o I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions. (2)
Skip To: End of Survey If ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT FORM Study #18-479 Title of Research Study: Digital
Conscience: Civic Cul... = I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions.

Page Break
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1 Have you traveled internationally?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Display This Question:
If Have you traveled internationally? = Yes

1a How many countries in total have you visited?
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Have you traveled internationally? = Yes

1b During your travels internationally, have you made friends to whom you are still connected?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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2 For the following statements, please rate your level of agreement with each:

Strongly
agree (1)

Somewh
at agree
(2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewh
at
disagree
(4)

Strongly
disagree
(5)

Being an American is important
to me (1)

o

o

o

o

o

International organizations are
taking away too much power
from the U.S. government (2)

o

o

o

o

o

I enjoy learning more about
different cultures in the world (6)

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o

I get upset when people do not
want to offer help when those in
need are foreigners (7)

o

o

o

o

o

I want to help those in need, even
if they are from other countries
(8)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe we should solve
problems at home before helping
other countries (9)

o

o

o

o

o

We should celebrate cultural
differences (10)

o

o

o

o

o

Immigrants increase crime rates
(3)
I am willing to work abroad in
another culture (4)
I am open to living abroad in
another culture (5)
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3 People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. To which of
these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? Please rank your selections
in the order in which you believe you belong to from most (1) to least (5).
______ World (1)
______ Continent (2)
______ Country (3)
______ State (4)
______ Town (5)
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4 People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of
the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly,
monthly, less than monthly, or never.

Daily (1)

Weekly
(2)

Monthly
(3)

Less than
monthly
(4)

Never (5)

Talking with friends or
colleagues (6)

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

Online traditional news
websites (CNN, Fox,
MSNBC, etc) (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Online agenda-based news
sites (Occupy Democrats,
Infowars, Breitbart, etc) (8)

o

o

o

o

o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Daily newspaper (1)
Printed magazine (2)
Cable News (CNN, Fox,
MSNBC, etc) (3)
Local television news (4)
Radio news (5)

Email newsletters (9)
Social media (Facebook,
Twitter, etc) (10)
Other (please specify) (11)
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5 People often have differing views on the trustworthiness of news sources. They may see some
as very reliable and accurate, and others as biased and inaccurate. Please rank your level of
trust in each of these sources, with 1 being very trustworthy and 5 being not trustworthy at all.

1 - very
trustwort
hy (1)

2trustwort
hy (2)

3Neither
trustwort
hy nor
untrustw
orthy (3)

4untrustw
orthy (4)

5 - very
untrustw
orthy (5)

Unsure
(6)

Talking with friends or
colleagues (6)

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

Online traditional news
websites (CNN, Fox,
MSNBC, etc) (7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

Online agenda-based
news sites (Occupy
Democrats, Infowars,
Breitbart, etc) (8)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Daily newspaper (1)
Printed magazine (2)
Cable News (CNN, Fox,
MSNBC, etc) (3)
Local television news (4)
Radio news (5)

Email newsletters (9)
Social media (Facebook,
Twitter, etc) (10)
Other (please specify)
(11)
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6 Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in domestic political affairs, with 1
being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested.

o 1 - not interested at all (1)
o 2 - not very interested (2)
o 3 - neither interested nor disinterested (3)
o 4 - interested (4)
o 5 - very interested (5)
7 Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in international/global affairs, with
1 being not interested at all, and 5 being very interested.

o 1 - not interested at all (1)
o 2 - not very interested (2)
o 3 - neither interested nor disinterested (3)
o 4 - interested (4)
o 5 - very interested (5)
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8 In political matters, people talk of "liberal" and "conservative." How would you place your
views on this scale, generally speaking?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Extremely Liberal (1)
Liberal (2)
Slightly Liberal (3)
Middle of the Road (4)
Slightly Conservative (5)
Conservative (6)
Extremely Conservative (7)

9 On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being not democratic at all and 10 being completely
democratic, how democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?

o 1 (not democratic at all) (1)
o 2 (2)
o 3 (3)
o 4 (4)
o 5 (5)
o 6 (6)
o 7 (7)
o 8 (8)
o 9 (9)
o 10 (completely democratic) (10)
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10 Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc)

o Yes (23)
o No (24)
Display This Question:
If Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) = Yes

11 On social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and others, people often share news
stories, memes, and posts from others about political issues that are important to them. Thinking
about those news stories, memes, and posts from others that you have shared, please consider
how you relate to the following statements.
Very
often (1)

Often (2)

Sometime
s (3)

Rarely (4)

Never (5)

I will share a news story,
meme, or post from others
without checking the
accuracy of the information
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

I will share a news story,
meme, or post from others
without checking the
accuracy of the information
if I trust the original source
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

When I see a story I am
interested in, I will read
about it from a variety of
news sources (4)

o

o

o

o

o
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12 Here are some of the forms of political action that people can take. For each of these, please
indicate if you have done any of these, would do them, might do them, or never would do them.
Have
Done (1)
Signing a petition (1)
Calling an elected official (6)
Joining in boycotts (2)
Attending peaceful demonstrations (3)
Joining strikes (4)
Other form of political action (please
specify) (5)

o
o
o
o
o
o

Would Do
(2)

o
o
o
o
o
o

Might Do
(3)

o
o
o
o
o
o

Would
Never Do
(4)

o
o
o
o
o
o

13 Thinking of the forms of political action you can take, please consider how many times you
have performed these actions in the last year.
Very
often (1)
Signing a petition (1)
Joining in boycotts (2)
Attending peaceful
demonstrations (3)
Joining strikes (4)
Other form of political action
(please specify) (5)

o
o
o
o
o

Often (2)

o
o
o
o
o

Sometime
s (3)

o
o
o
o
o

Rarely (4)

o
o
o
o
o

Never (5)

o
o
o
o
o
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Display This Question:
If Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) = Yes

14 Here are some forms of political action that people can perform online. For each of these,
please indicate if you have done any of these, would do them, or never would do them.

Have Done (5)

Would Do (2)

Might Do (3)

Would
Never Do
(4)

Engaging in an online
political discussion (2)

o

o

o

o

Commenting on an
elected official's social
media post (4)

o

o

o

o

Following an elected
official on social media
(5)

o

o

o

o

Emailing an elected
official (13)

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Following traditional
media accounts (CNN,
Fox, MSNBC, etc) (9)

o

o

o

o

Following issue advocacy
groups (NRA, Sierra
Club, etc) (10)

o

o

o

o

Other form of online
political action (please
specify) (12)

o

o

o

o

Sharing a political news
story (6)
Sharing political memes
(7)

183

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?
Display This Question:
If Are you on any social media platforms? (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc) = Yes

15 Thinking about those political actions that you can perform online, please consider how many
times you have performed these actions in the last year.
Very often
(1)

Often (2)

Sometimes
(3)

Rarely (4)

Never (8)

Engaging in a
political
discussion on
social media
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

Commenting
on an elected
official's
social media
post(s) (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Emailing an
elected
official (9)

o

o

o

o

o

Sharing
political news
stories (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Sharing
political
memes (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Other form of
online
political
action (please
specify) (8)

o

o

o

o

o
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16 Thinking about a time that you have have been politically active, or more politically active
than usual, was there an event or an issue that made you take political action? Please briefly
describe what the event was, why it made you take action, and what kind of action you took.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

17 When national elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or never?

o Always (1)
o Usually (2)
o Sometimes (6)
o Never (3)
o I was not old enough to vote, but I plan to (4)
o I was not old enough, but still do not plan to (5)
18 When state and local elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or never?

o Always (1)
o Usually (2)
o Sometimes (6)
o Never (3)
o I was not old enough to vote, but I plan to (4)
o I was not old enough, but still do not plan to (5)
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19 Please rate your agreement with the following statements.
Strongly
agree (1)

Somewhat
agree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree (3)

Somewhat
disagree (4)

Strongly
disagree (5)

I believe my
elected
representatives
care about my
views (1)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe my
elected
representatives
will respond to
me if I contact
them (2)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe the
actions of
government
have a great
deal of impact
on my life (3)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe I
receive the
same treatment
under the law as
anyone else
would (6)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe
politicians
usually do what
is in the best
interests of the
country (7)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe my
country usually
does what is in
the best interest
of the world (8)

o

o

o

o

o
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20 Please consider the following scenarios and possible action that could be taken.
I have never been in
such a situation (3)

Yes (1)

No (2)

Have you ever tried
to break up a fight (1)

o

o

o

Have you ever used
your cell phone to
record an abuse (3)

o

o

o

Have you ever helped
at the scene of an
accident (4)

o

o

o

Have you ever called
the police to help
someone (5)

o

o

o

Have you ever
defended a stranger
who was being
bullied in person (6)

o

o

o

Have you ever
defended a stranger
who was being
bullied online (7)

o

o

o
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21 You may have heard stories of widespread human suffering in places like Syria, Rwanda,
Bosnia, Darfur, and other places. Sometimes countries are unwilling or unable to protect their
own citizens. Thinking of these scenarios, please rate your agreement with the following
statements: When there is widespread human suffering in another country, I believe the US
should...
Strongly
agree (1)

Somewhat
agree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
disagree (4)

Strongly
disagree (5)

Send money
or food aid
(6)

o

o

o

o

o

Use military
intervention
with the help
of the United
Nations (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Use military
intervention
with the help
of other
countries (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Use military
intervention
regardless of
international
support (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Use military
intervention
if the country
is important
to the US (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Focus on its
responsibility
towards other
Americans
(5)

o

o

o

o

o
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22 When you think about the people you know in person, approximately how many of your close
friends are from other countries?

o None (1)
o A small few (3)
o Some (4)
o About half (6)
o A majority (7)
23 Again thinking about the people you know in person, approximately how many of your
friends (not just close friends, but all friends) are from other countries?

o None (1)
o A small few (2)
o Some (3)
o About half (4)
o A majority (5)
24 Now thinking about your social media contacts, those you have never met or only met briefly
in person, approximately how many of them are from a different country?

o None (1)
o A small few (2)
o Some (3)
o About half (4)
o A majority (5)
o I do not use social media (6)
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25 What is your gender?

o Male (1)
o Female (2)
o Other (3)
o Prefer not to answer (4)
26 Which category below includes your age?

o 21 or under (1)
o 22-37 (2)
o 38-53 (3)
o 54-72 (4)
o 72 or older (5)
27 Are you a U.S. citizen?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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28 Which of the following best describes your ethnicity?

o White (1)
o Black or African American (2)
o American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
o Asian (4)
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
o Two or more races (6)
o Other (7)
29 What is your classification in college?

o Freshman/First Year (1)
o Sophomore (2)
o Junior (3)
o Senior (4)
o Graduate Student (5)
o Unclassified (6)
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30 Which of these fields best includes your major or anticipated major?

o Arts and Humanities (1)
o Biological Sciences (2)
o Business (3)
o Education (4)
o Engineering (5)
o Physical Sciences (6)
o Other Professions (7)
o Social Sciences (8)
o Undeclared/Unsure (10)
o Other (9)
31 In what region of the country have you spent most of your life?

o Northeast (1)
o Southeast (2)
o Midwest (3)
o Southwest (4)
o West Coast (including Hawaii & Alaska) (5)
o Pacific Northwest (6)
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32 How would you classify the community in which you spent most of your life?

o Urban (1)
o Rural (2)
o Semi-urban (3)
33 How would you classify the community in which you live now?

o Urban (1)
o Rural (2)
o Semi-urban (3)
34 Please indicate if you are a member of any of the following types of student clubs. (Select all
that apply)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Academic (1)
Civil/Political (2)
Diversity/Cultural (3)
Honor Societies (4)
Sports/Recreation (5)
Religion/Spiritual (6)
Other (please specify) (7) ________________________________________________
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35 Please indicate if you are a member of any of the following types of organizations outside of
school. (Select all that apply)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Democratic Party (1)
Republican Party (2)
Other Political Party (3)
Church/Religious Group (4)
Sports/Athletics (5)
Civic Engagement (6)
Other (please specify) (7) ________________________________________________
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